"The public record reflects that the extreme focus on terrorism in place at the end of the Clinton administration dropped dramatically under the Bush administration. With few exceptions, little attention was paid to terrorism, even as the number of warnings reached unprecedented levels."
Time Magazine issued a Special Report on the Secret History of 9/11 as a cover story. It was based on many sources in and out of Washington, including reports from 15 key journalists located around the world. It concluded that:
The major terrorist attack wasn't averted because of "a systemic collapse in the ability of Washington's national security apparatus to handle the terrorist threat".
THE WHITE HOUSE COVER-UP
Following any major attack on this country, a president would normally be anxious to work closely with an investigation to get at the heart of the problem and prevent any reoccurrence. The Bush White House did just the opposite. President Bush and Vice-President Cheney urged the Senate Majority Leader not to pursue an investigation and managed to block it for a year. However, the 9/11 families and individual members of Congress persisted until legislation was finally passed to create the 9/11 Commission. Pressured by the 9/11 families, and with midterm elections approaching, the President changed his stance and signed the legislation.
The Bush administration then proceeded to stonewall the 9/11 Commission for much of its existence. It screened all Commission requests for information and intimidated agency officials by having monitors present at their Commission interviews. After several months, the commissioners openly acknowledged lengthy delays, maddening restrictions and disputes over access to sensitive documents and witnesses.
The Commission finally had to settle for less than full access to sensitive White House documents and, to get those, it had to threaten use of its subpoena power. Only a few selected Commission members were allowed access to sensitive documents, such as the presidential daily intelligence briefings. The reviewers were limited as to what portions they could see and what portions could be shared with the full Commission. Objecting to these terms of access, one Commissioner resigned. Ultimately, the various delays required an extension of the Commission"s reporting deadline.
COMMISSION REPORT OMITS INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE
For the most part, members of the Commission were former politicians rather than experts. They were evenly divided politically five Democrats and five Republicans. A presidential appointee (Republican) was put in charge as one of the President's conditions for signing the legislation. The members were all distinguished people with fine reputations.
The Commission hired a Staff Director (Philip Zelikow) who had previously co-authored a book with National Security Advisor Rice. The two of them had also worked together on Bush's transition team. After she became Secretary of State, he joined her as Counselor. The Commission's choice of him as Staff Director presented a conflict of interest and was most unwise.
The President's one-year delay in approving this investigation moved the timing of the Commission's report to the presidential election year, not a good time for a politically-divided group with deeply-held party loyalty to assess White House preparedness for the attacks. As the Commission neared its reporting deadline, partisan warfare broke out among individual commissioners at public hearings. The subject was White House responsibility.
The Commission leadership wanted a consensus across party lines and a unified report that would gain public acceptance. To achieve this, the Commission decided not to assess presidential responsibility and, instead, report facts and leave readers to draw their own conclusions. There were several problems with this agreement:
The Commission didn't report all the facts.
The Commission decision was kept secret from the public and Congress.
The Commission decision departed from its statutory mandate to assess U.S. preparedness.
The Commission's mistakenly told the public and Congress that "The most important failure was one of imagination."
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