Of course Alan Greenspan already knows that. And everything starts making more sense if you see Greenspan's comments as those coming from the chairman of a banking cartel, shielded by its illusory role as a "public servant" (please read this article)
But that's not all. Then came the "tight money," the coordinated (and predictable) freeze in credit. And then the collapse.
Once banks started going bust as a result of the housing and credit market defaults, and as the whole fractional reserve banking pyramid started crumbling piece by piece, the Fed then acted with immediacy to authorize yet more currency creation (TARP, creative lending, etc.)--not to help families save their homes; not to keep our industrial sector up and running; not to help small business enterprise survive--but to save the corrupt institutions that sponsored the bust. AIG. Goldman Sachs. Citigroup. JP Morgan Chase. Bank of America. Fannie and Freddie. Trillions of new tax-payer sponsored money, printed up and lent to banks for next to nothing!
These same institutions also coordinated to absorb the assets of those unfavored institutions that (it was decided) must go out of business. Over 60 banks have now failed within the last year. This number will continue to grow. And yesterday, today, tomorrow...the public (shareholders and taxpayers) will continue to take all the losses, as the "too big to fail" zombie banks absorb markets, deposits, and low-risk assets.
Who's side are these guys on?
New Regulatory proposals
And so now we finally come to President Obama's new regulatory proposals (full text of document can be found here), which is the the reason I started writing in the first place.
To introduce this thing, I'm merely going to quote from an article I found on page 1 of section B of Thursday's New York Times, which is one of a handful of articles that I read about the proposal. The choice of this particular article (over the others) is irrelevant, I found, as the same style of state-sponsored presentation and analysis can be observed in each one. The Times article indicates:
Both of Summers' assertions are highly misleading, a creative use of reasoning that borders on outright fabrication.
Because the Fed didn't then have direct "jurisdiction" over some of the delinquent firms, this certainly doesn't mean that Fed policy didn't have an intimate (and controlling) role in promoting these firms' behavior.
Take the American International Group (AIG) as a prime example. AIG's Financial Products Division single-handedly created trillions of dollars in risky securities trading. And after the bottom fell through, AIG became a main conduit of TARP money, through which billions of taxpayer dollars poured into delinquent banks around the world. Now one could imagine that AIG had no idea that the Treasury and Fed would provide the company with billions in free taxpayer 'insurance' for their role in the collapse. That is, unless one takes into account that AIG's largest shareholder, Maurice Greenberg, is himself a former chairman of the New York Fed, and now sits on the Federal Reserve's advisory board (read this); and that, additionally, he is both an honorary director of the Council on Foreign Relations, and a member of the Trilateral Commission, both Rockefeller-created institutions that direct national and international policy. Knowing this, the role of companies like AIG start making a lot more sense.
Take this into account as you continue to read:
But that's not all. Then came the "tight money," the coordinated (and predictable) freeze in credit. And then the collapse.
Once banks started going bust as a result of the housing and credit market defaults, and as the whole fractional reserve banking pyramid started crumbling piece by piece, the Fed then acted with immediacy to authorize yet more currency creation (TARP, creative lending, etc.)--not to help families save their homes; not to keep our industrial sector up and running; not to help small business enterprise survive--but to save the corrupt institutions that sponsored the bust. AIG. Goldman Sachs. Citigroup. JP Morgan Chase. Bank of America. Fannie and Freddie. Trillions of new tax-payer sponsored money, printed up and lent to banks for next to nothing!
These same institutions also coordinated to absorb the assets of those unfavored institutions that (it was decided) must go out of business. Over 60 banks have now failed within the last year. This number will continue to grow. And yesterday, today, tomorrow...the public (shareholders and taxpayers) will continue to take all the losses, as the "too big to fail" zombie banks absorb markets, deposits, and low-risk assets.
New Regulatory proposals
And so now we finally come to President Obama's new regulatory proposals (full text of document can be found here), which is the the reason I started writing in the first place.
To introduce this thing, I'm merely going to quote from an article I found on page 1 of section B of Thursday's New York Times, which is one of a handful of articles that I read about the proposal. The choice of this particular article (over the others) is irrelevant, I found, as the same style of state-sponsored presentation and analysis can be observed in each one. The Times article indicates:
"The architects of the plan, Timothy F. Geithner, Treasury Secretary, and Lawrence Summers, director of the National Economic Council, said it was essential to give the Fed more authority to avert or at least minimize future market crisis.
"'While I don't think there is any regulator that doesn't look back with a great deal of regret' Mr. Summers said at a news briefing, 'it's important to recognize that many of these problems didn't happen in areas that the Fed touched and, in fact, they often involved companies that managed to escape the Fed's jurisdiction.'"
Both of Summers' assertions are highly misleading, a creative use of reasoning that borders on outright fabrication.
Because the Fed didn't then have direct "jurisdiction" over some of the delinquent firms, this certainly doesn't mean that Fed policy didn't have an intimate (and controlling) role in promoting these firms' behavior.
Take the American International Group (AIG) as a prime example. AIG's Financial Products Division single-handedly created trillions of dollars in risky securities trading. And after the bottom fell through, AIG became a main conduit of TARP money, through which billions of taxpayer dollars poured into delinquent banks around the world. Now one could imagine that AIG had no idea that the Treasury and Fed would provide the company with billions in free taxpayer 'insurance' for their role in the collapse. That is, unless one takes into account that AIG's largest shareholder, Maurice Greenberg, is himself a former chairman of the New York Fed, and now sits on the Federal Reserve's advisory board (read this); and that, additionally, he is both an honorary director of the Council on Foreign Relations, and a member of the Trilateral Commission, both Rockefeller-created institutions that direct national and international policy. Knowing this, the role of companies like AIG start making a lot more sense.
Take this into account as you continue to read:
"The Fed, for example, did not supervise any of the major financial company failures like Bear Stearns, the American International Group (AIG), Lehman Brothers and Countrywide Financial. But it has supervised the holding companies at some of the largest banks, including Citigroup, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo.
"[Summers] said the other alternatives that some have proposed, a committee of regulators to police the system, simply would not work.
"'Experience in financial regulation, in government and in life in general suggests that collective responsibility means no responsibility, or at least no accountability,' Mr. Summers said.
"Mr. Geithner said the administration had studied a range of alternatives and had found that those countries that split functions of systemic regulator and central banker often suffered deeper financial problems during periods of crisis.
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