Nothing so brazen has occurred in Scotland in 2007. Yet 'even' (?) Scottish
Stop the War (as also in England) finds it impossible to take on board the
real implications of an equally brazen impossible phenomenon such as 911
(e.g. three buildings falling evenly through themselves at a speed either
slightly faster than the speed of bodies falling from an equivalent height
through mere air, or only slightly slower; and when steel framed buildings
never fall due to fire but will burn red hot until burn out.)
Even those who skillfully parried Labour attacks on SNP spending promises by
saying that 'after Iraq none of us can believe a word New Labour tells us',
seem implicitly to concede that such US-style electoral corruption couldn't
happen here. But how can we be sure?
Although there are only a handful of 'attack vectors' in traditional
elections (e.g. pre-stuffing ballot boxes if no one is there to check they
are empty when sealed), the number of ways of stealing e-counting and
e-voting are literally unknown. Basically none of us know for certain that
there was or wasn't dirty business going on at the electronic cross roads.
Nor can we be completely sure about all the companies running the
pre-election polls - recall the recent spate of TV phone-in scandals.
In the US concern has been expressed about the independence of polling
companies, some of which may have been used to put out misleading opinion
polls, thus rendering people less suspicious when 'late swings' see
incumbents get back in, or almost get returned (2006, with Lieberman
effectively a Republican, a tied Senate would have Cheney with the casting
vote).
In Ohio in 2004 we now know that when the computers appeared to freeze, the
results continued to be fed to Karl Rove by an electronic back door!
http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/04/23/705/
Probably there was nothing fishy going on when seven Scottish counts
experienced similar holdups, resulting in the public being sent home for the
'technicians' and 'computer experts' being left to 'fix the glitches'
overnight. But is 'probably' now good enough? Can we really be as sure as we
used to be able to be sure when we all hung around and watched the paper
ballots being hand-counted in public?
Far from being a 'modern advanced' way of doing elections, E-counting was
not just expensive (at around £9 million, of which more than £4m was spent
onthe machinery). Caetnralised E-counting often went slower than
decentralised citizen-involving counts could have been conducted, even of
multi-stage STV counts. And by its inherently non-transparent nature will do
nothing to restore trust in the political process.
As a candidate I was assured that the software to be used had been
'independently verified'. Eventually I was told that software experts at
Radboud University had verified it. When I checked them out I discovered
that they 'had been invited to tender' for the contract of testing the
software for applying the rules in an STV count.
All fine and dandy, I dare say, but this gives no guarantee that additional
software may not have controlled the registering of votes as the ballot
papers passed through the DRS counting machines, software which, as in the
US, may only be triggered when the real count starts (and may even be able
to rub itself out subsequently).
I was also assured that the ballot images taken and stored in computers
contained no voter ID. All very well, so long as those giving me these
assurances are a) honest (which I do not doubt) and b) at an extremely high
level of professional competence so that they would be able to detect
nano-technological ID barcodes within the Area barcode or the Contest
barcodes, should such stealth technology for citizen profiling have been
invented. (The police declined to take some sample papers for analysis.)
On researching the E-count company I not only discover that Lord Kinnock
(who as EU Commissioner once fired a whistleblower) has been taken on as a
non-executive director on £19,000 a year, but I also learn that DRS has
taken over a private San Diego based firm called Peladon Software, which had
recently bought in some imaging software from Diebold, the company most
closely associated with pro-Republican skullduggery in the public mind.
http://www.opednews.com/maxwrite/link.html?id=26586
http://www.talkdemocracy.org.uk/talk/viewtopic.php?t=118
I will readily concede that I may be being 'paranoid' so long as readers who
find themselves scorning my 'conspiracy theories' admit that they too could
not be sure that they would be able to tell whether the various software
companies and researchers involved are all sufficiently independent, honest
and expert to be able to offer cast-iron guarantees in this crucial aspect
of hard-fought social life, the control of elections, which has been likened
to conferring a license to print political money.
The paradox of voting in the traditional way is that through resolute mutual
suspicion, we have evolved a system in which all can have confidence. By
contrast, with electronic election machinery we are being asked to have
trust where none can exist.
http://www.notablesoftware.com/RMstatement.html
http://www.electronic-vote.org/
http://www.ejfi.org/Voting/Voting-4.htm
('Oh, but the paper ballots are securely stored, so they would never dare to
try it on' it is said. Which in the minds of those conducting many of the
counts, who have sole discretion on ordering a recount and may often have
been impressed by DRS presentations and rehearsals, translates as 'we don't
ever need to check' ... ?)
Far from technology taking us forward, its introduction has been a huge
set-back for Scottish democracy, whether or not anything dodgy has been
tried on on this occasion. Readers who would like to join me in a Campaign
for Hand-counted Paper Ballots are invited to get in touch on 01738 783677,
or at 2b Darnhall Cres, Perth, PH2 0HH (not by e-mail).
Although there are no shortage of bright young suits swarming around the New
Labour regime seeking to be given juicy contracts to run various e-pilots,
the verdict of the computer professionals is that this technology is
inherently non-transparent.
http://lib.store.yahoo.net/lib/realityzone/UFNnewbook04election.mht
This is the ironic verdict of one self-employed computer expert at the
height of his profession:
The programs that the voting vendors actually distribute - as opposed to
the software they may say they distribute - will continue to determine who
takes power after the votes are tallied.
Stop the War (as also in England) finds it impossible to take on board the
real implications of an equally brazen impossible phenomenon such as 911
(e.g. three buildings falling evenly through themselves at a speed either
slightly faster than the speed of bodies falling from an equivalent height
through mere air, or only slightly slower; and when steel framed buildings
never fall due to fire but will burn red hot until burn out.)
Even those who skillfully parried Labour attacks on SNP spending promises by
saying that 'after Iraq none of us can believe a word New Labour tells us',
seem implicitly to concede that such US-style electoral corruption couldn't
happen here. But how can we be sure?
Although there are only a handful of 'attack vectors' in traditional
elections (e.g. pre-stuffing ballot boxes if no one is there to check they
are empty when sealed), the number of ways of stealing e-counting and
e-voting are literally unknown. Basically none of us know for certain that
there was or wasn't dirty business going on at the electronic cross roads.
Nor can we be completely sure about all the companies running the
pre-election polls - recall the recent spate of TV phone-in scandals.
In the US concern has been expressed about the independence of polling
companies, some of which may have been used to put out misleading opinion
polls, thus rendering people less suspicious when 'late swings' see
incumbents get back in, or almost get returned (2006, with Lieberman
effectively a Republican, a tied Senate would have Cheney with the casting
vote).
results continued to be fed to Karl Rove by an electronic back door!
http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/04/23/705/
Probably there was nothing fishy going on when seven Scottish counts
experienced similar holdups, resulting in the public being sent home for the
'technicians' and 'computer experts' being left to 'fix the glitches'
overnight. But is 'probably' now good enough? Can we really be as sure as we
used to be able to be sure when we all hung around and watched the paper
ballots being hand-counted in public?
Far from being a 'modern advanced' way of doing elections, E-counting was
not just expensive (at around £9 million, of which more than £4m was spent
onthe machinery). Caetnralised E-counting often went slower than
decentralised citizen-involving counts could have been conducted, even of
multi-stage STV counts. And by its inherently non-transparent nature will do
nothing to restore trust in the political process.
As a candidate I was assured that the software to be used had been
'independently verified'. Eventually I was told that software experts at
Radboud University had verified it. When I checked them out I discovered
that they 'had been invited to tender' for the contract of testing the
software for applying the rules in an STV count.
All fine and dandy, I dare say, but this gives no guarantee that additional
software may not have controlled the registering of votes as the ballot
papers passed through the DRS counting machines, software which, as in the
US, may only be triggered when the real count starts (and may even be able
to rub itself out subsequently).
I was also assured that the ballot images taken and stored in computers
contained no voter ID. All very well, so long as those giving me these
assurances are a) honest (which I do not doubt) and b) at an extremely high
level of professional competence so that they would be able to detect
nano-technological ID barcodes within the Area barcode or the Contest
barcodes, should such stealth technology for citizen profiling have been
invented. (The police declined to take some sample papers for analysis.)
On researching the E-count company I not only discover that Lord Kinnock
(who as EU Commissioner once fired a whistleblower) has been taken on as a
non-executive director on £19,000 a year, but I also learn that DRS has
taken over a private San Diego based firm called Peladon Software, which had
recently bought in some imaging software from Diebold, the company most
closely associated with pro-Republican skullduggery in the public mind.
http://www.opednews.com/maxwrite/link.html?id=26586
http://www.talkdemocracy.org.uk/talk/viewtopic.php?t=118
I will readily concede that I may be being 'paranoid' so long as readers who
find themselves scorning my 'conspiracy theories' admit that they too could
not be sure that they would be able to tell whether the various software
companies and researchers involved are all sufficiently independent, honest
and expert to be able to offer cast-iron guarantees in this crucial aspect
of hard-fought social life, the control of elections, which has been likened
to conferring a license to print political money.
The paradox of voting in the traditional way is that through resolute mutual
suspicion, we have evolved a system in which all can have confidence. By
contrast, with electronic election machinery we are being asked to have
trust where none can exist.
http://www.notablesoftware.com/RMstatement.html
http://www.electronic-vote.org/
http://www.ejfi.org/Voting/Voting-4.htm
('Oh, but the paper ballots are securely stored, so they would never dare to
try it on' it is said. Which in the minds of those conducting many of the
counts, who have sole discretion on ordering a recount and may often have
been impressed by DRS presentations and rehearsals, translates as 'we don't
ever need to check' ... ?)
Far from technology taking us forward, its introduction has been a huge
set-back for Scottish democracy, whether or not anything dodgy has been
tried on on this occasion. Readers who would like to join me in a Campaign
for Hand-counted Paper Ballots are invited to get in touch on 01738 783677,
or at 2b Darnhall Cres, Perth, PH2 0HH (not by e-mail).
Although there are no shortage of bright young suits swarming around the New
Labour regime seeking to be given juicy contracts to run various e-pilots,
the verdict of the computer professionals is that this technology is
inherently non-transparent.
http://lib.store.yahoo.net/lib/realityzone/UFNnewbook04election.mht
This is the ironic verdict of one self-employed computer expert at the
height of his profession:
The programs that the voting vendors actually distribute - as opposed to
the software they may say they distribute - will continue to determine who
takes power after the votes are tallied.
(Note: You can view every article as one long page if you sign up as an Advocate Member, or higher).
