Lisa Pease
Former computer programmer and statistics tutor
Lifelong activist and author
Additional Resources:
The full CURRENT text of HR 811:http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h811rh.txt.pdf
Summary information about HR 811:http://holt.house.gov/HR_811.shtml
The status of the bill and cosponsors can be found here (make sure the last character in this link is a colon or it will not work – some readers will strip that out and you’ll have to type the colon into the browser manually):http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:H.R.811:
This document, while out of date in terms of the current legislation, summarizes the dangers posed by unverified electronic voting: Electronic Voting: America’s Vote At Risk http://www.realhistoryarchives.com/voterisk.pdf
Quotes from HR 811
Regarding voting on paper, even when using DREs (touch screen machines):
"The voting system shall require the use of or produce an individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballot of the voter's vote that shall be created by or made available for inspection and verification by the voter before the voter's vote is cast and counted.
"For purposes of this subclause, examples of such a ballot include a paper ballot marked by the voter for the purpose of being counted by hand or read by an optical scanner or other similar device, a paper ballot prepared by the voter to be mailed to an election official (whether from a domestic or overseas location), a paper ballot created through the use of a ballot marking device or system, or a paper ballot produced by a touch screen or other electronic voting machine, so long as in each case the voter is permitted to verify the ballot in a paper form in accordance with this subparagraph.”
Regarding the primacy of the paper record over the electronic one:
“In the event of any inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies determined by counting by hand the individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots produced pursuant to [the section quoted above], the individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots shall be the true and correct record of the votes cast.”
Regarding mandatory, hand counted audits in 3-10% of the voting districts, chosen on a surprise basis:
"...each State shall administer, without advance notice to the precincts selected, audits of the results of elections for Federal office held in the State (and, at the option of the State or jurisdiction involved, of elections for State and local office held at the same time as such election) consisting of random hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots...."
"In the event that the unofficial count as described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the election is less than 1 percent of the total votes cast in that election, the hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots shall occur in at least 10 percent of all precincts or equivalent locations (or alternative audit units used in accordance with the method provided for under sub section (b)) in the Congressional district involved (in the case of an election for the House of Representatives) or the State (in the case of any other election
for Federal office)."
The language repeats twice more with different numbers. If the difference between candidates or ballot issues is between 1-2%, then 5% of the districts will be audited.
If the difference between the two candidates or ballot issues is more than 2%, then the audit will be conducted in 3% of the district
Former computer programmer and statistics tutor
Lifelong activist and author
Additional Resources:
The full CURRENT text of HR 811:http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h811rh.txt.pdf
Summary information about HR 811:http://holt.house.gov/HR_811.shtml
This document, while out of date in terms of the current legislation, summarizes the dangers posed by unverified electronic voting: Electronic Voting: America’s Vote At Risk http://www.realhistoryarchives.com/voterisk.pdf
Quotes from HR 811
Regarding voting on paper, even when using DREs (touch screen machines):
"The voting system shall require the use of or produce an individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballot of the voter's vote that shall be created by or made available for inspection and verification by the voter before the voter's vote is cast and counted.
"For purposes of this subclause, examples of such a ballot include a paper ballot marked by the voter for the purpose of being counted by hand or read by an optical scanner or other similar device, a paper ballot prepared by the voter to be mailed to an election official (whether from a domestic or overseas location), a paper ballot created through the use of a ballot marking device or system, or a paper ballot produced by a touch screen or other electronic voting machine, so long as in each case the voter is permitted to verify the ballot in a paper form in accordance with this subparagraph.”
Regarding the primacy of the paper record over the electronic one:
“In the event of any inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies determined by counting by hand the individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots produced pursuant to [the section quoted above], the individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots shall be the true and correct record of the votes cast.”
Regarding mandatory, hand counted audits in 3-10% of the voting districts, chosen on a surprise basis:
"...each State shall administer, without advance notice to the precincts selected, audits of the results of elections for Federal office held in the State (and, at the option of the State or jurisdiction involved, of elections for State and local office held at the same time as such election) consisting of random hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots...."
"In the event that the unofficial count as described in section 323(a)(1) reveals that the margin of victory between the two candidates receiving the largest number of votes in the election is less than 1 percent of the total votes cast in that election, the hand counts of the voter-verified paper ballots shall occur in at least 10 percent of all precincts or equivalent locations (or alternative audit units used in accordance with the method provided for under sub section (b)) in the Congressional district involved (in the case of an election for the House of Representatives) or the State (in the case of any other election
for Federal office)."
The language repeats twice more with different numbers. If the difference between candidates or ballot issues is between 1-2%, then 5% of the districts will be audited.
If the difference between the two candidates or ballot issues is more than 2%, then the audit will be conducted in 3% of the district
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