While its economic theory, if it could be said to have one, favors things like markets, private property, and wealth accumulation, its political and theological outlook dominates its thinking. Patronage and charity, for Muslims with correct thinking only, are key economic ingredients to a moral vision bounded by fierce religious chauvinism that views outsiders as potentially deadly enemies that have to be dealt with violently. It calls for a semi-feudal throwback to what it imagines was a "golden age" under the direct teachings of the prophet Mohammed.
By no means can this ideology be said to be the mainline Islamic point of view, despite efforts by right-wing ideologues and religious spokespersons to paint it as such. In fact, just decades ago Salafists "were pretty much dismissed as in the pocket of the US and Britain," Ibish contended.
According to Ibish, it is closer in mode of thought to some of the right-wing Christian groups in America who fantasize about a golden age when Christianity dominated American life and envision making the country a theocracy.
Indeed, the Salafist-Jihadist anti-state ideology is at odds with most governments in the Middle East, including those deemed to be enemies of the US. Its violently sectarian nature has also put it into conflict with most people in the Middle East, even those people who are supposed to hate the US instinctively and naturally. For this reason, the overwhelming majority of the victims of this movement - from Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in the land of the two rivers (mistakenly called Al Qaeda in Iraq), Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia) to groups with nationalist tendencies such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hezbollah, and Hamas - have been Arab and Muslim people.
The turning point for the prestige of the Salafist-Jihadist movement came early on as a result of US foreign policy during the Cold War. Then, with the US response to 9/11, it received a new boost.
US support for anti-secular movements throughout the Middle East, from Palestine to Afghanistan, as a tool against the the Soviet Union and its regional allies, was a key factor in strengthening the Salafist-Jihadist movement. A serious problem with Bush administration foreign policy, Ibish argued, is that it continues to reject the idea of working with secular movements, even to the point of regarding them as enemies.
Additionally, Bush's Middle East policy has simply played into the hands of this movement and its goals. Martial rhetoric adopted by the Bush administration in response to 9/11, the so-called war on terror, strengthened the Salafist-Jhadist movement by allowing themselves to be portrayed as victims of military aggression against Muslims, Ibish noted.
A better approach
Success in stopping Al Qaeda, discrediting it and its ideology, and neutralizing the Salafist-Jihadist movement requires a whole new approach, according to Ibish. First, discard the "over-broad definition of the war on terrorism that includes issues, concerns, and targets that have nothing to with the groups and ideology behind 9/11." This element, which is propelled by the imperial agenda of some in the Bush administration, Ibish called "extraneous rubbish that is the real problem."
The failure to "keep it focused" on Al Qaeda has discredited the administration's efforts because they have become framed as and appear to be in fact comprising a war on all of Islam.
Ibish also called on the administration and other policymakers to listen and take seriously the opinions and analysis of its own intelligence experts and of Arab and Muslim scholars and experts on its cultures, religions, histories, and politics. Above all, take the views and opinions of the Arab and Muslim peoples seriously, and not reject them out of hand as manufactured propaganda. "Treat it as reasonable and legitimate," Ibish suggested.
Working to unify the people and movements in the Arab and Muslim worlds who want to stop Al Qaeda and its ideology will have a far more positive effect than treating them all as the same potential enemies.
Reject the fallacy that better security requires a "derogation of freedom." In Ibish's view, there is no evidence that freedom causes insecurity or that security requires a strengthened state that withdraws civil liberties or rights. Policies such as warrantless wiretapping and national security letters have to go.
Finally, other political institutions and civil society groupings - Congress, the courts, the media, democratic organizations and movements, and the people themselves - have to step up their role as overseers of the administration's policies, Ibish concluded. On domestic security policies, they have to ask, how does this make us safer, and how does it safeguard our rights and freedoms? Does it contradict our basic values?
--Joel Wendland can be reached at jwendland@polticalaffairs.net
By no means can this ideology be said to be the mainline Islamic point of view, despite efforts by right-wing ideologues and religious spokespersons to paint it as such. In fact, just decades ago Salafists "were pretty much dismissed as in the pocket of the US and Britain," Ibish contended.
According to Ibish, it is closer in mode of thought to some of the right-wing Christian groups in America who fantasize about a golden age when Christianity dominated American life and envision making the country a theocracy.
Indeed, the Salafist-Jihadist anti-state ideology is at odds with most governments in the Middle East, including those deemed to be enemies of the US. Its violently sectarian nature has also put it into conflict with most people in the Middle East, even those people who are supposed to hate the US instinctively and naturally. For this reason, the overwhelming majority of the victims of this movement - from Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in the land of the two rivers (mistakenly called Al Qaeda in Iraq), Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia) to groups with nationalist tendencies such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hezbollah, and Hamas - have been Arab and Muslim people.
US support for anti-secular movements throughout the Middle East, from Palestine to Afghanistan, as a tool against the the Soviet Union and its regional allies, was a key factor in strengthening the Salafist-Jihadist movement. A serious problem with Bush administration foreign policy, Ibish argued, is that it continues to reject the idea of working with secular movements, even to the point of regarding them as enemies.
Additionally, Bush's Middle East policy has simply played into the hands of this movement and its goals. Martial rhetoric adopted by the Bush administration in response to 9/11, the so-called war on terror, strengthened the Salafist-Jhadist movement by allowing themselves to be portrayed as victims of military aggression against Muslims, Ibish noted.
A better approach
Success in stopping Al Qaeda, discrediting it and its ideology, and neutralizing the Salafist-Jihadist movement requires a whole new approach, according to Ibish. First, discard the "over-broad definition of the war on terrorism that includes issues, concerns, and targets that have nothing to with the groups and ideology behind 9/11." This element, which is propelled by the imperial agenda of some in the Bush administration, Ibish called "extraneous rubbish that is the real problem."
The failure to "keep it focused" on Al Qaeda has discredited the administration's efforts because they have become framed as and appear to be in fact comprising a war on all of Islam.
Ibish also called on the administration and other policymakers to listen and take seriously the opinions and analysis of its own intelligence experts and of Arab and Muslim scholars and experts on its cultures, religions, histories, and politics. Above all, take the views and opinions of the Arab and Muslim peoples seriously, and not reject them out of hand as manufactured propaganda. "Treat it as reasonable and legitimate," Ibish suggested.
Working to unify the people and movements in the Arab and Muslim worlds who want to stop Al Qaeda and its ideology will have a far more positive effect than treating them all as the same potential enemies.
Reject the fallacy that better security requires a "derogation of freedom." In Ibish's view, there is no evidence that freedom causes insecurity or that security requires a strengthened state that withdraws civil liberties or rights. Policies such as warrantless wiretapping and national security letters have to go.
Finally, other political institutions and civil society groupings - Congress, the courts, the media, democratic organizations and movements, and the people themselves - have to step up their role as overseers of the administration's policies, Ibish concluded. On domestic security policies, they have to ask, how does this make us safer, and how does it safeguard our rights and freedoms? Does it contradict our basic values?
--Joel Wendland can be reached at jwendland@polticalaffairs.net
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