ballot is suitable for a meaningful audit. Please note that the
optical scan machine is subject to all the same kinds of risks and
attacks as a DRE. Therefore optical scan machines MUST be audited at
every election.
Conclusion. We need voting systems that are as open and obvious as
possible while preserving the secret ballot. We've been doing this
for centuries with paper ballots, and simple changes can improve the
accuracy, speed, and security of paper ballot systems even beyond
current levels. Paper ballots, hand counted, are the "gold standard"
around the world, and guidelines are published that make for reliable
results even in those parts of the world where corruption is the norm.
Paper ballot systems, especially ones that are hand counted, provide
not only the fewest opportunities for tampering but are the most
accurate as well. They are also the most open to public scrutiny, and
they are the only systems that can be thoroughly audited.
We can do even better -- with open counting and auditing of paper ballots.
[This paper is Copyright 2006 Robert J. Fleischer. Permission is
given to all to copy, excerpt, or reference it for any non-commercial
purpose as long as authorship is credited and the original paper cited
(use the above URL).]
rjf@tiac.net
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