Ceballos told her that he did not believe rewriting the memo was appropriate and that the proper course was to turn over the memo with portions redacted. Although initially she was not receptive to idea, he said, she later agreed and Ceballos gave the redacted memo to the defense.
Before the hearing, according to court filings, the supervisor called Ceballos into her office and made a veiled threat of reprisal if he insisted on testifying candidly at the hearing.
The same supervisor represented the prosecution at the hearing, and objected to the defense calling Ceballos as a witness. The court permitted him to testify, but it sustained most of the prosecution's objections to his testimony, which allowed Ceballos to testify only about the statements the deputy had made to him.
According to Ceballos in documents filed, the trial judge later remarked to him that his supervisor's conduct toward him on the stand was "very chastising, rude, and hostile."
Over the next 6 months, the lawsuit alleges, the DA's Office took a series of retaliatory actions against Ceballos because of his oral and written statements to his supervisors and his testimony at the hearing.
He says he was demoted from calendar deputy to trial deputy and that one of his murder cases was reassigned to a junior colleague with no murder trial experience, and that he was assigned no new murder cases, undercutting his chances for promotion.
According to court documents, Ceballos was also transferred to a courthouse in El Monte, significantly lengthening his commute to and from work, in a form of punishment that Ceballos describes as "freeway therapy."
He filed a grievance challenging these actions and while it was pending, he spoke at the Mexican-American Bar Association about the Sheriff Department's misconduct, the lack of a policy in the DA's Office for dealing with police misconduct, and the retaliatory measures taken against him.
Two days after he spoke before the Bar Association, the DA's Office denied his grievance, in part, he alleges, because he spoke to Association. Ceballos then filed an action under 42 USC �1983 challenging the retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights.
On January 30, 2002, the district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, and concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the �1983 claim because Ceballos' speech was not protected by the First Amendment.
The court acknowledged that Ceballos' "speech clearly involved a matter of public concern."
"For reasons that need not be recited," the court noted, "the code word 'Rampart' says it all""there can be no doubt that, in Southern California, police misconduct is a matter of great political and social concern to the community."
Yet "[d]espite the intrinsic and important public interest in excluding perjured evidence from court proceedings," the court said, the speech did not touch on a matter of public concern for First Amendment purposes because Ceballos wrote his memo "as part of his job," and in fulfillment of his duties "not to introduce or rely on evidence known to be false."
Caballos appealed the district court's decision and the court of appeals reversed the ruling, finding that "the law was clearly established that Ceballos's speech addressed a matter of public concern and that his interest in the speech outweighed the public employer's interest in avoiding inefficiency and disruption."
In the court's view, critical under the analysis was whether the "point of the speech in question" was "to bring wrongdoing to light" or "to raise other issues of public concern."
The court held that allegations that a policeman may have lied in an affidavit to obtain a warrant to constitute "whistleblowing" and noted that "when government employees speak about corruption, wrongdoing, misconduct, wastefulness, or inefficiency by other government employees, including law enforcement officers, their speech is inherently a matter of public concern."
Before the hearing, according to court filings, the supervisor called Ceballos into her office and made a veiled threat of reprisal if he insisted on testifying candidly at the hearing.
The same supervisor represented the prosecution at the hearing, and objected to the defense calling Ceballos as a witness. The court permitted him to testify, but it sustained most of the prosecution's objections to his testimony, which allowed Ceballos to testify only about the statements the deputy had made to him.
According to Ceballos in documents filed, the trial judge later remarked to him that his supervisor's conduct toward him on the stand was "very chastising, rude, and hostile."
He says he was demoted from calendar deputy to trial deputy and that one of his murder cases was reassigned to a junior colleague with no murder trial experience, and that he was assigned no new murder cases, undercutting his chances for promotion.
According to court documents, Ceballos was also transferred to a courthouse in El Monte, significantly lengthening his commute to and from work, in a form of punishment that Ceballos describes as "freeway therapy."
He filed a grievance challenging these actions and while it was pending, he spoke at the Mexican-American Bar Association about the Sheriff Department's misconduct, the lack of a policy in the DA's Office for dealing with police misconduct, and the retaliatory measures taken against him.
Two days after he spoke before the Bar Association, the DA's Office denied his grievance, in part, he alleges, because he spoke to Association. Ceballos then filed an action under 42 USC �1983 challenging the retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights.
On January 30, 2002, the district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, and concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the �1983 claim because Ceballos' speech was not protected by the First Amendment.
The court acknowledged that Ceballos' "speech clearly involved a matter of public concern."
"For reasons that need not be recited," the court noted, "the code word 'Rampart' says it all""there can be no doubt that, in Southern California, police misconduct is a matter of great political and social concern to the community."
Yet "[d]espite the intrinsic and important public interest in excluding perjured evidence from court proceedings," the court said, the speech did not touch on a matter of public concern for First Amendment purposes because Ceballos wrote his memo "as part of his job," and in fulfillment of his duties "not to introduce or rely on evidence known to be false."
Caballos appealed the district court's decision and the court of appeals reversed the ruling, finding that "the law was clearly established that Ceballos's speech addressed a matter of public concern and that his interest in the speech outweighed the public employer's interest in avoiding inefficiency and disruption."
In the court's view, critical under the analysis was whether the "point of the speech in question" was "to bring wrongdoing to light" or "to raise other issues of public concern."
The court held that allegations that a policeman may have lied in an affidavit to obtain a warrant to constitute "whistleblowing" and noted that "when government employees speak about corruption, wrongdoing, misconduct, wastefulness, or inefficiency by other government employees, including law enforcement officers, their speech is inherently a matter of public concern."
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