Detailed structural calculations were performed before and after the sinking of the Titan (Figure 5). This design by analysis window was not tested for Titan cyclic fatigue failure, where calculated cyclic failure was possible at 5800 psi for an OceanGate window, which required 'a safer more reliable' solution. That is, a report to OceanGate stated that 'The specified [Titan] design at 5800 psi indicates significant strain that is consistent with potential short cycle failure modes.' and 'The results indicated it was possible the [Titan] window would fail in cyclic failure.' Of paramount importance, OceanGate was warned that their original window design could fail in low cycle fatigue,. Also, of note, the final window differed from the initially installed design, where neither design was adequately tested per the MBI.
Also, the possibility of the window imploding like a cork was noted, where the window experiences 'about 3 million pounds of force', where 2 million pounds push inward (click here, click here). Additionally, storage in freezing weather and being 'left on the dock' may have contributed to viewport, adhesive, and hull damage, where such storage was performed shortly before the last dive to the Titanic. Potential failure locations were noted in the investigation (Figure 6), where a subsequent hull explosion was not mentioned.
Experts who testified during the Titan Marine Board of Investigation did not consider the possibility of a hull explosion at all (Figure 7). In fact, I have not found any publications that discuss the possibility of hull explosions due to shock waves for any submersible or submarine designs. The Titan explosion is a first-of-a-kind explosion ("List of submarine and submersible incidents since 2000", click here).
Figure 6. Types of implosions for metal hulls.
(Image by American Bureau of Shipping, 'Pressure Hull Requirements for Passenger Submersible') Details DMCA
Figure 7. Potential Titan failure locations, where this work confirms a viewport implosion.
(Image by Kemper Engineering Services, LLC) Details DMCA
The Rest of the Story
I have spent many thousands of hours studying the complexities of the little understood science of shock waves in pressurized systems. When I first saw the blast of bogus Titan implosion stories two years ago, I expected the truth to be buried in misunderstandings and incompetence, which is exactly what happened. Ignoring two years of my requests to consider shock wave science, the Coast Guard followed this trail of misinformation as did Netflix in their Titan movie.
Convincing people to accept science is tremendously difficult. Following junk science is much easier.
If the Coast Guard does not know what happened, how questionable are their conclusions be? Again, the Titan exploded, and the Coast Guard does not even know what happened at the moment of destruction.
New Science and a Scathing Report of the MBI's Scathing Report
Along with the Titan shock wave explosion explanation that was first presented to the MBI more than two years ago, this article reflects another new theory that explains catastrophic explosions in pressure vessels. When a water-filled pressure vessel cracks, the pressurized water momentarily flows so fast that it vaporizes in a process known as cavitation, which releases an extraordinary amount of energy as water changes to vapor.
This process is explained in further detail in a forthcoming book ("The Fluid Transient Disaster- Water Hammers and Gas Hammers" by R. A. Leishear through ASME Press). This yet to be published research proves that the energy released when water suddenly flashes to steam is tremendous. For the first time ever, major industrial accidents have an explanation.
For example, a detailed report of a steam pipe explosion in New York proved that the pressures were adequate to burst an underground pipe, but an explanation of a massive explosion could not be provided at that time (Figure 8). The science is now available to determine the s magnitude of that explosion.
Figure 8. New York Fluid Transient Explosion. A preliminary TNT equivalent is between 3.2 and 8.9 tons.
(Image by ABS Consulting) Details DMCA
For the Titan, pressures inside the sub exceeded the ocean pressure by thousands of psi for either a viewport or adhesive failure. When the hull cracked, the crashing water in the sub momentarily cavitated outward to create an explosion estimated at 2 tons of TNT. Fluid transients destroyed the Titan, and fluid transient technology evolves as research uncovers new facts. In my review of the MBI Titan hearing, expert testimony on fluid transient explosions was absent, i.e., the MBI ignored the actual disaster cause.
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