Roy Lipscomb
Chicago, Ill.
Here's the original version:
Dear Editor,
In "Pull the Plug" (September 4, 2006), Avi Rubin does an excellent
job of diagnosing the ills of voting machines.
But after finishing this expert diagnosis, he proposes a remedy. And
that's where he falls short.
His proposal is that we cast votes on paper ballots, and count the
votes by means of optical scanners. He concludes: "Even the designer
of the system cannot cheat if the voters check the printed ballots and
if the optical scanners are audited."
Unfortunately, these two conditions impose no real-world constraints.
1. Paper ballots printed by voting machines are unreliable.
Studies have shown that many or most voters do not bother to confirm
the contents of such ballots.(Footnote 1)
When participants in one study were asked if their printed paper
ballots contained errors, 60% of the subjects admitted that they did
not know.(Footnote 2)
And a study of Ohio's 2006 primary election discovered that equipment
problems completely ruined about 10% of the paper ballots.(Footnote 3)
2. Optical scanners are themselves a type of voting machine.
Rubin recommends that we use voting machines to print the ballots, but
not for tabulating them. He assures us that voting machines, even if
they are audited, are too untrustworthy for vote counting. So far, so
good.
But then he advises us to tabulate those paper ballots by means of
optical scanners--a type of voting machine. The irony of this eludes
him.
The bottom line?
Avi's remedy for unreliable machines is...unreliable machines and
unreliable data.
Avi pulled the plug, but not hard enough.
Chicago, Ill.
Here's the original version:
Dear Editor,
In "Pull the Plug" (September 4, 2006), Avi Rubin does an excellent
job of diagnosing the ills of voting machines.
But after finishing this expert diagnosis, he proposes a remedy. And
that's where he falls short.
votes by means of optical scanners. He concludes: "Even the designer
of the system cannot cheat if the voters check the printed ballots and
if the optical scanners are audited."
Unfortunately, these two conditions impose no real-world constraints.
1. Paper ballots printed by voting machines are unreliable.
Studies have shown that many or most voters do not bother to confirm
the contents of such ballots.(Footnote 1)
When participants in one study were asked if their printed paper
ballots contained errors, 60% of the subjects admitted that they did
not know.(Footnote 2)
And a study of Ohio's 2006 primary election discovered that equipment
problems completely ruined about 10% of the paper ballots.(Footnote 3)
2. Optical scanners are themselves a type of voting machine.
Rubin recommends that we use voting machines to print the ballots, but
not for tabulating them. He assures us that voting machines, even if
they are audited, are too untrustworthy for vote counting. So far, so
good.
But then he advises us to tabulate those paper ballots by means of
optical scanners--a type of voting machine. The irony of this eludes
him.
The bottom line?
Avi's remedy for unreliable machines is...unreliable machines and
unreliable data.
Avi pulled the plug, but not hard enough.
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