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While the buck still stops in the Oval Office, it lingers for an inordinately long time with the vice president. And, clearly, that is the way Bush prefers it.
Sen. Bob Graham recalls that when he became chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, the president told him, “The vice president should be your point of contact in the White House [and] has the portfolio for intelligence activities.”
And, sure enough, when the chairmen and ranking members were invited to the White House for their first briefing on electronic eavesdropping, they were ushered into the vice president’s office where Cheney chaired the discussion.
One of the authors of the FISA law, longtime NSA director, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman (ret.), expressed serious reservations at the flouting of FISA during a New York Public Library panel discussion on May 8, 2006.
“There clearly was a line in the FISA statutes which says you couldn’t do this,” said Inman. He went on to call specific attention to an “extra sentence put in the bill that said, ‘You can’t do anything that is not authorized by this bill.’”
Inman spoke proudly of the earlier ethos at NSA, where “it was deeply ingrained that you operate within the law and you get the law changed if you need to.” As for now, Inman insisted, “What you want is to get away from this idea that they can continue doing it.”
He placed the blame squarely on Vice President Dick Cheney, whose attitude he said was: “We don’t need law. The president has authorized these in the past and can authorize them now.”
Inman added that this attitude explains why there was no attempt to change the law. Whether Bush eventually decides to change course and work with Congress on this issue will depend on “whether the president walks away from the vice president on this issue,” said Inman.
John Dean, no stranger to White House intrigue, also sees Cheney’s hand behind the defiance of inconvenient laws like FISA. Dean’s sources tell him that there is serious doubt that the president and his staff is well informed as to what Cheney is doing, why he is doing it, or how he is doing it.
Bush may be the “decider,” says Dean, “but by shaping the debate and controlling the paper flow, Cheney decides what the decider will decide.”
Eminence Grise Behind Eminence Grise
Please welcome David Addington, Cheney’s kemosabe, his main man, his legal adviser of many years, a strong advocate of the “unitary executive” concept invented by the Bush administration to amass power under, well, one executive.
Addington worked closely with Dick Cheney on the Iran-Contra Affair, and played a strong supporting role with those who set out to ensure that no one was held accountable. Addington came in with the vice president as his chief counsel and became his chief of staff as well, after Irv Lewis Libby left.
Addington is the author of the so-called “torture memo” of Jan. 25, 2002—the one signed by then-chief counsel to the president, Alberto Gonzales, calling provisions of the Geneva treaties on prisoners of war “quaint” and “obsolete.”
Assigning a “new paradigm” to the post-9/11 world, that memo advised Bush that he could authorize torture by simply saying that the U.S. would treat prisoners “humanely, as appropriate, and as consistent with military necessity.” This the president did in an executive memorandum on Feb. 7, 2002.
Addington’s legal legerdemain was applied liberally to the issue of warrantless eavesdropping, as well. Most are unaware that Addington earned his spurs while working in the CIA’s Office of General Counsel (OGC) under Director William Casey, certainly a kindred soul in terms of respect for the law—national or international.
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