All the foregoing proposed alternatives are doomed and would only exacerbate the crisis.
All of them go against the national consensus on national unity as well as the "prisoners' document," which promotes national unity, calls for a national unity government and incorporating Hamas and Islamic Jihad into PLO, and reforming the security forces and banning security officers from political activity.
While giving it a lip service, the minority of the civil war provocateurs are undermining the only credible alternative of the unity government by their brinkmanship tactics.
The choice they are incessantly and insistently throwing into Abbas' face is not a breakthrough but only a recipe for what he has dreaded all throughout his leading career and did his best especially recently to avoid: Sack the Hamas-led government, dismantle its infrastructure and risk civil war or do nothing and watch the current crisis snowballing to the abyss.
In a thinly-concealed threat that questioned Abbas' qualifications, a Fatah leader said: "All the doors have been shut in his (Abbas') face...I believe he has one last chance to prove he is qualified to lead the Palestinian people or it will be his political end."
Skilfully and opportunistically exploiting the plight of about 16 hundred thousand unpaid public employees, they exploited a general strike and escalated it into an almost armed civil disobedience, inviting the ruling Hamas to respond in kind and ignite what could be the first salvos in the dreaded civil war, which claimed more than 12 lives last week.
The smell of the taboo bloodletting did not deter the provocateurs to desist from incitement against Hamas and used the let blood as a new war cry against it.
The general strike is legitimate and has legitimate goals were it not open-ended, exploited for political ends, enforced on the populace and embroiled the security personnel in provocative and threatening armed protests, some of which torched the headquarters of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and the premises of the premiership, in a symbolic gesture indicating a determination to burn Hamas out of power by force if needed.
Abbas in a televised appeal for calm ordered the security personnel protesters out of the streets and back to their barracks, indicating publicly that he who had campaigned against the militarization of the uprising against the Israeli occupation could not tolerate any militarization of protests against en elected Palestinian government that is besieged by Israel.
However Abbas has contributed to the crisis by not firmly distancing himself from the civil war provocateurs and by encouraging them to float their coup d'etat proposals, first by adopting their referendum idea, then by not ruling out publicly their proposed state of emergency measures. Bypassing Hamas in his international relations also sent the wrong message that he indirectly subscribed to the anti-Hamas campaign and allied himself with the provocateurs' agenda, which he has yet to confirm.
True Abbas wants Hamas either out of power or incorporated in the PLO strategy, but even Hamas has publicly acknowledged that he never resorted to force to do so. Even before Hamas assumed power Abbas for two years has fended off Israeli-U.S. pressures to forcefully disarm Hamas and successfully opted for dialogue and diplomatic pressure to clinch from Hamas a truce and a pledge to join the Palestinian Authority political process.
With the self-proclaimed friends like his Abbas needs no enemies; and for sure the Israeli occupying power is watching joyfully on the sidelines while preoccupied undisturbed with its colonial expansionist policies, leaving to Palestinian mouthpieces to promote its message without even paying for the translation from Hebrew into Arabic.
The so-called friends are making Abbas' mission more critical and uncomfortable and weakening his chances both to defuse the inter-Palestinian divide and to arrange his domestic cards in a way conducive to meeting international conditions to jump-start a moribund peace process.
If Hamas opts not to be dragged into military confrontation, removing it from power would entail two alternatives, pushing it back to resistance and bringing back an internally corrupt and politically deadlocked status quo, the main two factors that brought Hamas to power in the first place in a popular yearning for changing the status quo. But nothing so far indicates Hamas will resort to this option and everything indicates it will honor its public pledge that it will defend the people's democratic choice which carried it to power, and this is exactly the prescription to civil war.
One could not but wonder whether the real Israeli-U.S.-backed provocateurs' aim is to bring about the downfall of both Abbas and Hamas in order to maintain and sustain a pre-Hamas comfortable status quo, where their interests and privileges are preserved and the interests of their backers are ideally served.
Abbas -- a founding father of the PLO alongside late Yasser Arafat ï ¿ ½ has been a veteran man of dialogue, peaceful negotiations with the Israelis even at the high days of armed struggle, historically opposed the militarisation of the national struggle, always believed that diplomacy would in the end prevail to translate the UN legitimacy into national dividends on the ground, and accordingly has always defended the Palestinian international assets to offset the overpowering Israeli military superiority.
All of them go against the national consensus on national unity as well as the "prisoners' document," which promotes national unity, calls for a national unity government and incorporating Hamas and Islamic Jihad into PLO, and reforming the security forces and banning security officers from political activity.
While giving it a lip service, the minority of the civil war provocateurs are undermining the only credible alternative of the unity government by their brinkmanship tactics.
The choice they are incessantly and insistently throwing into Abbas' face is not a breakthrough but only a recipe for what he has dreaded all throughout his leading career and did his best especially recently to avoid: Sack the Hamas-led government, dismantle its infrastructure and risk civil war or do nothing and watch the current crisis snowballing to the abyss.
Skilfully and opportunistically exploiting the plight of about 16 hundred thousand unpaid public employees, they exploited a general strike and escalated it into an almost armed civil disobedience, inviting the ruling Hamas to respond in kind and ignite what could be the first salvos in the dreaded civil war, which claimed more than 12 lives last week.
The smell of the taboo bloodletting did not deter the provocateurs to desist from incitement against Hamas and used the let blood as a new war cry against it.
The general strike is legitimate and has legitimate goals were it not open-ended, exploited for political ends, enforced on the populace and embroiled the security personnel in provocative and threatening armed protests, some of which torched the headquarters of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and the premises of the premiership, in a symbolic gesture indicating a determination to burn Hamas out of power by force if needed.
Abbas in a televised appeal for calm ordered the security personnel protesters out of the streets and back to their barracks, indicating publicly that he who had campaigned against the militarization of the uprising against the Israeli occupation could not tolerate any militarization of protests against en elected Palestinian government that is besieged by Israel.
However Abbas has contributed to the crisis by not firmly distancing himself from the civil war provocateurs and by encouraging them to float their coup d'etat proposals, first by adopting their referendum idea, then by not ruling out publicly their proposed state of emergency measures. Bypassing Hamas in his international relations also sent the wrong message that he indirectly subscribed to the anti-Hamas campaign and allied himself with the provocateurs' agenda, which he has yet to confirm.
True Abbas wants Hamas either out of power or incorporated in the PLO strategy, but even Hamas has publicly acknowledged that he never resorted to force to do so. Even before Hamas assumed power Abbas for two years has fended off Israeli-U.S. pressures to forcefully disarm Hamas and successfully opted for dialogue and diplomatic pressure to clinch from Hamas a truce and a pledge to join the Palestinian Authority political process.
With the self-proclaimed friends like his Abbas needs no enemies; and for sure the Israeli occupying power is watching joyfully on the sidelines while preoccupied undisturbed with its colonial expansionist policies, leaving to Palestinian mouthpieces to promote its message without even paying for the translation from Hebrew into Arabic.
The so-called friends are making Abbas' mission more critical and uncomfortable and weakening his chances both to defuse the inter-Palestinian divide and to arrange his domestic cards in a way conducive to meeting international conditions to jump-start a moribund peace process.
If Hamas opts not to be dragged into military confrontation, removing it from power would entail two alternatives, pushing it back to resistance and bringing back an internally corrupt and politically deadlocked status quo, the main two factors that brought Hamas to power in the first place in a popular yearning for changing the status quo. But nothing so far indicates Hamas will resort to this option and everything indicates it will honor its public pledge that it will defend the people's democratic choice which carried it to power, and this is exactly the prescription to civil war.
One could not but wonder whether the real Israeli-U.S.-backed provocateurs' aim is to bring about the downfall of both Abbas and Hamas in order to maintain and sustain a pre-Hamas comfortable status quo, where their interests and privileges are preserved and the interests of their backers are ideally served.
Abbas -- a founding father of the PLO alongside late Yasser Arafat ï ¿ ½ has been a veteran man of dialogue, peaceful negotiations with the Israelis even at the high days of armed struggle, historically opposed the militarisation of the national struggle, always believed that diplomacy would in the end prevail to translate the UN legitimacy into national dividends on the ground, and accordingly has always defended the Palestinian international assets to offset the overpowering Israeli military superiority.
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