But Bush’s short-term strategy would likely aggravate Iraq’s central underlying problem—ethno-sectarian hostility.
Had the Bush administration made a serious effort to consult experts on the Arab world before invading Iraq, it would have discovered that the country was one of the most fractured in the Arab world and would be one of the least likely to support and sustain a liberal democratic federation.
Prior to supporting former Sunni guerrillas, the administration was only funding, equipping and training two sides—the Kurds and Shiites—in the ongoing civil war. Now the administration is supporting all three sides.
The Shiite/Kurdish-controlled government is opposed to the U.S. program to support the Sunnis and has been reluctant to let them in the security forces.
Such deep underlying ethno-sectarian suspicions and fissures have been around for centuries in what is now Iraq and are unlikely to be rectified by passing a few benchmark laws.
Given the history of Iraq—in which one group controlled the central government and oppressed the other groups—all groups, even including the formerly ruling Sunnis, are suspicious of central authority and will fight for control of it.
Thus, societal cooperation, of which Iraq has little, must precede legislation or the laws will be disregarded. Even less credibility will accrue to laws passed under pressure from an outside occupying power.
The only way the United States can pull its finger out of the dike without the dam crashing down is to use the threat of withdrawal—pulling the backstop out from the corrupt Shiite/Kurdish government—to get the Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds to agree to formally decentralize the country.
If the central government has only limited power, the groups would fear its potential oppression less and attenuate their fight for control of it.
In a decentralized, loosely confederated Iraq, their militias could provide security over members of the their own groups in new autonomous regions (the country would probably have three or more of these regions based on ethno-sectarian or tribal affiliation).
Also, judicial, resource (oil) management and most other government functions could reside at the regional level. The central government would be responsible only for diplomatic representation overseas and negotiating trade agreements with other countries and among regions.
Heretofore, the major sticking point in getting the three groups to support such a decentralization scheme was Sunni worries about meager oil resources in their region.
The Kurds have had a de facto state in northern Iraq since the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Many Shiite leaders also favor setting up an autonomous region, the possibility of which is guaranteed in Iraq’s constitution.
Even the Sunnis, finally disabused of the fantasy that they are strong enough to once again rule all of Iraq, and having tasted oppression at the hands of the Shiite-dominated security forces, are becoming more favorable to decentralization.
To push the Shiite/Kurdish-dominated Iraqi government into gerrymandering regional borders—giving territory containing oil to the Sunnis to ensure their acceptance of decentralization—any new U.S. president must establish a timetable for the rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces, which prop up that dysfunctional government.
Because the Shiite have roughly 60 percent of the oil and about 60 percent of the population, the only border that might need to be gerrymandered is near the northern oil fields by Kirkuk between Kurdistan (about 20 percent of the population and approximately 40 percent of the oil) and Sunni-dominated areas (roughly 20 percent of the population and little oil).
Had the Bush administration made a serious effort to consult experts on the Arab world before invading Iraq, it would have discovered that the country was one of the most fractured in the Arab world and would be one of the least likely to support and sustain a liberal democratic federation.
Prior to supporting former Sunni guerrillas, the administration was only funding, equipping and training two sides—the Kurds and Shiites—in the ongoing civil war. Now the administration is supporting all three sides.
The Shiite/Kurdish-controlled government is opposed to the U.S. program to support the Sunnis and has been reluctant to let them in the security forces.
Given the history of Iraq—in which one group controlled the central government and oppressed the other groups—all groups, even including the formerly ruling Sunnis, are suspicious of central authority and will fight for control of it.
Thus, societal cooperation, of which Iraq has little, must precede legislation or the laws will be disregarded. Even less credibility will accrue to laws passed under pressure from an outside occupying power.
The only way the United States can pull its finger out of the dike without the dam crashing down is to use the threat of withdrawal—pulling the backstop out from the corrupt Shiite/Kurdish government—to get the Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds to agree to formally decentralize the country.
If the central government has only limited power, the groups would fear its potential oppression less and attenuate their fight for control of it.
In a decentralized, loosely confederated Iraq, their militias could provide security over members of the their own groups in new autonomous regions (the country would probably have three or more of these regions based on ethno-sectarian or tribal affiliation).
Also, judicial, resource (oil) management and most other government functions could reside at the regional level. The central government would be responsible only for diplomatic representation overseas and negotiating trade agreements with other countries and among regions.
Heretofore, the major sticking point in getting the three groups to support such a decentralization scheme was Sunni worries about meager oil resources in their region.
The Kurds have had a de facto state in northern Iraq since the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Many Shiite leaders also favor setting up an autonomous region, the possibility of which is guaranteed in Iraq’s constitution.
Even the Sunnis, finally disabused of the fantasy that they are strong enough to once again rule all of Iraq, and having tasted oppression at the hands of the Shiite-dominated security forces, are becoming more favorable to decentralization.
To push the Shiite/Kurdish-dominated Iraqi government into gerrymandering regional borders—giving territory containing oil to the Sunnis to ensure their acceptance of decentralization—any new U.S. president must establish a timetable for the rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces, which prop up that dysfunctional government.
Because the Shiite have roughly 60 percent of the oil and about 60 percent of the population, the only border that might need to be gerrymandered is near the northern oil fields by Kirkuk between Kurdistan (about 20 percent of the population and approximately 40 percent of the oil) and Sunni-dominated areas (roughly 20 percent of the population and little oil).
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