In fact, if you legitimately consider a "non-vote (i.e. did not vote)" as a vote "against" the Referendum, then one could argue and make a strong case the overall "no" vote (i.e. against the Referendum) was not 51% but rather 72%+:
44% ("non-vote") plus 51% x's 56% ("the no-vote") = 72% plus (against)
Meaning, on a "total voter population basis", the Referendum really lost 72%-28%, and that's even before assessing that "real" result "without" the social welfare sweetener factor. See below. Accordingly, the numbers (and the voters' message) get even worse for Mr. Chavez.
Mr. Chavez tried in diversionary fashion to "personalize" the election to "divert" the vote (issue), as way to deflect attention from the core issue (President for Life). While Mr. Chavez aggressively campaigned, promoted and pitched the Referendum as "Chavez versus Bush (i.e. United States)", meaning a vote against the Referendum was a vote for the U.S., the people were not fooled and saw through it for what it really was – "Chavez versus (Venezuelan) Democracy.
Mr. Chavez garnered 49%, Democracy 51%. That's "before" taking into account the 44% "non-vote" above and the fact that the Chavez Referendum package included robust social welfare enhancers to entice voters to vote.
The question then, if the same election vote was done "without" the socialism sweeteners, how much lower would the 49% have been? In other words, how much of that 49% is attributed solely to the sweetener piece (factor)?
Considering Mr. Chavez' emphasis and aggressive trumpeting of these social reform sweeteners during his campaign to help get out the vote, one can assume they were a huge part/component of the 49%. For argument purposes then, assume a reasonable 50%, again based on the importance placed upon it by Mr. Chavez in his campaigning.
Therefore, using the 72-28% total voter overall "real" result above "with" sweetener factor, and now "excluding" the 50% sweetener factor vote (which represents 50% of the "election" 49%. In other words, 50% of the "real" 28%), drives the hidden, but very "real" Referendum result to an even more pronounced landslide 86-14% against the Referendum.
Note: A case can be made that the 14% would likely fall even further when removing the "fear and/intimidation" factor (component) to "vote Chavez".
Bottom line, the significance of the results being that even with extremely generous sweeteners for the majority poor, he still lost....and by a "virtual" landslide.
Whether the "real" percentage numbers are specifically 86-14, 90-10, 80-20, or elsewhere in "that ballpark", the pure and simple fact is that they were not in the 51-49 ballpark, by a LONG shot. In retrospect, looking at the "real" numbers suggests the only "long shot" was Mr. Chavez's chances of ever winning, had all Venezuelans voted and voted solely with their heart, and without fear.
So in the final analysis, Mr. Chavez, who prides himself as a man of the people, could not even muster a win with "social welfare candy", specifically targeted at his core constituency, the majority bulge (i.e. the poor) in the overall voting population, which desperately needs that help. Why did they not take that attractive carrot? Because they did not want the stick that came with it (i.e. President for Life).
Another interesting observation, for all his graciousness in defeat, not once did Mr. Chavez say, "the people have spoken in favor of the United States (and/or Democracy)", which would have been an entirely consistent and magnanimous concession speech measuring up to his pre-Referendum campaign "Chavez or U.S." vote decision rhetoric.
So while "superficially gracious" in defeat, Mr. Chavez clearly was not "comprehensively sincere" (on many fronts) in his concession.
What U.S. Leverage?
Analyst Answer:
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