The nuclear weapons argument is weak for reasons other than the disinformation in regard to Iran's capabilities on that score. Granted, just because Bush cried wolf over Iraq's WMD, it doesn't mean that no such threat will ever emerge. But the evidence is too scanty and the sources too questionable and in contradiction to the findings of legitimate inspectors, to use that as a rationale for war. Secondly, even if Iran is pursuing a weapons program, the way to address it is via diplomacy. The nuclear genie is long out of the bottle and, in fact, Iran is surrounded by other regional nuclear powers: Russia, China, Pakistan, India, and Israel. Countries are going after nukes because the technology is there and they figure they'd better have them if everyone else does. Iran's concerns are likely defensive; even if they build one or two bombs they are a long way from an effective arsenal, and they would also represent a threat to powers much closer to home, i.e., Russia, China, Pakistan, etc., more than to the U.S.A. Even within the Middle East, they are a long way from being a top tier player. Their influence is real and it is growing, but there are natural limits which diplomacy can strengthen. While we cannot afford to be complacent about nuclear weapons proliferation, we have to understand that in the long run, bombing a country's uranium enriching facilities will only delay matters. It is hardly a solution.
We might also wonder what happens if we do score a direct, bunker-busting hit on a uranium enrichment plant. As I argued last year, Iran's main intention regarding nuclear energy lies in building power plants. So whether we hit an incipient weapons-grade facility or just a fuel storage area or a nuclear power plant itself, the radioactive fallout will be significant and could make the Chernobyl fall-out, which wreaked substantial damage throughout Europe, pale in comparison.
Iran itself is changing. It is easy to demonize President Ahmadinejad, but he himself came to power on the winds of change. He is the first Iranian president since Bani-Sadr over 25 years ago who is not a cleric, despite his religious fundamentalism and strident rhetoric. He is also the first president since the revolution to have face-to-face talks with the U.S., represented by Condoleeza Rice, over the course of three different sessions. But he is only one indicator.
A truly relentless force for change is time itself. The generation that planned the 1979 Islamic revolution is dying off. The generation that executed it is now in late middle age and the younger generations have a very different world view. To them, the Shah of Iran is an abstraction in the history books, while the dictates of the mullahs are very real obstructions to the life they envision for themselves. They are an Internet generation and even the followers of the older radicals do not, for the most part, have the same passion for an Islamic theocracy as their elders did.
A sensible long-term view would realize that change is coming and that the nuclear question is a complex one. Whether or not one trusts it, Iran has its point of view as well, one lost in our mindless mainstream media hysteria about Iran that beats the drum for war. For instance, the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, stated on September 4 that "Iran has shown its goodwill by drawing up a framework to settle the remaining issues concerning its peaceful nuclear program with the IAEA in less than two months." (www.presstv.ir). Iran has little of substance to gain by going nuclear except to earn the world's condemnation. It has everything to gain, as I described last year, from its nuclear power program (without the weapons). And if it does develop a bomb, as distressing as it may be, it will only be one more nation in a nuclear club whose firepower far outweighs its own capabilities.
For many reasons that I noted last year, an attack on Iran is militarily absurd. In fact, the last line of Baxter's article cites Alexis Debat as believing that the U.S. simply doesn't have the military resources to conduct the planned attacks on Iran. The attacks would in effect open up a military front stretching from Iraq across Iran (even though we will not be committing ground troops) and all the way through Afghanistan to the Pakistan border. America cannot sustain it politically, economically, or militarily.
Which brings us to Pakistan, perhaps the country with the most potential to disrupt the region. Pakistan is, militarily, far more powerful than Iran. Its importance is self-evident, yet it is in danger of imploding, fueled in large part by the chaos and violence in Afghanistan and Iraq. If Pakistan's government loses its grip, the result may well be a zone of chaos in which terrorist groups would have access to an arsenal that could dwarf anything the Iraqi insurgents have. The fruit of the Bush policy of deception, violence, and war-profiteering will be a region in chaos; a U.S. military stretched beyond breaking point across two thousand miles of Asia; a nation (the U.S.) on the brink of bankruptcy; a legacy of refugees, environmental destruction, and political instability; and an absolutely ideal 1 1/3 million square mile incubator for future terrorist action against us.
So will we attack Iran? I certainly don't know but the following scenarios can clarify the options:
1) No, because the U.S. still recognizes that Iran is central to our interests and that hostility to Iran offers us no benefits. Threats of an attack may be intended to intimidate Iran into being more open about its weapons program or reducing its support for Shi'ite factions in Iraq, but even the Bush administration recognizes that attacking Iran is counter to our interests, provides the ultimate recruiting tool for terrorists, and places undue stress on our military.
2) Probably not, because the anti-Iran rhetoric is a desperate political gambit by the Bush administration to buy time for its Iraq policy, to deflect criticism, to blame Iran for its failure, and to get out of the White House in time so that when a Democrat becomes president and we pull out our troops, Bush and Cheney can say we were so close to winning and now the nefarious Democrats have pulled out because they didn't have the guts to stay the course. Yet the rhetoric may take on a life on of its own, as it continually strengthens such groups as MeK and the IPC, thus giving the hard-liners a stronger bargaining position within the Administration, and making the public more willing to support an attack.
3) Yes, because Bush and Cheney are addicted to the notion of a war-time presidency and believe that the American public will ultimately buy into their rationale and see them as "strong" leaders. They also figure Congress will back down as it has in the past, with the Democrats afraid of being labeled "weak". And yes, because there is still, within the administration, the vision of a U.S. dominated global order in which a chaotic, volatile Middle East enables the U.S. to assume a stronger and stronger military position there with greater control over oil and access to the underbellies of China and Russia. Or perhaps they truly believe they can significantly weaken Iran with no other damage to our interests.
One can only hope that the Bush administration is conducting politics as usual, as in the first scenario or even the second, because if we do attack Iran, it means that the U.S. is set upon a course that has already tipped it over the edge of rationality in its conduct of foreign policy. An attack on Iran would be so destructive to our national interests, as well as highly immoral, that Congress and the Pentagon would have no choice but to step in and countermand the order.
That is why Democrats Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama have revealed themselves as unqualified for the presidency by their hawkish statements on Iran. Of course, they are calculating that they can counter-balance their (pallid) opposition to Bush's Iraq policy by showing us that they're not afraid to breathe forth the fiery winds of war. But the time is past for such dangerous political posturing, for policies decided by how "strong" or "weak" a given candidate or president will appear. Instead of assessing the situation from a diplomatic, historical, or systems perspective, they are mindlessly – with an eye ever on the polls – treating the Iranian military option as viable when it is, in fact, a Category 5 disaster. By cynically jumping on board President Bush's bandwagon, they enhance its credibility and thus provide support to hard-liners in the Administration and among Beltway lobbyists. Any major candidate who cannot treat this issue in a sober, thoughtful way is guilty of a failure of courage, will, sensibility, and intellect. We already have enough such failures in our government. And if they all are just playing the war card for what it is worth, without any coherent notion of how it will actually play out, how sad a commentary that is on the state of our national political culture and those who seek its highest prize.
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