The State Department's Collective Madness

During the 1980s, American diplomats with integrity were systematically marginalized, hounded or removed. (Human rights coordinator Derian left at the end of the Carter administration and was replaced by neocon Elliott Abrams; White was fired as U.S. ambassador to El Salvador, explaining: "I refused a demand by the secretary of state, Alexander M. Haig Jr., that I use official channels to cover up the Salvadoran military's responsibility for the murders of four American churchwomen.")

The Neocons Rise

As the old-guard professionals left, a new breed of aggressive neoconservatives was brought in, the likes of Paul Wolfowitz, Robert McFarlane, Robert Kagan and Abrams. After eight years of Reagan and four years of George H.W. Bush, the State Department was reshaped into a home for neocons, but some pockets of professionalism survived the onslaughts.

While one might have expected the Democrats of the Clinton administration to reverse those trends, they didn't. Instead, Bill Clinton's "triangulation" applied to U.S. foreign policy as much as to domestic programs. He was always searching for that politically safe "middle."

As the 1990s wore on, the decimation of foreign policy experts in the mold of White and Derian left few on the Democratic side who had the courage or skills to challenge the deeply entrenched neocons. Many Clinton-era Democrats accommodated to the neocon dominance by reinventing themselves as "liberal interventionists," sharing the neocons' love for military force but justifying the killing on "humanitarian" grounds.

This approach was a way for "liberals" to protect themselves against right-wing charges that they were "weak," a charge that had scarred Democrats deeply during the Reagan/Bush-41 years, but this Democratic "tough-guy/gal-ism" further sidelined serious diplomats favoring traditional give-and-take with foreign leaders and their people.

So, you had Democrats like then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (and later Secretary of State) Madeleine Albright justifying Bill Clinton's brutal sanctions policies toward Iraq, which the U.N. blamed for killing 500,000 Iraqi children, as "a very hard choice, but the price -- we think the price is worth it."

Bill Clinton's eight years of "triangulation," which included the brutal air war against Serbia, was followed by eight years of George W. Bush, which further ensconced the neocons as the U.S. foreign policy establishment.

By then, what was left of the old Republican "realists," the likes of Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, was aging out or had been so thoroughly compromised that the neocons faced no significant opposition within Republican circles. And, Official Washington's foreign-policy Democrats had become almost indistinguishable from the neocons, except for their use of "humanitarian" arguments to justify aggressive wars.

Media Capitulation

Before George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq, much of the "liberal" media establishment -- from The New York Times to The New Yorker -- fell in line behind the war, asking few tough questions and presenting almost no obstacles. Favoring war had become the "safe" career play.

But a nascent anti-war movement among rank-and-file Democrats did emerge, propelling Barack Obama, an anti-Iraq War Democrat, to the 2008 presidential nomination over Iraq War supporter Hillary Clinton. But those peaceful sentiments among the Democratic "base" did not reach very deeply into the ranks of Democratic foreign policy mavens.

So, when Obama entered the White House, he faced a difficult challenge. The State Department needed a thorough purging of the neocons and the liberal hawks, but there were few Democratic foreign policy experts who hadn't sold out to the neocons. An entire generation of Democratic policy-makers had been raised in the world of neocon-dominated conferences, meetings, op-eds and think tanks, where tough talk made you sound good while talk of traditional diplomacy made you sound soft.

By contrast, more of the U.S. military and even the CIA favored less belligerent approaches to the world, in part, because they had actually fought Bush's hopeless "global war on terror." But Bush's hand-picked, neocon-oriented high command -- the likes of General David Petraeus -- remained in place and favored expanded wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

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