Thanks to Saudi Intelligence chief Sheikh Kamal Adham and and BCCI banker, Sheikh Agha Hasan Abedi, there were ample funds to finance a holy jihad against Russia in Afghanistan but the motives for undermining Russia on its southern border didn't stop there. Bringing war to Afghanistan provided the opportunity to assist the migration of the heroin trade from Southeast Asia to the Pakistani/Afghan border and to make billions of dollars for the BCCI doing it. Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Provinces had been targeted early on by international drug syndicates eager to find a new home as the Vietnam War wound down. Cited in a French Study by Catherine Lamour and Michel R. Lamberti originally published in 1972 titled Les Grandes Manoeuvres de l'Opium,"Afghanistan and northern Pakistan represent a source of opium as yet virtually untapped by European traffickers. Situated at the junction of the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the two territories are not as far from Marseilles or Munich as are Burma and Laos. The political conditions in their opium-producing areas make these places an ideal refuge where racketeers from Europe could go about their business untroubled by international law-enforcement agencies."
As of the early spring of 1978 the narcotics problem in the Golden Crescent, appeared to then Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asia Affairs Adolph Dubs to be under control by the governments of the United States, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. But by January of 1979 the newly unstable region was fast becoming the launch pad for the greatest heroin empire in history and the primary financing source for a terrorist campaign that would transform the world.
The Frankenstein political monster emerging to thwart Dubs' plan for Afghanistan could only have come from Brzezinski's ethnic experiment called the Nationalities Working Group. The potential for stirring up Muslim unrest against Soviet/Russian rule had been kicking around for decades but gained little traction within the CIA. But the rise of the neoconservatives following the Vietnam War had brought with it an ethnic strategy that put Saudi Wahhabists, Iranian Shiites, Tajik Maoists, assorted Marxist-Leninists and Afghan extremists together with European and Middle Eastern racketeers - fed by a Trotskyist hatred for all things Russian.
Contrary to Brzezinski's assertion that Hafizullah Amin was Moscow's obedient servant, Dubs was learning that his target was not much of a Communist, convincing him to restore and expand a U.S. military-training program for Afghan army officers. Russian documents reveal the Kremlin didn't consider him to be a Communist at all but "a commonplace petty bourgeois and an extreme Pushtu nationalist" with "boundless political ambitions and a craving for power", in addition to most likely being a CIA agent. According to Selig Harrison, Amin had even bragged to him that the Soviets needed him more than he needed them. The trick was to maintain a balance of American influence while not triggering Soviet countermeasures that would bring them in. But for the ambassador who'd been sent to rope Amin closer to the U.S., Jimmy Carter's national-security advisor seemed to be doing everything in his power to put the rope around Dubs' neck. Still, Dubs continued his mission; Selig Harrison writes, "Dubs, meanwhile was arguing vigorously for keeping American options open, pleading that destabilization of the regime would provoke direct Soviet intervention" Ironically, while Brzezinski was promoting armed opposition to Amin, Dubs was continuing to nurture his dialogue with the Afghan leader."
A Time magazine article that January suggested Brzezinski's campaign to frame the Kabul regime as hopelessly pro-Soviet was on the verge of being exposed as a lie. "The new government in Afghanistan of President Noor Mohammed Taraki is commonly thought to be in Moscow's pocket, especially since it recently signed a friendship treaty with the Soviets. There are signs however, that this too may be an exaggeration. During Taraki's visit to Moscow last month President Brezhnev reportedly chided him for behaving too obsequiously before the Russians, which he felt made the Afghan leader look bad. As soon as they got back to Kabul, Afghan officials began to drop hints that they would welcome more Western aid. Apparently, the Russians are not altogether satisfied with their new client regime in Kabul."
But Brzezinski's objectives were not to be undone by appearances, protests from the ambassador or reasoned political arguments. That same month, Brzezinski's NSC director of South Asian affairs, Thomas P. Thornton, arrived in Kabul to shut Dubs down. Meeting with Amin, he provided a "negative assessment" of the regime, recommending that any additional aid be cut off.
In the interim between Dubs' arrival in Kabul in July of 1978 and the fall of the Shah on January 16, 1979, American foreign policy in Iran, China and Afghanistan had shifted into the hands of a neoconservative/right-wing cabal with hardly anyone being the wiser. Backed by Brzezinski's National Security Council but run by a consortium of right-wing intelligence officers including France's intelligence chief, Count Alexandre de Marenches and his cohorts at the Pinay Cercle, Safari Club and 6I, the decades-long geopolitical plan to move the United States into alignment with the old European right-wing of Antoine Pinay and Brian Crozier was nearing completion.
Regardless of Brzezinski's public denials about supporting the Afghan rebels, the CIA's "secret" program to lure the Soviets into their own Vietnam was becoming so well known it was making headlines in the American papers and a mockery of the Carter administration. Selig Harrison writes: "By early February 1979, this collaboration became an open secret when the Washington Post published an eyewitness report that at least two thousand Afghans were being trained at former Pakistani bases guarded by Pakistani patrols." Yet President Carter and his Secretary of State never seemed to realize that increased destabilization on the Soviet Union's southern border would eventually produce Soviet counter moves to offset it.
By mid-February the unholy alliance between Shi'ite fundamentalists and Marxists that Brian Crozier had warned the Shah about only months earlier had been turned against Kabul by remnants of the Shah's Savak and Chinese intelligence. The Shah had fallen and the Afghan countryside was in open revolt. The Marxist regime of Nur Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin was calling on Moscow for military assistance and the only man left to hold back a Soviet military takeover in Kabul was the American Ambassador, Adolph Dubs. But on the morning of February 14, 1979, he too would fall into the hands of the covert plan to give Russia its own Vietnam and, in a tragic twist of irony, become the vehicle for the very operation he had gone to Kabul to stop.
Copyright - 2018 Fitzgerald & Gould All rights reserved
The Sordid History of British Manipulation of American Democracy Series: Read it and weep!
Part 1: MI6 intelligence has always been an anti-Soviet/Russian "Rumor Factory"
Part 2: America's "Soviet problem" is the old "Russia problem" that European Imperialists have been facing since Napoleon's disastrous march on Moscow in 1812 Part
3: How U.S. foreign policy came to be directed by a diabolical, London-backed, privately funded, neoconservative/right-wing alliance
Part 4: How the Safari Club became the real CIA
Part 5: Brzezinski's Safari Club "Friends" Did the Dirty Work Behind the Scenes
(Note: You can view every article as one long page if you sign up as an Advocate Member, or higher).
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