According to Time Magazine, from 2003 through 2008, McChrystal "led the Pentagon's Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)."
The March 11 description of Joint Special Operations Command, and its leader, General McCrystal, was seemingly contradicted by Hersh on May 19 (See analysis) but the cat was out of the bag on the general's tactics. Unless Hersh was referring to some other Joint Special Operations Command that McChrystal ran, we have a special type of general in charge of the war in Afghanistan.
A report in March validated the problems with the JSOC mission of commando actions eliminating enemies of the state: "The commander of a secretive branch of America's Special Operations forces last month ordered a halt to most commando missions in Afghanistan, reflecting a growing concern that civilian deaths caused by American firepower are jeopardizing broader goals there" New York Times, March 9. In the same article, Iraq commander General David Petraeus was said to have "supported the decision to suspend the Special Operations missions."
Despite his record or, perhaps, because of it, General McChrystal was appointed to the Afghanistan command after these statements and controversies over JSOC.
Just two weeks later, President Obama appointed General Eikenberry as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. In addition to his career achievements, Eikenberry's good relationships with the Karzai government and NATO were mentioned prominently.
Eikenberry was a logical choice as ambassador to Afghanistan given the ongoing military missions and his emphasis on improvements in living conditions for citizens. He'd held high level and top level command in the country for a total of thirty six months. During that time, he had concentrated on a multi level approach with an emphasis on building a strong civil base of for a government and military run by the people.
In testimony before Congress in February, 2007, Eikenberry outlined progress in the military effort and civic governance and the largest threat to success:
"The
long-term threat to campaign success, though, is the potential
irretrievable loss of legitimacy of the Government of Afghanistan. If
the Afghan Government is unable to counter popular frustration with the
lack of progress in reform and national development, the Afghan people
may lose confidence in the nature of their political system." Congress, Feb. 17, 2007
Eikenberry listed progress in public education, infrastructure, and
training efforts for Afghan police and military but stressed the need
for more support for civilians in the forgotten war. He stressed the
stakes for NATO in the largest ever non European military effort.
While not "make or break," the stakes were high. He also made this
highly significant point: "Pakistan's military and security forces
have taken significant casualties against the same enemy that we in
Afghanistan face" Feb. 17, 2007
Eleven months into the new administration, we have radically different choices for policy in Afghanistan advanced by diametrically opposed military professionals appointed by the same president.
Why the Radical Split in Advice and Why Now
It seems that General McChrystal is on a special mission based a specific philosophy of warfare and that General Eikenberry is performing his duty according to his current assignment with an ongoing evaluation of the various players and facts at hand. McCrystal job has been killing what Seymour Hersh called "enemies of the state" in Afghanistan and Iraq. He's not finished. They're still out there. He made commitments to the 400 officers and soldiers that he hand picked. He doesn't want to let them down.
Given his history and assignments before his command role, everything he's done suggests that he would want to finish the job. Why wouldn't he push for as many more troops as he can get?
But the real questions are: does finishing that job make any sense and will more troops help finish the job?
Eikenberry's position has evolved over time. He once got along with Karzai but, as ambassador, during the recent presidential campaign, he appeared with the opposition candidates who accused Karzai of election fraud in the first election and pushed Karzai to overturn the initial disputed results that would have ruled out a runoff election.
Can you recall any U.S. ambassador ever showing up at a press conference with opposition candidates challenging the legitimacy of an election?
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