“Once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be
drawn which are inconsistent with the equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, state measures which have the effect of
denying or diluting a citizen’s vote must be justified with a
compelling state interest.( Harper at 670, 86 Supreme Court 1079)
(striking down the State Poll tax ); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533.
Title 42, Section 1973 (h) provides: Congressional finding and
declaration of policy against enforced payment of poll taxes
as a device to impair voting rights.
The Congress finds that the requirement of the payment of a poll tax
as a precondition to voting (i) precludes persons of limited means
from voting or imposes unreasonable financial hardship upon such
persons as a precondition to their exercise of the franchise,
(ii) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any legitimate State
interest in the conduct of elections, and (iii) in some areas has
the purpose or effect of denying persons the right to vote because
of race or color. Upon the basis of these findings, Congress
declares that the constitutional right of citizens to vote is
denied or abridged in some areas by the requirement of the payment
of a poll tax as a precondition to voting.
Taking the events of “licensing requirement” as the abstract of a
payment of a tax, along requiring that as a measure to
precondition operates as a “poll tax”. The Gould candidacy was not
fulfilled but for the additional non-constitutional qualification.
While a license for which a fee is paid is necessary in the
absence of a right, the absence of a license as a rationale for
the removal of a right is a undue and burdensome. While appearing
“neutral”, or it is decidedly discriminatory as the results as
“it dilutes the voting strength of the minority group“ (East
Jefferson Coalition for Leadership and Development v. Jefferson
Parrish-. 691 F.Supp 991)
Invidious discrimination applies a differentiation scale
to people who belong or appear to belong group or another
group. The group being discriminated against is generally
seen as being lower, lacking or deficient in some way.
(This type of discrimination is an unfair and often
illegal practice that can go on daily in many different
forms.) Relative to the specifics of the instant case, it
is based upon the ‘assumption that a license is required’
rather than a right assured by state and federal
constitutions and statutes. The right to seek public
office of a future government cannot be so disregarded. It
fundamentally breaches the Equal Protection Clause.
In the context of the instant matter, there was no overt or subtle
racial appeal or issue. However, the Nomination Signatures
constitute, by axiom, a “minority group that is politically
cohesive”. There were over 950 raw signatures, of which over the
statutory requirement of 545 for the First Judicial District. The
“minority” is a mixture of persons who had personal contact with
the candidate. Most received literature of platforms and positions
of the candidate . Their individual signatures were provided by
their own hands, freely absent any coercions or
misrepresentations, and recorded the names ( as registered to
vote), signatures, places which the person resided and city of
residences. The signature process was carried out regularly in
public places, private lands and included persons from each of the
three counties that compose the First Judicial District.
The petitions clearly stated the candidate’s name, address, county
of registration, and the pertinent information regarding the time,
place and conduct of the election. And the validity of the
petitions were not challenged, excepting as to the “licensure
issue”.
As the record reads, that issue was addressed before the district
court and the state Supreme court. “ New Mexico’s constitution
provides: [District attorneys] There shall be a district attorney for
each judicial district, who shall be learned in the law, and who shall
be a resident of New Mexico for three years next prior to his
election, shall be the law officer of the state and of the counties
within his district, shall be elected for a term of four years, and
shall perform such duties and receive such salary as prescribed by
law. (NMSC Art VI Sec 24)
The threshold of qualification is direct of the state constitution.
While the qualification is determinant for judges having been in the
actual practice of law for 6 years or the attorney or that the
attorney general of the State be a licensed attorney of the supreme
court, those thresholds are direct of the state constitution under
different sections. Applying the same standard of qualifications for
those offices to displace the direct language of the State
constitution upon the qualifications for the district attorney is a
breach of the direct language and meaning of the qualifications.
New Mexico’s constitution also provides: “Every citizen of the
United States who is a legal resident of the state and is a
qualified elector therein, shall be qualified to hold any elective
public office except as otherwise provided in this constitution.
(Article VII, New Mexico State constitution)
The imperative that ‘purity’ in elections be maintained is also
promoted in Article II of the New Mexico constitution :
Sec 8. [Freedom of Elections]
All elections shall be free and open, and no power, civil or military
shall at any time prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.
That imperative is furthered under the election code that a once a
decision of the state district court is rendered, “The decision shall be
appealable only to the supreme court and notice of appeal shall be filed
within five days after the decision of the district court. The supreme
court shall hear and render a decision on the appeal forthwith. 1-8-35
NMSA
The state supreme court heads the Judicial Branch of State government.
It is the state’s appellate court of last review and has supervisory
control over all lesser courts. The state supreme court has original
jurisdiction. The court also is empowered to issue necessary and
proper writs and to provide for the transfer of any action or decision
enumerated in the statutes.
The failure of the Court to provide a “ reasoned answer” upon the
petition for a mandamus exacerbates the issue that the District court
‘added additional qualifications to the strict reading and express
portions of the constitution” In its rendering an order, “whereas,
this matter came on for consideration by the Court upon motion for
reconsideration and request for hearing, and the Court having
considered said motion, and being sufficiently advised, Justice
Patricio M. Serna, Justice Petra Jimenez Maes and Justice Charles W.
Daniels concurring;
Now therefore, it is ordered that the motion for reconsidration be DENIED…
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Witness, The Hon. Edward L. Chavez,
Chief Justice
It gives form but not substance. It offered no protection from undue
action nor offered a necessary statement of reason that the District court
correctly addressed that ‘learned in the law’ is not the threshold of
qualification for the office of District attorney while holding to the
effect that “learned in the law” is substantially the same as “licensed
attorney’ .
Chavez v. Evans,[79 N.M. 587, 446 P.2nd 445 ] the state Supreme court
case introduced and underlying the objections to the candidacy did
not simply equate “licensed and learned” as interchangeable ( as is
commonly understood). It did not attempt to raise itself to
substantially amend the express state constitution. It presented the
state’s compelling rationale as to why certain candidates were
withheld from the ballots in 1968.
Chavez was written in the era Harper and voting rights expanse. It
established a review of the threshold qualifications of the slate of
“People Constitutional Party”. “Petitioners, eight in number, seek
mandamus to require to certify their names… for the offices to which
they were nominated….The remaining candidates of that party have
already been certified.
Chavez articulated the questions involving each of the Peoples
Constitutional party candidates separately. The Court noted that
the “constitution must be read as a whole’ and that two sections
must be read together. In ordering the mandamus to for the
candidates for President, Vice –president, (a state board of
education member) and (at that time) the two Congressional District
candidates, Chavez provided that the refusal to certify those
candidates was erroneous. “The constitutional qualifications for
membership in the lower house of Congress exclude all other
qualifications, and state law can neither add nor subtract from
them”. “The state may provide such qualifications and restrictions
as it may deem proper for offices created by the state; but for
offices created by the United States Constitution, we must look to
the creating authority for all qualifications and restrictions.”
Thus it followed that the ‘statute unconstitutionally adds
additional qualifications.
With respect to the candidates of the Peoples Constitutional state
offices of Governor, Lt Governor and District attorney, Chavez provided
that those candidates did not meet the qualifications as provided for
office. Gubernatorial candidate Tijerina was denied certification
because ‘a conviction of a felony within the constitutional
prohibition. As Tijerina was disqualified , so to was the candidate for
Lt. Governor ‘as those offices are elected jointly”.
Finally, Chavez dealt with the question of Preston Monongye, the
candidate for District Attorney of the Peoples Constitutional Party.
It pointed out that Montagye was denied certification ‘for the
announced reason that he is not learned in the law as required by the
New Mexico Constitution for one to hold that office.” ‘While
providing “to our minds to hold that “learned in the law” and being a
licensed attorney are synonymous as indicated”, it more importantly
showed that the denied certification of Monongye was because of an
absence of any showing of “learned in the law” as constitutionally
required. “By affidavit the petitioner sets forth his qualifications
which do not include the completion of a law course or graduation
from an approved law school. Neither does he claim that h has been
admitted or is qualified to be admitted to practice law in this or
any other state. Under these circumstances, can he be learned in the
law”?
We would answer unhesitantly in the negative were it not for the
different qualifications contained in our constitution, as noted
above, for the holding of the offices of district attorney, attorney
general and justice of the Supreme Court…
It follows that in light of the statute and the surrounding
circumstances present when our constitution was adopted, an
interpretation such as argued for by petitioner Monongye is
unreasonable and incongruous and will not be adopted by us.
Chavez per se is not the fault. In no manner did it attempt to
provide an undeclared amendment to the state constitution. Rather
categorically, Chavez provided a straight-forward and direct
interpretation. It dealt with circumstances which were specific to
that time and those events, stated the questions and provided a
rationale direct upon those questions.
Chavez per se is not at fault. It is the practices such as
introducing excerpts and concluding that the excerpt gives the full
meaning.
The instant case, however, is a different set of circumstances
than were present in 1968. The state district court added
additional qualification when it found the candidate “learned in
the law”
and then proceeded to disqualify the candidate for not being a “licensed
attorney.” The state District court provided no rationale nor any
compelling reason of the State in its decision. The State supreme Court
abdicated it necessary responsibility and obligations to define by reason
or interpretation “learned in the law”
is only satisfied by a license-- when the whole in totality of
circumstance it remains as a parlor game shuffle, a specious legal
argument that obscures what was taken was certain inalienable rights”.
1. The 950 signatures did not receive the equal protection necessary
to a meaningful vote of a candidate of their choice.
2. And even as early as May, June , July, the candidate was ‘barred ‘
by statutes which would could provide access to the general election.
3.And by a means of negative vote bearing forth an unwritten meaning
forth precedence, the People of the state witnessed a constitutional
change, an amendment , in a manner that is patently unconstitutional
itself.
Before continuing, That which presents the disparity or provide for the
“results test” is the contrast in the treatment of the Citizens
Committee v. Joseph Campbell, the nature of which included the
allegations of “fraud“.
The conveyance of false or self serving signature, by Campbell or
those in his campaign (despite other formal complaint) was never
taken seriously. The Sena petition and local attorneys providing that
assistance never filed with the campaign finance laws . No action
was pursued, despite “daily fines” was not pursued. Their candidates
names appeared on the ballots.
drawn which are inconsistent with the equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, state measures which have the effect of
denying or diluting a citizen’s vote must be justified with a
compelling state interest.( Harper at 670, 86 Supreme Court 1079)
(striking down the State Poll tax ); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533.
Title 42, Section 1973 (h) provides: Congressional finding and
declaration of policy against enforced payment of poll taxes
as a device to impair voting rights.
The Congress finds that the requirement of the payment of a poll tax
as a precondition to voting (i) precludes persons of limited means
from voting or imposes unreasonable financial hardship upon such
persons as a precondition to their exercise of the franchise,
(ii) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any legitimate State
interest in the conduct of elections, and (iii) in some areas has
the purpose or effect of denying persons the right to vote because
of race or color. Upon the basis of these findings, Congress
declares that the constitutional right of citizens to vote is
denied or abridged in some areas by the requirement of the payment
of a poll tax as a precondition to voting.
Taking the events of “licensing requirement” as the abstract of a
payment of a tax, along requiring that as a measure to
precondition operates as a “poll tax”. The Gould candidacy was not
fulfilled but for the additional non-constitutional qualification.
While a license for which a fee is paid is necessary in the
absence of a right, the absence of a license as a rationale for
the removal of a right is a undue and burdensome. While appearing
“neutral”, or it is decidedly discriminatory as the results as
“it dilutes the voting strength of the minority group“ (East
Jefferson Coalition for Leadership and Development v. Jefferson
Parrish-. 691 F.Supp 991)
Invidious discrimination applies a differentiation scale
to people who belong or appear to belong group or another
group. The group being discriminated against is generally
seen as being lower, lacking or deficient in some way.
(This type of discrimination is an unfair and often
illegal practice that can go on daily in many different
forms.) Relative to the specifics of the instant case, it
is based upon the ‘assumption that a license is required’
rather than a right assured by state and federal
constitutions and statutes. The right to seek public
office of a future government cannot be so disregarded. It
fundamentally breaches the Equal Protection Clause.
In the context of the instant matter, there was no overt or subtle
racial appeal or issue. However, the Nomination Signatures
constitute, by axiom, a “minority group that is politically
cohesive”. There were over 950 raw signatures, of which over the
statutory requirement of 545 for the First Judicial District. The
“minority” is a mixture of persons who had personal contact with
the candidate. Most received literature of platforms and positions
of the candidate . Their individual signatures were provided by
their own hands, freely absent any coercions or
misrepresentations, and recorded the names ( as registered to
vote), signatures, places which the person resided and city of
residences. The signature process was carried out regularly in
public places, private lands and included persons from each of the
three counties that compose the First Judicial District.
The petitions clearly stated the candidate’s name, address, county
of registration, and the pertinent information regarding the time,
place and conduct of the election. And the validity of the
petitions were not challenged, excepting as to the “licensure
issue”.
As the record reads, that issue was addressed before the district
court and the state Supreme court. “ New Mexico’s constitution
provides: [District attorneys] There shall be a district attorney for
each judicial district, who shall be learned in the law, and who shall
be a resident of New Mexico for three years next prior to his
election, shall be the law officer of the state and of the counties
within his district, shall be elected for a term of four years, and
shall perform such duties and receive such salary as prescribed by
law. (NMSC Art VI Sec 24)
The threshold of qualification is direct of the state constitution.
While the qualification is determinant for judges having been in the
actual practice of law for 6 years or the attorney or that the
attorney general of the State be a licensed attorney of the supreme
court, those thresholds are direct of the state constitution under
different sections. Applying the same standard of qualifications for
those offices to displace the direct language of the State
constitution upon the qualifications for the district attorney is a
breach of the direct language and meaning of the qualifications.
New Mexico’s constitution also provides: “Every citizen of the
United States who is a legal resident of the state and is a
qualified elector therein, shall be qualified to hold any elective
public office except as otherwise provided in this constitution.
(Article VII, New Mexico State constitution)
promoted in Article II of the New Mexico constitution :
Sec 8. [Freedom of Elections]
All elections shall be free and open, and no power, civil or military
shall at any time prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.
That imperative is furthered under the election code that a once a
decision of the state district court is rendered, “The decision shall be
appealable only to the supreme court and notice of appeal shall be filed
within five days after the decision of the district court. The supreme
court shall hear and render a decision on the appeal forthwith. 1-8-35
NMSA
The state supreme court heads the Judicial Branch of State government.
It is the state’s appellate court of last review and has supervisory
control over all lesser courts. The state supreme court has original
jurisdiction. The court also is empowered to issue necessary and
proper writs and to provide for the transfer of any action or decision
enumerated in the statutes.
The failure of the Court to provide a “ reasoned answer” upon the
petition for a mandamus exacerbates the issue that the District court
‘added additional qualifications to the strict reading and express
portions of the constitution” In its rendering an order, “whereas,
this matter came on for consideration by the Court upon motion for
reconsideration and request for hearing, and the Court having
considered said motion, and being sufficiently advised, Justice
Patricio M. Serna, Justice Petra Jimenez Maes and Justice Charles W.
Daniels concurring;
Now therefore, it is ordered that the motion for reconsidration be DENIED…
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Witness, The Hon. Edward L. Chavez,
Chief Justice
It gives form but not substance. It offered no protection from undue
action nor offered a necessary statement of reason that the District court
correctly addressed that ‘learned in the law’ is not the threshold of
qualification for the office of District attorney while holding to the
effect that “learned in the law” is substantially the same as “licensed
attorney’ .
Chavez v. Evans,[79 N.M. 587, 446 P.2nd 445 ] the state Supreme court
case introduced and underlying the objections to the candidacy did
not simply equate “licensed and learned” as interchangeable ( as is
commonly understood). It did not attempt to raise itself to
substantially amend the express state constitution. It presented the
state’s compelling rationale as to why certain candidates were
withheld from the ballots in 1968.
Chavez was written in the era Harper and voting rights expanse. It
established a review of the threshold qualifications of the slate of
“People Constitutional Party”. “Petitioners, eight in number, seek
mandamus to require to certify their names… for the offices to which
they were nominated….The remaining candidates of that party have
already been certified.
Chavez articulated the questions involving each of the Peoples
Constitutional party candidates separately. The Court noted that
the “constitution must be read as a whole’ and that two sections
must be read together. In ordering the mandamus to for the
candidates for President, Vice –president, (a state board of
education member) and (at that time) the two Congressional District
candidates, Chavez provided that the refusal to certify those
candidates was erroneous. “The constitutional qualifications for
membership in the lower house of Congress exclude all other
qualifications, and state law can neither add nor subtract from
them”. “The state may provide such qualifications and restrictions
as it may deem proper for offices created by the state; but for
offices created by the United States Constitution, we must look to
the creating authority for all qualifications and restrictions.”
Thus it followed that the ‘statute unconstitutionally adds
additional qualifications.
With respect to the candidates of the Peoples Constitutional state
offices of Governor, Lt Governor and District attorney, Chavez provided
that those candidates did not meet the qualifications as provided for
office. Gubernatorial candidate Tijerina was denied certification
because ‘a conviction of a felony within the constitutional
prohibition. As Tijerina was disqualified , so to was the candidate for
Lt. Governor ‘as those offices are elected jointly”.
Finally, Chavez dealt with the question of Preston Monongye, the
candidate for District Attorney of the Peoples Constitutional Party.
It pointed out that Montagye was denied certification ‘for the
announced reason that he is not learned in the law as required by the
New Mexico Constitution for one to hold that office.” ‘While
providing “to our minds to hold that “learned in the law” and being a
licensed attorney are synonymous as indicated”, it more importantly
showed that the denied certification of Monongye was because of an
absence of any showing of “learned in the law” as constitutionally
required. “By affidavit the petitioner sets forth his qualifications
which do not include the completion of a law course or graduation
from an approved law school. Neither does he claim that h has been
admitted or is qualified to be admitted to practice law in this or
any other state. Under these circumstances, can he be learned in the
law”?
We would answer unhesitantly in the negative were it not for the
different qualifications contained in our constitution, as noted
above, for the holding of the offices of district attorney, attorney
general and justice of the Supreme Court…
It follows that in light of the statute and the surrounding
circumstances present when our constitution was adopted, an
interpretation such as argued for by petitioner Monongye is
unreasonable and incongruous and will not be adopted by us.
Chavez per se is not the fault. In no manner did it attempt to
provide an undeclared amendment to the state constitution. Rather
categorically, Chavez provided a straight-forward and direct
interpretation. It dealt with circumstances which were specific to
that time and those events, stated the questions and provided a
rationale direct upon those questions.
Chavez per se is not at fault. It is the practices such as
introducing excerpts and concluding that the excerpt gives the full
meaning.
The instant case, however, is a different set of circumstances
than were present in 1968. The state district court added
additional qualification when it found the candidate “learned in
the law”
and then proceeded to disqualify the candidate for not being a “licensed
attorney.” The state District court provided no rationale nor any
compelling reason of the State in its decision. The State supreme Court
abdicated it necessary responsibility and obligations to define by reason
or interpretation “learned in the law”
is only satisfied by a license-- when the whole in totality of
circumstance it remains as a parlor game shuffle, a specious legal
argument that obscures what was taken was certain inalienable rights”.
1. The 950 signatures did not receive the equal protection necessary
to a meaningful vote of a candidate of their choice.
2. And even as early as May, June , July, the candidate was ‘barred ‘
by statutes which would could provide access to the general election.
3.And by a means of negative vote bearing forth an unwritten meaning
forth precedence, the People of the state witnessed a constitutional
change, an amendment , in a manner that is patently unconstitutional
itself.
Before continuing, That which presents the disparity or provide for the
“results test” is the contrast in the treatment of the Citizens
Committee v. Joseph Campbell, the nature of which included the
allegations of “fraud“.
The conveyance of false or self serving signature, by Campbell or
those in his campaign (despite other formal complaint) was never
taken seriously. The Sena petition and local attorneys providing that
assistance never filed with the campaign finance laws . No action
was pursued, despite “daily fines” was not pursued. Their candidates
names appeared on the ballots.
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