Though kept in the dark, Thurman began the process of transferring the TOWs to the CIA, the first step of the journey.
Powell’s orders “bypassed the formal [covert procedures] on the ingress line,” Thurman acknowledged in later Iran-Contra testimony. “The first shipment is made without a complete wring-out through all of the procedural steps.”
As Powell’s strange orders rippled through the top echelon of the Pentagon, Lt. Gen. Vincent M. Russo, the assistant deputy chief of staff for logistics, called Powell to ask about the operation.
Powell immediately circumvented Russo’s inquiry. In effect, Powell pulled rank by arranging for “executive instructions” commanding Russo to deliver the first 1,000 TOWs, no questions asked.
“It was a little unusual,” commented then Army chief of staff, Gen. John A. Wickham Jr. “All personal visit or secure phone call, nothing in writing – because normally through the [covert logistics office] a procedure is established so that records are kept in a much more formal process. ...
“I felt very uneasy about this process. And I also felt uneasy about the notification dimension to the Congress.” Under federal law, the Executive was required to notify Congress both of covert action “findings” and the transfer of military equipment to third countries.
However, on January 29, 1986, thanks to Powell’s intervention, 1,000 U.S. TOWs were loaded onto pallets at Redstone Arsenal and transferred to the airfield at Anniston, Alabama.
As the shipment progressed, senior Pentagon officers grew edgier about Powell withholding the destination and other details. The logistics personnel also wanted proof that somebody was paying for the missiles.
Major Christopher Simpson, who was making the flight arrangements, later told Iran-Contra investigators that Gen. Russo “was very uncomfortable with no paperwork to support the mission request. He wasn’t going to do nothin’, as he said, without seeing some money. … ‘no tickey, no laundry.’”
Swiss Accounts
The money for the first shipment was finally deposited into a CIA account in Geneva, Switzerland, on February 11, 1986. Three days later, Russo released the 1,000 TOWs.
Inside the Pentagon, however, concern grew about Powell’s unorthodox arrangements and the identity of the missile recipients. Major Simpson told congressional investigators that he would have rung alarm bells if he had known the TOWs were headed to Iran.
“In the three years that I had worked there, I had been instructed ... by the leadership ... never to do anything illegal, and I would have felt that we were doing something illegal,” Simpson said.
Even without knowing that the missiles were going to Iran, Simpson expressed concern about whether the requirement to notify Congress had been met.
He got advice from a Pentagon lawyer that the 1986 intelligence authorization act, which mandated a “timely” notice to Congress on foreign arms transfers, had an “impact on this particular mission.”
The issue was bumped up to Secretary of the Army John Marsh. Though still blind about the shipment’s destination, the Army high command was inclined to stop the peculiar operation in its tracks.
At this key moment, Colin Powell intervened again. Simpson said, “General Powell was asking General Russo to reassure the Secretary of the Army that notification was being handled, ... that it had been addressed and it was taken care of.”
Despite Powell’s assurance, Congress had not been notified.
Army Secretary Marsh shared the skepticism about Powell’s operation. On February 25, 1986, Marsh called a meeting of senior Army officers and ordered Russo to “tell General Powell of my concern with regard to adequate notification being given to Congress,” Russo testified.
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