This article summarizes some of the events concerning the 4 hijacked flights on 9/11, provides information on standard air defense procedures and warnings received prior to 9/11 and gives a brief overview of the multiple war games and military operations surrounding 9/11, including Continuity of Government planning. Links are provided for more in depth research.
Air Defense “Failures”:
Flight 11:
The first sign of a potentially very serious problem and possible hijacking came at 8:14 am when American Airlines (AA) Flight 11 didn’t respond to an order to climb to 35,000 feet, shortly after acknowledging an instruction to turn 20 degrees to the right, and according to initial reports, this is when its transponder is turned off; it’s later decided that this is when the flight was hijacked. With the transponder being off, the flight’s number, exact speed and altitude can’t be determined, but it was always visible on FAA radar. After this, the “talkback” button for radio communication was pushed intermittently most of the way to WTC 1, but the 4 digit hijack code is never entered into the transponder. At 8:19 am Flight Attendant Betty Ong used an airfone at the back of the plane to call an AA reservation desk and reported that a passenger had been stabbed, it seemed Mace had been used as it was hard to breathe, the cockpit was not answering, and the flight was probably hijacked. Supervisor Nydia Gonzalez was patched in at 8:21 am, and at this time she also contacts Craig Marquis, a manager at the AA Operations Center, who says they’re contacting Air Traffic Control (ATC) and attempting to reach the flight crew; the call with Ong lasted 25 minutes. At 8:20 am, Flight 11 changed course to head northwest; according to some news reports from the time, Boston Flight Control considers Flight 11 to have been hijacked at this time, but doesn’t notify other control centers for 5 minutes, and doesn’t notify NMCC/NORAD for 20 minutes.
Starting at 8:22 am, Flight Attendant Amy Sweeney uses an airfone to contact the AA flight service office at Boston Logan airport. She makes attempts at 8:22 and 8:24, but these are quickly disconnected. During attempts at 8:25 and 8:29 she communicates a passenger has been hurt, before being cut off. She manages to speak to manager Michael Woodward, who is also a friend of hers, from 8:32 to 8:44, and confirms the flight has been hijacked. During this call, Woodward uses a second phone to call Nancy Wyatt, a supervisor at Boston Logan; in turn, she transmits what he is saying to AA headquarters in Fort Worth, TX; this call is taped, and two managers are heard to be discussing that the information should not be shared, i.e. that it should be covered up. At 8:24 am, during one of the times the talkback button is pressed, Boston Air Traffic Controllers hear the message, “We have some planes. Just stay quiet and you’ll be OK. We are returning to the airport.” Seconds later, another message comes through, “Nobody move. Everything will be OK. If you try to make any moves you’ll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.”
At 8:25 am Boston ATC decides Flight 11 has been hijacked and reportedly begins notifying other ATC centers and FAA chain of command, but not NMCC/NORAD. However, according to Ben Sliney, the national operations manager at the FAA’s Command Center, “the protocol was in place that the center that reported the hijacking would notify the military.… I go back to 1964, where I began my air traffic career, and they have always followed the same protocol.” At 8:26 am, Flight 11 makes a 100 degree turn to the south and a minute later it turns south-southwest. At 8:28 am Boston ATC calls the FAA Command Center in Herndon and tells them they believe Flight 11 is headed for New York City. At 8:29 am Flight 11 turns south-southeast. At 8:32 am Herndon notifies the Operations Center at FAA headquarters. At 8:34 am, Boston Air Traffic Controllers hear a 3rd transmission from Flight 11; “Nobody move, please, we are going back to the airport. Don’t try to make any stupid moves.” They go outside of normal procedure and contact the FAA facility at Otis Air National Guard Base, and request for them to inform the military there (The Commission claims this happened at 8:37 am).
Otis had 2 fighters on 24-hour alert; according to Lt. Col. Tim Duffy, he received word of the hijacked flight around 8:30-35 am; “As soon as we heard there was something about a hijacking we got moving.… I called for ‘Nasty’ (Maj. Dan Nash) and I to suit up right away.” “Halfway to the jets, we got ‘battle stations,’ and I briefed Nasty on the information I had about the American Airlines flight. About 4-5 min. later, we got the scramble order and took off.” At 8:35 am, Colin Scoggins, military liaison to the FAA at Boston, says he notifies NORAD’s North East Air Defense Sector (NEADS) (the 9/11 Commission Report doesn’t mention this). Also according to Scoggins, Joseph Cooper, a Boston Center air traffic management specialist, had already notified NEADS. Reportedly, NEADS is unable to find Flight 11 on their radar, despite being given location information by Scoggins. Also during this time there is confusion at NEADS over whether this is actually part of Vigilant Guardian, a live-fly hijacking exercise involving false radar injects (war games covered in more detail later in this article). At 8:39 am Flight 11 flies past the Indian Point nuclear power plant. At 8:40 am, NORAD finally receives notification of the hijacking from the FAA, according to the first NORAD timeline. At 8:46 am Flight 11 crashes into World Trade Center 1 and NORAD approves the launch of fighters to go after 11; however, according to NORAD’s first timeline. This summary was sourced from the AA 11 Timeline at HistoryCommons.org; many additional details are available there.
Flight 175 hit WTC 2 at 9:03 am, Flight 77 (or whatever it was) hit the Pentagon sometime between 9:36 and 9:38 am, and Flight 93 crashed (or was shot down) at 10:03 am if you believe NORAD and the 9/11 Commission, or 10:06 am if you believe the seismic report, which is consistent with all news reports from the time. Either way, this last event was nearly 2 hours after the first sign of hijacking. If the failure to recognize and respond to a crisis involving multiple hijackings is just a sign of massive and unprecedented incompetence and failure to follow standard procedures at the FAA, how were they able to land hundreds of planes without incident soon after the order was given to ground all flights nationwide? Regarding how anything was able to hit the Pentagon, see this testimony of Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta to the 9/11 Commission (left out of their final report). He said he arrived at the PEOC before 9:30 and Dick Cheney was already there and in charge; “There was a young man who had come in and said to the vice president, ’The plane is 50 miles out. The plane is 30 miles out.’ And when it got down to, ‘The plane is 10 miles out,’ the young man also said to the vice president, ‘Do the orders still stand?’ And the vice president turned and whipped his neck around and said, ‘Of course the orders still stand. Have you heard anything to the contrary?’” Shortly after that, the Pentagon is hit.
Read the timelines for the other flights here:
UA 175 Timeline | AA 77 Timeline | UA 93 Timeline – HistoryCommons.org
Context in which the “failures” of standard air defense procedures occurred:
Click here to read the rest of this article at 911Reports.com
Click here for all the articles in the: 9/11 Truth Overview Series
