![]() |
By Andrew Mills (about the author) Page 1 of 4 page(s)
For OpEdNews: Andrew Mills - Writer
by Andrew Mills
The more you study the facts and the circumstantial evidence surrounding the 9/11 attacks, the more you doubt the official explanation of the attacks given in the 9/11 Commission Report. Most all the necessary information is, or has been, available through the major media. It's just a matter of pulling it all together and organizing the data. When you do that, you are left with major doubts about the official story and you begin to suspect that some of our officials may have been involved, at least in the sense that they had fore-knowledge of the attacks and just let them happen.
You are not alone. In a national poll conducted by the Scripps Howard News Service and Ohio University in August 2006, 36 percent of respondents said it is "very likely" or "somewhat likely" that federal officials either participated in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon or took no action to stop them "because they wanted the United States to go to war in the Middle East."
Let's look at some of the evidence.
The Administration Ignored the Threats
Despite the Administration's rhetoric that they had "no warnings" leading up to 9/11, it has become abundantly clear that key Administration officials were made aware of a vast array of al Qaeda threats and warnings that existed in years prior, and more importantly, in the weeks leading up to September 11, 2001. Here not only the Administration, but also the 9/11 Commission, failed to connect the dots.
1. Results of an investigation by a commission headed by Gary Hart and Warren Rudman appeared in its third and final report on 2/15/2001. "The commission believes that the security of the American homeland from the threats of the new century should be the primary national security mission of the U.S. government." But instead, the new Bush administration chose to focus on out-dated conventional defense concerns-missile defense and a review of the military's force structure.
2. A Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) entitled, "Bin Laden Planning High-Profile Attacks." was sent to top White House officials on June 30, 2001. It stated that bin Laden operatives expected near-term attacks to have dramatic consequences of catastrophic proportions. The brief said that despite evidence of delays possibly caused by heightened US security, al Qaeda's planning for the attacks was continuing. (SEIBs usually are released one day after President Daily Briefings are given to President Bush and contain similar content, so it is probable Bush was given this warning.)
3. George Tenet called an urgent special meeting with Condoleezza Rice on July 10, 2001 to discuss the al Qaeda threat.
4. Officials in the Administration were concerned about the threat of a possible assassination of President Bush at the G-8 Summit by al Qaeda in July of 2001. One of the scenarios of concern was the use of aircraft to dive bomb the summit building.
5. FBI headquarters totally ignored urgent warnings by FBI field offices regarding Middle Eastern men attending flight schools in different parts of the country. On July 10, 2001, Phoenix FBI agent Kenneth Williams sent a memo stating this concern to FBI headquarters. In August 2001, Colleen Rowley, an FBI Minneapolis field agent, wrote emails to headquarters warning of Middle Eastern men taking flying lessons. One such email mentioned that a civilian flight instructor had warned her that a Boeing 747 loaded with fuel could be used as a weapon. There was no response from FBI headquarters.
FBI Agent Harry Samit made 70 unsuccessful attempts to get a FISA Warrant to examine Moussaoui's belongings-papers, computer, etc. The excuse given was the 'Reno Wall,' even though this did not apply in the case of an alien.
6. On August 6, 2001 President Bush and Condoleezza Rice completely ignored the CIA's daily presidential briefing, "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S," a report indicating al Qaeda could hijack airplanes to attack the U.S. The next day Bush said, "I'm working on a lot of issues, national security matters," and on the next day he told the press, "I've got a lot of national security concerns that we're working on-Iraq, Macedonia, very worrisome right now."
7. Also in August 2001, Acting FBI Director Thomas Pickard, after being briefed on a top-secret, comprehensive review of counterterrorism programs in the FBI, met with Attorney General John Ashcroft. He asked Ashcroft for $58 million from the Justice Department to hire hundreds of new field agents, translators and analysts to improve the Bureau's capacity to detect foreign terror threats. On September 10, 2001, Pickard received an official letter from Ashcroft turning him down flat.
8. On September 4, 2001, the FBI notified the State Department about the need to revoke the visa of one of the hijackers, Khalid al Mihdhar, which included instructions to detain al Mihdhar for questioning, as he was considered armed and dangerous and had participated in terrorist activities, including the bombing of the USS Cole. The State Department then used its visa revocation authority under section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to revoke his visa under section 212 (A)(3)(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act for his participation in terrorist activities. But the next day, September 5th, the State Department put out a directive regarding al Mihdhar--to let him go. The excuse was that al Mihdhar was a potential witness in an FBI investigation, and thus he [though an armed and dangerous terrorist] should not be detained.
The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author
and do not necessarily reflect those of this website or its editors.
Contact Author |
Contact Editor |
View Authors' Articles |
| 12 comments |
Want to post your own comment on this Article?
|
||||
Tell a Friend:
|
Copyright © 2002-2009, OpEdNews |