The amount estimated as income to the Taliban using figures given in the report is as much as $400 million per year. For comparison purposes, the Taliban's opium profits are estimated at $300 million per year. Corruption which includes weapons and cash reaching the enemy has been a feature of wars past, notably Vietnam; rarely, however, has the problem reached the level of a primary, and, perhaps, principle, source of funding, exposed in its minutest details by sworn testimony and thousands of pages of documentation.
Knowledge of the practice has run all the way up the chain of command for some time, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton telling Congress in testimony last June: "You offload a ship in Karachi [Pakistan] and by the time whatever it is -" you know, muffins for our soldiers' breakfasts or anti-IED equipment -" gets to where we're headed, it goes through a lot of hands. And one of the major sources of funding for the Taliban is the protection money."
The payments are in essence unavoidable as a result of the remote and hostile nature of the Afghan countryside. An American officer says in the Tierney report:
[T]he heart of the matter is that insurgents are getting paid for safe passage because there are few other ways to bring goods to the combat outposts and forward operating bases where soldiers need them. By definition, many outposts are situated in hostile terrain, in the southern parts of Afghanistan. The [Afghan security companies run by warlords] don't really protect convoys of American military goods here, because they simply can't; they need the Taliban's cooperation.
The ability to pay fighters through illegal profits and other sources is a critical part of the Taliban's strength, as its popularity remains low after previous years of repressive rule. But through opium profits and other sources, such as the protection payments, it can easily afford to pay fighters a wage, excellent for Afghanistan, of $10 a day. Despite spending over 30 times Afghanistan's yearly GNP since 2001 on military operations, poverty remains wretched, and 40 percent of the labor force is unemployed, giving the Taliban a vast pool of potential recruits. Still, although the US presence has reinvigorated the Taliban's preferred image of nationalist freedom fighters, few Afghans, even among Pashtuns (the ethnic group most associated with the Taliban) want to see them return as a government.
The report found that insurgents and their warlord allies, who run Afghan "security companies," extort anywhere from $1,500 to $3,000 USD per truck to allow to pass unhindered the two-hundred- or three-hundred-vehicle convoys which cross the country daily. The convoys transport MRAP armored vehicles, Humvees, ammunition, bottled water, fuel, Oreo cookies, video games, treadmills, frozen turkeys, air conditioners, and any number of goods which comprise the range of Department of Defense contracting in the now $100 billion per year war.
Representative Tierney told CBS News: "What shocked me is the constant call of the contractors to bring it to the attention of the Department of Defense." The response from the US, said Tierney, was to turn a blind eye as long as the goods got to where they needed to go.
The "Warlord, Inc." report shows that up to 20 percent of all overland transportation contracts for military supply convoys are paid to warlords and their insurgent allies. The contract examined in depth by the investigation was worth $ 2.16 billion. Tierney called what the report had found "the tip of the iceberg."
"The business is war and the war is business and you've got 'Warlord Inc.' going on over there," Tierney said.
The report noted that the weight and volume of freight is many orders of magnitude over what would be possible to transport any other way than truck convoy. Fuel and bottled water requirements alone are many times the weight capacity of military airlift by helicopter or cargo plane, and the number of airstrips capable of handling large aircraft is severely limited.
In its specific descriptions of the layout in Afghanistan in which every stretch of road is considered prime real estate, the report detailed an array of unsavory characters. In the north, every contractor and subcontractor assigned to take US supplies to Uruzgan exclusively uses Matiullah Khan's security services. According to the CEO of one of the contracting companies, "Matiullah has the road from Kandahar to Tarin Kowt completely under his control. No one can travel without Matiullah without facing consequences. There is no other way to get there. You have to either pay him, or fight him."
The report warns that the de facto policy of protection payments to insurgents and their allies strengthen and arm the very elements of society most opposed to the emergence of a strong central government, and are also the elements which tend to have the most repressive attitudes towards women.
Of a Commander "Ruhullah" (likely a nom de guerre), the report says:
Commander Ruhullah [who controls the key Highway 1 between Kabul and Kandahar to the south] is just one of dozens of warlords, strongmen, and commanders who have found a niche in providing security services to the US military in Afghanistan. Some are well-known tribal leaders or former mujahedeen who have been in the business of war for the past thirty years. Others, like Commander Ruhullah, are relative newcomers whose power and influence are directly derivative of their contracting and subcontracting work for the US government. Both the old and new warlords' interests are in fundamental conflict with a properly functioning government.
One convoy that made the mistake of not paying Commander Ruhullah, known by villagers along his stretch of highway as "the butcher," reported hostile contact with 15-20 insurgents. According to the report: