The entire history of New York's Election Law, until ERMA, recognized that post-election ballot tampering is so probable that it has never permitted post-election verification of the secure, reliable, publicly observed first count.Under ERMA, not only is the first count (on software) undependable and concealed from the pubic, but the post-election "audit" is also unreliable, since the ballots being hand counted to verify the first count no longer enjoy the security of uninterrupted public scrutiny enabled by the many authorized watchers at the poll site.Under ERMA, the integrity of the verification is impugned, leaving the entire count unknowable and unreliable.
Moreover, since we believe that transparency in a public election demands that many eyes be able to observe the process that results in the count, we are opposed to optical scanners and DREs which hide that process.
Since we believe in the democratic requirement that everyday people be able to witness the process that results in the count, we are opposed to optical scanners and DREs which conceal the count.
Since we believe that a democratic electoral system requires the production of reliable, publicly accessible evidence of both how the votes were counted as well as evidence of tampering, we are opposed to optical scanners and DREs which computer scientists have agreed can be programmed to destroy evidence of the count as well as evidence of the tampering.Without reliable evidence of the count or of fraud, there is no way to challenge the results in a court of law, potentially disenfranchising the electorate and depriving them of their legal recourse to vindicate the loss of their constitutional right.
Since we believe a democratic electoral system must be designed to detect, deter and reveal fraud, we are opposed to optical scanners and DREs which have been shown to be hackable without detection on a massive, outcome-determinative scale, by a single person who doesn't even have to be physically present.
Since we believe a democratic electoral system must contain safeguards that prevent every known opportunity for tampering, and indeed this is what New York's case law has consistently required of the legislature, we are opposed to optical scanners and DREs which subject the count to known opportunities for tampering and expose the count to new and greater risks made possible by software.The highest court in New York has repeatedly found that dilution of the count by tampering amounts to unconstitutional disenfranchisement.
We therefore reject software driven voting systems and demand that New York hand count the ballots marked by accessible ballot markers for voters with special needs, and retain its secure, transparent, and reliable lever voting system, with all the attendant laws enacted to secure the lever count.
In 2004, Rady Ananda joined the growing community of citizen journalists. Focused mainly on elections, her blogs also address religious, gender, sexual and racial equality, as well as environmental issues; and are sprinkled with book and film reviews on various topics. She spent most of her working life as a legal investigator for private lawyers, and five years as an editor. She currently serves as a senior editor at OpEdNews.
All material offered here is the property of Rady Ananda, copyright 2006, 2007, 2008. Permission is granted to repost, with proper attribution including the original link.
"In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act." Tell the truth anyway.
There was no need/is no need for New York to surrender. They'll clean the clocks of the DOJ in any court contest and they've got the law on their side.
You make the key point - BOTH touch screens and optical scan counters have private code that can't be accessed and, even if it could, the complexity of detecting rotten software would require extensive computer software expertise, i.e., the number of machines potentially infected = the number of forensic specialists.
What a fraud this election will be with devices that can't be examined taking and counting the votes. The winner will look like a loser as a result and shame on Congress for doing nothing.
by
Michael Collins (105 articles, 16 quicklinks, 5 diaries, 355 comments)
on Monday, July 7, 2008 at 10:58:28 PM
Has an organization been formed to pursue this lawsuit? Are you getting excellent legal representation [person(s) with experience in NYS constitutional law]? Will Kellner testify?
by
ClearEye (1 articles, 0 quicklinks, 0 diaries, 18 comments)
on Tuesday, July 8, 2008 at 4:46:04 AM
We need both money to pursue the litigation (legal expenses including transcripts, filing fees, depositions, etc.) additional lawyers and volunteers who are willing to support our efforts through letter writing and by their physical presence in a courtroom.
We've got a PLEDGE where folks can sign up, but I see it hasn't yet been posted to our Documents Server. That should happen later today, and I'll post the link (or the entire pledge, probably) to OEN.
Thanks for asking, ClearEye
by
Rady Ananda (124 articles, 283 quicklinks, 36 diaries, 1061 comments)
on Tuesday, July 8, 2008 at 8:21:24 AM
I have a question about this paragraph in the article:
Fact:Unlike New York's lever voting machine or a hand-count voting system -- which require a completed, verified count on election night (because exposing the count to the watchfulness of ongoing public surveillance has been considered the most secure way to count our votes for the history of the State of New York), the new computerized systems will abandon the security provided by ongoing public scrutiny and no longer provide a completed, reliable, secure count on election night.NY Election Laws, McKinney's Chapter 17 at New York State Board of Elections.
The part in parenthesis. Are you talking about levers or HCPB as "being the most secure way to count our votes for the State of New York"?
Thanks,
Sheila Parks, Ed.D.
by
Sheila Parks (5 articles, 0 quicklinks, 0 diaries, 20 comments)
on Tuesday, July 8, 2008 at 8:08:16 AM