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July 1, 2008 at 00:33:04
Promoted to Headline (H2) on 7/1/08: by Rady Ananda Page 1 of 6 page(s) |
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"The voting industry sells crap, and that is the problem." Douglas A. Kellner, Co-Chair New York State Board of Elections I received a cache of documents surrounding NY's electoral system. Some of this material indicates justified resistance to computerized systems that fail to perform as intended, despite being certified. Some exposes deliberate info-suppression, preventing election officials from acting in the best interest of the public. One NY attorney extensively researched NY's election law history, showing the wisdom and security of prior law. A University of Virginia professor researched lever voting machines and provides a dire warning about new technology with its paper-based audit trail. This lengthy piece synthesizes the material for those interested in New York's battle to retain election integrity or to implement wholly condemned systems that have failed across the nation. New York doesn't use computerized voting systems. For over a century, it has protected election integrity by using a mechanical lever voting system that can be reliably tested, combined with a brilliant legislative scheme that anticipates every opportunity for election fraud – from insiders and from voters; from before, during and after the election. Yet, New York may join the 49 other lemming states in electoral suicide, with its 2005 Election Reform and Modernization Act (ERMA), as amended.
NY Loves Its Levers
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) does not require states to buy irredeemable computerized voting systems. Lever voting systems satisfy all but one of HAVA's requirements, as Douglas Kellner, Co-Chair of the New York State Board of Elections (SBOE) testified:
"[HAVA] sets minimum standards for voting machines. Our lever machines satisfy all but one of those standards, that there be at least one machine at each poll site that is 'accessible for individuals with disabilities....'"
Most NY officials have not been blinded by the glitz of high-tech wizardry. NY has kept its levers for the past six years, while elections across the nation crashed, glitched, and otherwise left the public even less confident in US elections. NY kept its levers when the nation switched to punchcard systems, which eventually brought us Florida's 2000 "election." Kellner decried these failed computerized systems at a June 19th SBOE meeting:
"The voting industry sells crap, and that is the problem....
"With the scanners I'm not going to get caught in this bargain with the devil. If the vendors do not have a product that today complies with the guidelines, I'm not prepared to use it.
"And I'm prepared to go back to Judge Sharpe and to say: 'Judge, it would be unconstitutional to enforce [HAVA] by requiring us to replace the lever voting machines with scanning equipment or DRE equipment or any equipment that does not comply with the current guidelines.'"
In naming Judge Sharpe, Kellner is referencing the 2006 Dept. of Justice lawsuit against the SBOE for failure to implement disabled-accessible voting devices and a statewide computerized voter database as required by HAVA.
Also resisting the effort to employ expensive gadgets that don't work is a mounting revolution on both sides of the aisle. Republican commissioner Gregory Peterson, newly appointed to the SBOE, expressed his bafflement at that June 19th meeting:
"[I]f it doesn't work the way you said it was going to work, we're better with a lever - just pushing down levers. And if the judge doesn't understand that then he's going to have to be made to understand that."
NY Experiences Software Failure
In accord with Judge Sharpe's order, NY must install disabled-accessible voting devices in the Fall 2008 election. Testing is underway, with three systems approved: Sequoia/Dominion Imagecast, ES&S Automark, and Premier (formerly Diebold) Automark.
Take action -- click here to contact your local newspaper or congress people:
Save NY's Levers; Reject Computerized Voting
Click here to see the most recent messages sent to congressional reps and local newspapers
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NY is first rate
Thanks to the great atate of New York for waiving open source certification fees as open source is now deemed to be " in the public interest " - A thousand hats tipped for leading the way !!- Brent Turner by Brent Turner (1 articles, 0 quicklinks, 0 diaries, 94 comments) on Tuesday, Jul 1, 2008 at 1:20:25 AM
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Vote in the Poll!!
POLL: Lever Voting Machines or Computerized Systems? by Rady Ananda (182 articles, 374 quicklinks, 49 diaries, 1718 comments [201 recommended, 2 rejected]) on Tuesday, Jul 1, 2008 at 1:23:42 AM
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Paper vs. Lever vs. Computers
Thank you Rady for publicising a "third road" to trustworthy elections. Many people think paper ballots hand counted in the polling place immediately after the polls close by bi-partisan teams to be the best method. I now believe lever machines to be as good or better, from what I read in Rady's article. As for recounts, paper ballots cannot be effectively sealed into the ballot box, since a truely devious thief with inside help could circumvent the seals without detection. So, once the ballots have left the room and been transported, it is true they can no longer be trusted in a recount. The arguments against recounts are valid, but the recount ban can be part of a hand counting process as well as a mechanical (lever) device process. Lever machines can be "hacked", but unlike computers, as the article notes, the hack would be plainly visible to the naked eye. Pre-polling tests could be done at the polling place before the polls open, with the poll workers casting the test votes, in order to test the accuracy of the machines, which would then be zeroed out for the real vote. There would be no possibility of a hacked computer program starting a theft at say, 10:30 am. Again, hand counts can be self auditing and reliable, but they must be done in the polling place before the ballots are moved. For the hand counts and the lever machines, the vote total tallys have to be verified and transmitted correctly. Photos of the tally sheets, telephone calls to the press, uploads to the internet: All could be used to make sure the precinct level results are accurately transmitted. On the other hand, there is ultimately no way of verifying any computerized system, even with hand count audits. Telephoned data, flashcards and cartridges are completely unverifiable and thus totally untrustworthy. Conclusion? New York should keep their lever machines, but since not enough of them could possibly be manufactured in time for the November 2008 elections, we here in Florida should continue to fight for significant audits of the scanners, if not a direct move to self auditing hand counts ala New Hampshire. Lever machines would be a simple and effective way to do voting, and we should work to implement them in future cycles, but we don't have time this cycle. Hand counts could be implemented in two weeks time, and hand audits of the scanners devised overnight. Since the Florida powers-that-be have no intention of performing meaningful audits, and would laugh out loud in hand counter's faces, perhaps we should be planning our lawsuits right now. by GitarChris (0 articles, 0 quicklinks, 0 diaries, 142 comments) on Tuesday, Jul 1, 2008 at 3:56:55 PM
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Reply: hey, hey, a Convert!
Thanks, GitarChris, for your open mind. I have been an avid fan of HCPB since at least April 05 - but Professor Pfaffenberger's research into levers, and my own research into HCPB fraud have nudged me into hoping that levers might truly be "one of the most astonishing achievements of American technological genius" There is more breaking news on this story... I'll post it shortly. by Rady Ananda (182 articles, 374 quicklinks, 49 diaries, 1718 comments [201 recommended, 2 rejected]) on Tuesday, Jul 1, 2008 at 7:17:37 PM
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The KISS principle
Paper ballots counted at the polling station immediately at the close of polling by electoral commission employees under the watchful eyes of scruitineers from each candidate and the results posted at each polling station ensures that the electoral count is accurate. Then you only have to worry about the valid voter lists and double voting. Why complicate a simple process? by John Haigh (1 articles, 0 quicklinks, 1 diaries, 118 comments) on Wednesday, Jul 2, 2008 at 2:38:06 AM
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