But it isn't just legislation that is pushed down the tracks by the outside
game. Media tends to gravitate towards coverage of the outside game. The
message of the outside game sticks in the public's consciousness better then
legislative bill numbers. After the outside game succeeds in pushing the
message into the mainstream, embedding it in the public psyche, change becomes
more durable.
The inside game doesn't necessarily think the outside game is necessary. Because
the outside game pushes the envelope, opening up new frontiers, it pushes
concepts into the mainstream that are -- by definition -- not really accepted
yet. When you depend on the establishment to do your bidding, you have to
distance yourself from the outside game. The smartest of the inside game folks
recognize how the ecosystem works, though, and often provide discreet support
and/or intelligence to the outside game.
Less savvy inside gamers allow themselves to be persuaded that the outside game
is dangerous, puts the agenda at risk, endangers the country. This is helped
along by disruptors (posing as part of the movement) who are actually working
for the opposition. In the civil rights movement, and in the anti-Viet Nam War
movement, there were paid infiltrators who posed as activists, but those
individuals persuaded many real activists over to a more controlled, less
"dangerous" point of view. They also helped pit them against the outside game.
It's all part of the play book.
You don't catch criminals by passing a rule against it.
The outside game defines the problem a bit differently. Let me give you an
analogy to show just how ridiculous the current inside game is to those of us
who start with the premise that there just might -- possibly -- be a criminal
enterprise at work in certain election situations.
Let's say it's small, localized, and simply mercenary. For $40,000 a guy with
inside access will make sure a developer-friendly commissioner gets in. To get
the guy in, he arranges to exploit a known hole in voting machine security.
Now, the Rush Holt bill will have you wait a couple years before it even gets to
the rules committee, where the lobbyists step in and gut the bill. So that
won't do a thing to protect 2006, because it wont be in effect by then, and it
probably won't protect 2008 because even if it makes it to the rules committee,
it will be quietly tweaked behind closed doors.
So the guy pockets his $40,000 and the commissioner gets into office. It will
almost certainly never be discovered, because there are no audit provisions
anywhere for electronic voting machines likely to catch this stuff, but let's
say it does get caught.
If you're playing the inside game, you take this example of the $40,000 cheat
and spend nine months discussing it into new standards, then a couple years to
grandfather the old voting systems, and finally, around 2009, you address what
the guy did for $40,000 back in 2006.
By this time, another guy is selling elections using a different back door. He
builds a better hack, having learned from the NIST discussion what they ARE
looking at. All he has to do is go where they are not looking.
If you're worried about national politics, listen up:
In a time-critical situation, the inside game runs out the clock.
Let's not call this dirty tricks or Rovian spin or pretend it is just the way
hardball politics work. If we can't substantiate the data in our elections
systems (both voter registration and votes) these weaknesses will attract
people who want to manipulate elections. Subverting election-related data is a
criminal act. If it involves more than one person, it is a criminal enterprise.
If criminal enterprises want to manipulate a national election by attacking the
data, that criminal entity will be thrilled to see activists derailed into
sincere actions that actually just run out the clock.
Efforts to steer everyone to the inside game a a bit insidious. Think for
yourself.
game. Media tends to gravitate towards coverage of the outside game. The
message of the outside game sticks in the public's consciousness better then
legislative bill numbers. After the outside game succeeds in pushing the
message into the mainstream, embedding it in the public psyche, change becomes
more durable.
The inside game doesn't necessarily think the outside game is necessary. Because
the outside game pushes the envelope, opening up new frontiers, it pushes
concepts into the mainstream that are -- by definition -- not really accepted
yet. When you depend on the establishment to do your bidding, you have to
distance yourself from the outside game. The smartest of the inside game folks
recognize how the ecosystem works, though, and often provide discreet support
and/or intelligence to the outside game.
Less savvy inside gamers allow themselves to be persuaded that the outside game
is dangerous, puts the agenda at risk, endangers the country. This is helped
along by disruptors (posing as part of the movement) who are actually working
for the opposition. In the civil rights movement, and in the anti-Viet Nam War
movement, there were paid infiltrators who posed as activists, but those
individuals persuaded many real activists over to a more controlled, less
"dangerous" point of view. They also helped pit them against the outside game.
It's all part of the play book.
The outside game defines the problem a bit differently. Let me give you an
analogy to show just how ridiculous the current inside game is to those of us
who start with the premise that there just might -- possibly -- be a criminal
enterprise at work in certain election situations.
Let's say it's small, localized, and simply mercenary. For $40,000 a guy with
inside access will make sure a developer-friendly commissioner gets in. To get
the guy in, he arranges to exploit a known hole in voting machine security.
Now, the Rush Holt bill will have you wait a couple years before it even gets to
the rules committee, where the lobbyists step in and gut the bill. So that
won't do a thing to protect 2006, because it wont be in effect by then, and it
probably won't protect 2008 because even if it makes it to the rules committee,
it will be quietly tweaked behind closed doors.
So the guy pockets his $40,000 and the commissioner gets into office. It will
almost certainly never be discovered, because there are no audit provisions
anywhere for electronic voting machines likely to catch this stuff, but let's
say it does get caught.
If you're playing the inside game, you take this example of the $40,000 cheat
and spend nine months discussing it into new standards, then a couple years to
grandfather the old voting systems, and finally, around 2009, you address what
the guy did for $40,000 back in 2006.
By this time, another guy is selling elections using a different back door. He
builds a better hack, having learned from the NIST discussion what they ARE
looking at. All he has to do is go where they are not looking.
If you're worried about national politics, listen up:
In a time-critical situation, the inside game runs out the clock.
Let's not call this dirty tricks or Rovian spin or pretend it is just the way
hardball politics work. If we can't substantiate the data in our elections
systems (both voter registration and votes) these weaknesses will attract
people who want to manipulate elections. Subverting election-related data is a
criminal act. If it involves more than one person, it is a criminal enterprise.
If criminal enterprises want to manipulate a national election by attacking the
data, that criminal entity will be thrilled to see activists derailed into
sincere actions that actually just run out the clock.
Efforts to steer everyone to the inside game a a bit insidious. Think for
yourself.
(Note: You can view every article as one long page if you sign up as an Advocate Member, or higher).
