SOUND POLICY Jervis advises that we shouldn't base policy on how we think the Other would respond if our assumptions are correct, but explore how they might respond if our assumptions and perceptions about their intentions and perceptions of us are not what we think.
If we assume crippling sanctions may cause another to back down they may have the opposite effect and provoke defiance, especially if demands are perceived as illegitimate, unfair, and unequal. In our pursuit of security, we may provoke humiliation, intimidation, insecurity, moral outrage all of which can provoke violence.
Jervis describes when states cooperate everybody wins, and when they conflict everybody loses. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, we did not avert catastrophe by deterrence but by quiet negotiations, creatively and intelligently reducing tension and offering a face-saving way out for both parties, and resisting pressures for military escalation. However, the underlying conflict was not addressed, so the Cold War and arms racearms race continued for decades. It seems best to lead with tension-reducing measures, positive inducements, security assurances, and face-saving ways out, quietly keeping knowledge of potential negative consequences in the background.
Jervis cautions us not to be concerned only about the "fog of battle" but also the "fog of foreign policy making."
We have explored deterrence and spiral theory here. There are two better and deeper strategies to be described in part 2 Osgood's GRIT Graduated Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction and mediation, conflict resolution and conflict transformation which creatively consider basic human needs and legitimate goals and design outside the box approaches capable of producing enduring security.
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