Security vs. Freedom: the False Choice
By Jeff Milchen
OpEdNews.COM
When Congress reacted to the events of Sept. 11, 2001, by passing the
"Patriot Act" just weeks later, many Representatives agreed to
support it only because the most drastic expansions of government power
were made temporary. Those provisions will not expire until 2005, but the
Bush administration seeks not only to make them permanent (without
evaluating their effectiveness or consequences) but to further expand
police power.
Inevitably this will generate renewed debate on "striking the right
balance" between freedom and safety. But to have meaningful
discussion, the premise that American freedom either enabled the crimes of
9/11 to occur or hinders the effectiveness of terrorism prevention should
be scrutinized.
That premise, underlying the "Patriot Act" and the Bush
administration's draft Domestic Security Enhancement Act ("Patriot
II") doesn't hold up to such scrutiny. No credible evidence has been
presented that legalizing more invasive technology and granting law
enforcement agencies the sweeping power to arrest, detain and spy on
citizens enhances the safety of Americans.
To the contrary, history suggests that allowing law officials to spy on
citizens based on their politics or to search property without judicially
scrutinized evidence typically wastes resources. The FBI's COINTELPRO
operations of the 1960s and '70s, including the government's Church
Commission Report, support this. Martin Luther King Jr., for one, was the
target of countless federal agents' investigations which produced
mountains of files, but no evidence of dangerous activity.
Rather than viewing political dissent - the focus of much FBI activity to
this day - as a danger sign, authorities should recognize it as a safety
valve that enhances stability. When opportunities to create peaceful
change are available, people are less likely to turn to violence.
America's high level of political freedom contributes substanitially to
the nation's comparatively low incidence of terrorism.
Besides, the most dangerous terrorists tend to keep a low profile, rather
than advocating publicly for social change. The Sept. 11 attackers, for
example, evidenced little or no public political or religious activism.
Government security agencies did have evidence that should have led to the
investigation of some of the Sept. 11 hijackers, but that crucial evidence
apparently was lost in an information overload.
Yet more information overload is what many Bush administration proposals
would create. For example, the Transportation Security Administration's
controversial Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS
II) purports to sort airline passengers according to risk potential. As
originally proposed, CAPPS II would have required that air passengers
check their Fourth Amendment rights along with their bags by forcing
disclosure of extensive personal information in order to fly.
Travel history, organizations you support, books you bought, and even your
credit rating were to be analyzed (no word yet on whether it's being
prompt or tardy in paying bills that enhances your terrorist tendencies)
to evaluate you. Sensibly, the TSA recently yielded to growing citizen
opposition and announced it was scaling back the information to be
gathered, but it has stonewalled requests for critical information.
Undermining safety
Promoters of CAPPS argue that sacrificing privacy will enable most people
to check in with less hassle and enable security to focus on
"high-risk" passengers. But on closer inspection, this
arrangement would undermine air safety. Intelligent terrorist groups
readily could use these ratings to increase their odds of success. By
thoroughly testing who among them gains easy passage, they could minimize
risk of a thorough search at the critical time.
Perhaps the single most effective measure needed to prevent a Sept. 11
repeat has been implemented with zero cost to freedom -- securing cockpit
doors. Banning such potential weapons as box-cutters onboard was also a
sensible move that left freedom unscathed.
Another effective measure, bag matching, could be implemented at a much
lower cost than the CAPPS scheme and without encroaching on our privacy.
Already in effect at many foreign airports, bag matching simply prevents
luggage from flying on the aircraft unless the owner is on board. Though
this may not prevent a suicide bombing, unaccompanied luggage bombs caused
three of the worst air disasters of the 1980s, including the Pan Am
explosion over Lockerbie, Scotland.
In contrast to common-sense precautionary measures like these, the Bush
Administration