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Inconvenient
Facts and "Conspiracy Theories" A
second glimpse at the neocons and the case for war
by
Jeremy R. Hammond
OpEdNews.Com
"Do
you ever get the sense the whole world is becoming unhinged from
reality?"
That
is the question posed by David Brooks in his New
York Times op-ed of January 6, appropriately entitled, "The
Era of Distortion".
"Yes,"
would be my own answer to that question, and never more so than when the
Bush Administration began echoing the neoconservative cabal's rallying cry
for war against Iraq, suggesting that the war-torn and impoverished nation
was a grave and imminent "threat" to the United States of
America and to the world -- a threat so great that the world could not
wait for U.N. weapons inspectors to finish their job, for fear that the
"smoking gun" would come "in the form of a mushroom
cloud".
It
is this same "neocon" cabal which is the subject of Brooks'
article, in which he notes that many articles have appeared suggesting
that the neocons "had taken over U.S. foreign policy." He
then proceeds to debunk this "conspiracy theory" by picking out
one such article (his "favorite") which "described a neocon
outing organized by Dick Cheney to hunt for humans". By
equating all articles on
the topic, then, with "conspiracy theorists" whose ramblings
rank with talk no less incredible than Nessie and the Abominable Snowman,
he mocks those who would suggest the obviously ludicrous notion that the
neocons could possibly be such a powerful influence in our government.
Brooks closes his article by suggesting that to state such a thing is to
"choose your own reality", an act dependent largely upon
ignoring "inconvenient facts". Finally, suggesting neocon
influence over the White House, in Brooks' view, equates with nothing less
than "anti-Semitism".
Indeed.
As an example of such a fact regarded as all too "inconvenient",
and therefore ignored by the Bush Administration in declaring its case for
war, might be that Iraq had been, according to former weapons inspector
Scott Ritter, 90-95% disarmed by UNMOVIC by 1998, when weapons inspectors
were pulled out so that the U.S. and U.K. could begin its bombing
campaign, "Operation Desert Fox". Couple with this fact
admissions from such senior officials as Colin Powell, who stated on
February 24, 2001 that Saddam Hussein "has not developed any
significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction",
and the full extent of the inconvenience of certain facts becomes
glaringly apparent.
Another
fact which proved inconvenient is that both U.S. and U.K. intelligence
analysts believed that Saddam Hussein would use any (alleged) chemical and
biological weapons only
"if he believes his regime is under threat" -- a sentence which
proved far too inconvenient to be included in the U.K.'s document
"Iraq--It's Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and
Intimidation", the "dodgy dossier" which was, in just such
a manner, "sexed up" to make the case for war. Recently,
the British government confirmed that the MI6 ran "Operation Mass
Appeal", a campaign to plant stories in the media in order to
convince people of the "necessity" for war (never mind also the
fact that, considering this analysis, which has been the interpretation of
the CIA since at least 1988, the Bush Administration deliberately placed
the country in the only circumstances under which Iraq could even remotely
be considered as a "threat").
It
certainly proved much too inconvenient for the Bush Administration to
note, when it mentioned Iraq's purchase of aluminum tubes, that Mohammed
El Baradei, chief inspector for the International Atomic Energy Agency,
had stated that the tubes were "destined for the conventional rocket
program" and would need "substantial modification before they
could be used" for enrichment, a process which would be expensive,
time consuming, and detectable. Inconvenient, also, was the note in
the CIA's own National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that the Department of
Energy had assessed "that the tubes are not intended for use in
Iraq's nuclear weapon program." The claim regarding the tubes,
although "central to the argument that Baghdad is reconstituting its
nuclear weapons program", was refuted by the "judgment of
technical experts" at the DOE, who asserted that "the tubes Iraq
seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges for uranium
enrichment" and found "unpersuasive the arguments advanced by
others to make the case that they are intended for that purpose."
It was considered "far more likely that the tubes are intended for
another purpose, most likely the production of artillery rockets."
Truly, such information proved far too inconvenient to share with the
American people as the Administration laid out its case for war.
While
the Administration claimed Iraq had developed "mobile biological
weapons laboratories", chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix
reported that there was no evidence any such vehicles existed. This
did not stop Bush from claiming on May 30, 2003, several months after the
invasion, that U.S. forces had "found the weapons of mass
destruction". Testifying that the U.S. had "found
biological laboratories", Bush asked the rhetorical question,
"Remember when Colin Powell stood up in front of the world, and said
Iraq has got laboratories, mobile labs to build biological weapons?",
to which he answered, "we've so far discovered two".
Adding that "we'll find more weapons as time goes on", he then
made a vain attempt to belittle his critics by saying, "But for those
who say we haven't found the banned manufacturing devices or banned
weapons, they're wrong. We found them."
Inconvenient
to the Administration, when making this declaration, was the fact that a
British investigation launched to determine the purpose of the trailers
concluded that nothing of the sort had been found. One biological
weapons expert told The Observer,
"They are not mobile germ warfare laboratories. You could not
use them for making biological weapons. They do not even look like
them. They are exactly what the Iraqis said they were -- facilities
for the production of hydrogen gas to fill balloons." As it
turns out, it was Britain, apparently, who had sold the system, known as
an Artillery Meteorological System, or "Amets", to Saddam
Hussein in 1987.
But
let us return, for a moment, to Brooks' own assessment of what he regards
as "inconvenient facts". As Brooks points out, the
"conspiracy theory" he attempts to refute is "fixated on a
think tank called the Project for the New American Century" (PNAC),
which, "To hear these people describe it" is the "nexus of
the sprawling neocon tentacles." In order to dispel such
"anti-Semitic" myths, he notes that the neocons "travel in
widely different circles and don't actually have much contact with one
another." Furthermore, "The ones outside government have
almost no contact with President Bush" and "senior
administration officials" have told him that Richard Perle, who has a
legendary "insidious power over administration policy", has had,
in fact, "no significant meetings with Bush or Cheney since they
assumed office." Clearly, then, the neocons could not possibly
have any influence over the Bush Administration--at least not unless a man
like Perle was "microwaving his ideas into their fillings."
While
it is "true that both Bush and the people labeled neocons agree that
Saddam Hussein represented a unique threat to world peace", the fact
remains that "correlation does not mean causation". This
undeniable fact having been made apparent, Brooks next states that
"All evidence suggests that Bush formed his conclusions
independently." Of course, any would-be evidence that
think-tanks such as PNAC, or other such "tentacles" of the
neocons, had any influence on Bush's "conclusions" is discarded
offhand as "conspiracy theory" and "anti-Semitism".
After all, "Jews are a handy explanation for everything".
Moreover, argues Brooks, in certain communities "half-truths get
circulated and exaggerated" and "Dark accusations are believed
because it is delicious to believe them."
There
is, perhaps, no greater example of this latter fact than the
Administration's claim (yet another "highly dubious" assertion)
that Iraq had "recently sought significant quantities of uranium from
Africa", a claim which was shown to have been based upon fabricated
evidence well before the invasion of Iraq commenced on March 19, 2003, and
which the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board headed by Brent Scowcroft
has recently concluded was the result of the Administration's desire to
"grab onto something affirmative" in making its case for war.
If
such "half-truths" allow us to equate those who propagate them
with "conspiracy theorists" who speak of man-hunting Vice
Presidents, then I am forced to wonder whether Americans would be just as
convinced if the United States government informed them that the
Abominable Snowman was intent on terrorizing the nation, or that the bogey
man was hiding under their bed at this very moment. After all,
America swallowed tales of the "International Communist
Conspiracy" for half a century. Replace Emmanuel Goldstein with
Osama bin Laden and the two-minute hate with CNN or FOX and you've got the
makings of a great sequel to Orwell's 1984.
As
Brooks notes, "You get to believe what makes you feel good" and
"ignore inconvenient facts so rigorously that your picture of the
world is one big distortion." Indeed.
It's
interesting to note, at this point, that Perle, along with Douglas Feith,
was responsible for creating a document entitled "A Clean Break: A
New Strategy for Securing the Realm". It's further interesting
to note that the "realm" referred to is not
the United States, but Israel,
which could perhaps be a revelation as to where the authors' true
loyalties lie. In that document, they called for a "new
intellectual foundation" for "rebuilding Zionism", which
stresses the "shared philosophy" of "might-is-right",
which is a reflection of "continuity with Western values".
Furthermore, the document calls for "reestablishing the principle of
preemption" and calls for "focus on removing Saddam Hussein from
power", which is considered to be "an important Israeli
strategic objective in its own right".
Among
other notable facts which might prove "inconvenient" for Brooks
is a letter from PNAC to President Clinton encouraging "the removal
of Saddam Hussein's regime from power", which "now needs to
become the aim of American foreign policy"; a goal which "cannot
continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN
Security Council." Among those who scribbled their John Hancock
upon this letter were Richard Armitage, Robert Kagan, William Kristol,
Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz (of course, suggesting
that such men could possibly have a strong influence on the Bush
Administration is merely an "anti-Semitic conspiracy theory").
In
fact, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz is credited with principle
authorship of a 1992 draft document known as "Defense Planning
Guidance" which declares that the U.S. "must maintain the
mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring
to a larger regional or global role" (emphasis added), and
identifies several scenarios in which regional conflicts could threaten
U.S. interests, including "access to vital raw materials, primarily
Persian Gulf oil".
Far
too inconvenient for Brooks is the fact that this document is widely
considered by analysts to have been the predecessor of the current
National Security Strategy of the United States of America--otherwise
known as "the Bush Doctrine".
Wolfowitz
has also noted that, in a meeting immediately following the events of
September 11, 2001, Iraq's place in the "counterterrorist
strategy" was discussed in a debate which "appeared to be about
not whether but when". The main disagreement was "whether
it should be in the immediate response or whether [the Administration]
should concentrate simply on Afghanistan first."
On
September 20, PNAC issued a letter to George W. Bush outlining the
"necessary parts of a comprehensive strategy" which notes that
Osama bin Laden is "a key goal" but not "the only
goal" in the "war on terrorism" and moves quickly on to
suggest that "It may be that the Iraqi government provided assistance
in some form to the recent attack on the United States"
However, "even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the
attack", a "determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from
power" should be included in the Administration's
"strategy".
In
a PNAC document entitled "Rebuilding America's Defenses" -- a
document which builds "upon the defense strategy outlined by the
Cheney Defense Department in the waning days of the Bush
Administration" and which notes the 1992 defense policy document as
"a blueprint for maintaining U.S. preeminence" -- the authors
note that "the United States has for decades sought to play a more
permanent role in Gulf regional security".
"Security"
is, of course, defined in relation to the protection of U.S.
"interests", most notably, perhaps, "access to vital raw
materials" such as "Persian Gulf oil".
The
"immediate justification" for providing
"security"--that is, for "maintaining U.S.
preeminence"--in the oil-rich Gulf region, is provided by "the
unresolved conflict with Iraq", a nation which has proved to be
"a threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf". However, as the
document points out, "the need for a substantial American force
presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam
Hussein."
To
guide us into further understanding of the need to rebuild America's
"defenses", the document points to a statement from Andrew
Krepinevich, a member of the National Defense Panel, in which he explains
that "the defense Department's rhetoric asserting the need for
military transformation ... has yet to be matched by any great sense of
urgency or any substantial resource support".
Finally,
for those mindful of outrageous "conspiracy theories", it may
prove instructive to note that Krepinevich, on March 5, 1999, testified
before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities on "the need to transform the U.S. military into a
significantly different kind of force from that which emerged victorious
from the Cold and Gulf Wars", noting that "the 'critical mass'
needed to effect" that transformation "has not yet been
achieved"; a transformation which would "likely prove a long
arduous process" in "the absence of a strong external shock to
the United States -- a latter-day 'Pearl Harbor' of sorts".
"Rebuilding
America's Defenses" echoes both of Krepinevich's statements by
suggesting that "the process of transformation, even if it brings
revolutionary change, it likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic
and catalyzing event -- like a new Pearl Harbor."
After
the catastrophic and catalyzing event known as 9/11, Robert Kagan, a
director of PNAC, wrote, in a Washington
Post column that "Just as the Korean War, Pearl Harbor and
the sinking of the Lusitania taught us that we can't immunize ourselves
against the world's problems, Sept. 11 must spur us to launch a new era of
American internationalism. Let's not squander this opportunity"
(emphasis added).
If,
in light of these facts, we can disregard Brooks' discourse on the neocon
influence in the current Adminstration as being itself too reliant upon
his ignorance of "inconvenient facts", and if, then, following
his example, we can place his hypothesis into a category parallel with
"conspiracy theory", then perhaps the corollary can be drawn
that the "millions of people" he mentions "who cling to the
notion that the world is controlled by well-organized and malevolent
forces" are not living in quite so distorted a reality as Brooks
would have us believe.
Of
course, all else aside, one would be hard-pressed to refute his assertion
that the habit of choosing one's own reality is dependent upon ignoring
particular facts "so rigorously that your picture of the world is one
big distortion." And as is quite easily demonstrable by looking
at its so-called "evidence" in making the case for war, the Bush
Administration has truly ushered in an "Era of Distortion".
©2004
Jeremy R. Hammond
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