East Timor after Alkatiri: nation or protectorate? By Tim Anderson
"We did not expect that the elected leader of a party with an overwhelming mandate could be forced to stand down in this way in a democracy" Fretilin press release, 26 June
Backed by a foreign army, and with his country's own army confined to barracks, the great resistance leader Xanana Gusmao finally led the charge to topple the leadership of Timor Leste's first post-independence government. But the backing of Australia was critical.
If this appears puzzling, we must understand that, what ever the configuration of East Timor's new government, there will be lasting bitterness amongst the major players over management of the recent crisis and intervention, and conflict over how to manage the new relationship with Australia. Further, June's palace coup clearly has implications not just for the personalities involved, but also for the country's development strategy.
Talk of the need for an 'inclusive' or a 'national unity' government rather misses the point that all recent political leadership in East Timor has been by coalition. The broadest of these, the CNRT, was disbanded after the UN insisted on multiparty elections. The Fretilin-led Government, elected in 2001, included high profile ex-Fretilin members Jose Ramos-Horta and the separately elected President Xanana Gusmao. After the coming elections the government may not be much different.
The immediate difference is the sidelining of Mari Alkatiri, Fretilin's chief strategist, following his forced resignation as Prime Minister. Suggested charges against Alkatiri (for arming para-militaries, during the coup attempt) will go nowhere. The 'hit squad' accusations, broadcast by Australia's ABC, have no credibility. But the Australian media and military intervention which helped topple the leadership of an elected government flags a new political reality for East Timorese citizens.
The Australian newspaper, leader of the anti-Alkatiri charge, says his removal will be "good news for Australian companies wanting to do business in Dili". But Fretilin remains (by a long way) the major party in Parliament. Rupert Murdoch's flagship insists the "continuing crisis" requires a semi-permanent Australian troop presence to block what the paper calls a "Marxist revolutionary" government and because "there is no other way to keep the country from sliding back into chaos".
Other Australian commentators sympathetic to this line are already muttering the need to abolish the country's army. Indeed, it seems that Xanana's authority with a number of army commanders has been undermined, as a result of his perceived sympathy with the Reinado-led rebels. But abolition of the army would lead very quickly to calls for the establishment of a permanent Australian military base in East Timor, a major dilemma for a people who fought so hard for independence.
Yet the 'chaos' was in large part fostered by Australian passive support for the rebels and hostility to the government; while the "Marxist revolution" was a rather modest economic nationalism, led by Alkatiri. I have explained in another article ('Achievements of a 'Failed State'') the areas of tension with Australia, arising from an independent policy in East Timor. Xanana has not expressed a distinct vision of development, remaining concerned with reconciliation. Ramos Horta has expressed a wish for closer relations with the US and Australia, and a greater privileging of foreign investment. But there is no sign yet that Fretilin will abandon the more independent course set by Alkatiri.
Herein lies the problem. An oligarchy of Australian business leaders, who consistently opposed East Timorese independence, pre-1999, have openly declared themselves hostile to the Fretilin-led project. The Howard regime maintains public political correctness, concerning East Timorese autonomy, but shares the hostility. This is a strategic hostility, as much as opposition to any particular policy. But the 'protectorate' mindset certainly wants easier access to East Timorese resources, greater privileging of foreign investment and a shift in national language policy from Portuguese-Tetum to English-Tetum.
It seems likely that, even with Alkatiri sidelined, a Fretilin-led government will maintain the strategy spelt out in a National Development Plan and sectoral policies, and backed by the Constitution. Alternatively (and if Murdoch's scribblers have their way), a new government might be persuaded to abandon its economic nationalist past, and accept Australian protectorate status.
So what is the problem for a small country in taking loans from the World Bank and becoming more 'western friendly'? Isn't this a legitimate way of attracting investment, improving governance and reducing poverty? Let's examine this, in light of experience elsewhere.
The process begins with loans for essential infrastructure, usually power and roads; and everyone has been complaining about power and roads. The World Bank would loan money to the government at low commercial interest or (in view of East Timor's low GDP per capita) a very low IDA loan at only 0.7% interest over 35 years. This, at first glance, seems generous. But strict conditions would be attached, in the form of a 'good governance' contract.
An important section of the 'good governance' conditions would stipulate that, while the loan is public, the construction and service delivery would be private - a 'development partnership'. This means that large foreign companies would be contracted to construct the power grid and roads, while others would meter and enforce a 'user pays' power supply regime. As the 'good governance' agreement would also stipulates no price subsidies, the only way poor families could access power would be by direct fiscal subsidy. But the government has no spare cash, which is why it borrowed in the first place.
Such 'partnership' schemes have seen even water supplies become unaffordable in major cities from The Philippines to Bolivia. The small middle classes who can afford the fees might get a better service, but the government will still have to intervene, to ensure quality and contain the corruption that privatisations generate. Poor families' access to water or power would depend on their capacity to pay.
'User pays' regimes, urged by the Bank across all services, damage access to education and health services. The evidence on this is conclusive. Neoliberalism in the 1980s redefined the global consensus on the right to education, so that only primary education is regarded as a full right and is therefore subsidised in poor countries. Secondary education, essential for social mobility but subject to 'user pays' principles, became unaffordable for the children of most poor families. In oil rich but neoliberal Venezuela, in the late 1990s, only 20% of children reached senior high school. More than half the children in today's Bali, flush with tourist dollars, do not reach senior high school. This is the pattern across the world. Neoliberal regimes have denied a whole generation of poor children their future. With World Bank 'good governance', secondary school enrolments in East Timor would go backwards.
