Washington Think-Tank Cultivating 'Last Resort' Against Iran and Priming Next President

Generally we don’t expect death, destruction and illegality to rest on the preventive side of the equation. Then again, after March 19, 2003, perhaps we should. When WINEP uses the word preventive they mean "preventive military action." More precisely - a military attack on another country, in this case Iran that is neither in self-defense nor in response to an immediate threat of attack.

The likelihood of a military strike against Iran either by the United States or Israel has been debated for years waxing and waning with the geopolitical climate. What is not in question is the steady effort by some to lay the ground work for such an action.

The Washington Institute founded by Martin Indyk, a former research director for AIPAC, seeks to "bring scholarship to bear on the making of U.S. policy" in the Middle East. Among its programs is the Presidential Study Group "charged with drafting a blueprint for the next administration’s Middle East policy." WINEP’s board of advisers includes noted figures such as Richard Perle, R. James Woolsey and until 2001 Paul Wolfowitz.

Michael Eisenstadt, a senior fellow and director of WINEP’s Military and Security Studies Program wrote a three-page article in September 2006 entitled "Iran: The Complex Calculus of Preventive Military Action." Eisenstadt discussed the factors that would be in play if the U.S. took preventive military action to "thwart Iran’s nuclear ambitions."

He tackled first the matter of congressional authorization for a planned attack on Iran. He referred to it as "consulting Congress." Quickly bypassing Congress’ constitutional power to declare war citing precedence, Eisenstadt laid out two options. 1. Inform a select group of members of Congress prior to launching a strike, but compromise public support for "subsequent actions." 2. Allow Congress to openly debate the "merits of military action" and seek a joint resolution, but preclude surprise and risk defeat.

Bearing in mind WINEP’s mission to use scholarship to assist in policy making, it is worth noting a glaring omission. Mr. Eisenstadt made no room for discussion of the UN Charter ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1945 thereby making it the law of our land. It requires that member nations refrain from the threat or use of force and that if a dispute is not settled it shall be referred to the Security Council which will make recommendations.

While the Charter allows for military action in self-defense and the issue of a preemptive attack in the face of "imminent danger" has been a point of contention in recent years, no strong case for an "imminent" attack was even put forth in the article. What Eisenstadt was considering was a preventive strike to "thwart ambitions."

To minimize national backlash - a rally around the flag in Iran – Eisenstadt recommended that the U.S. engage in a "high-profile information campaign" to convince the Iranian people that an attack on their country is in their best interest. The article concluded that while seeking diplomacy, military prevention should be on the table.

In summer 2007, Eisenstadt published another article on preventive action "The Complex Calculus of Preventive Military Action." Along with the title the article was, with a few exceptions, the same as the one he authored in 2006.

In 2006, his reason was "faltering diplomacy" over Iran’s nuclear program. In 2007, he pointed to Bush administration claims that Iran was supplying IED’s that were being used against U.S. forces in Iraq. This was a big news item at the time. What was not big news was that proof of those claims never fully materialized.

Both articles shared an important statement, "[One] should not dismiss the possibility that the intelligence picture concerning Iran’s nuclear program could change rapidly." And change it did. In December 2007, the key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran were made public. Among the findings: "We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program."

Thus began the campaign to discredit the 2007 NIE on Iran.

Patrick Clawson, WINEP’s deputy director for research offered his own spin. He asked "how much does weaponization matter?" and claimed that the findings only suggest a change in sequence by Tehran. For good measure, Clawson lamented about the U.S. intelligence community’s "poor track record."

 1  |  2  |  3  |  4  |  5  |  6