The Vatican's Immoral Declaration

Madison, WI (OpEdNews) 14 December 2008 – The Vatican has issued a sweeping declaration on issues in bioethics, including a ban on the morning-after pill, the use of IUDs and RU-486. As Laurie Goodstein and Elisabetta Povoledo, “Vatican Issues Instruction on Bioethics”, The New York Times (12 December 2008) have reported, the purported rationale is that their use can result in “what amount to abortions”, which the Roman Catholic Church proscribes.  These methods have proven beneficial for women who have unwanted pregnancies or who have suffered the trauma of incest or rape.  The document also reaffirms the church’s opposition to in vitro fertilization, human cloning, and forms of stem-cell research.  Yet this position, as an article of faith, violates (what is known as) “the ethics of belief”.

The foundation for the church’s stance appears to be rooted in the dogma that ensoulment occurs at conception and that every stage of human gestation—from the zygotic and embryonic through the birth of a developed fetus—deserves protection, even though the process of ensoulment lies beyond the scope of human observation and scientific investigation. As Wikipedia (“Ensoulment”) remarks, “There is considerable debate about the timing of ensoulment during fetal development, with some claiming the moment of conception, some the moment of implantation, some the formation of the heart, some the formation of the nervous system and brain, the first brain activity, the ability of the fetus to survive independently of the uterus (viability), and still others the time of quickening”. Which should come as no surprise, since its occurrence is not empirically detectable.

These stages in development bear close approximation to the tripartite division of gestation into trimesters, where the formation of the heart and brain tends to occur toward the end of the first trimester and viability—which is dependent upon the capacity of the lungs to process oxygen—toward the end of the second.  The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade (1973) has determined that women are entitled to abortions without restriction during the first trimester and that states may regulate how they are performed during the second, but that they are permissible during the third trimester only when the survival of the fetus adversely affects the life or the health of the mother.  This appears to be compatible with the view that, once a fetus has attained viability, it acquires a “right to life” that does not apply at earlier stages.

The question at stake is not the beginning of life—there is no good reason to doubt that human life begins at conception—but the stage at which the developing entity qualifies as a “person”, which entails attaining a legal/moral status appropriate to have its rights respected.  There is no doubt that infants and children, not to mention seniors and adults, qualify as “persons” in the appropriate sense.  They are entitled to certain rights and others have the obligation to respect those rights and not interfere with their exercise.  But the character of those rights tends to vary with the age, background and experience of different persons.  Not all persons are entitled to the same rights.

Even though, in most states, persons are entitled to serve in the military, enter contracts for pay, drive automobiles on highways and become engaged and marry, for example, when they are of an appropriate age, background and experience, there are few who would seriously contend that children, for example, have the same rights as young adults.  Even if those who attain the age of 18 acquire the right to drive automobiles on highways—with appropriate driver’s training—there are few who would contend that children who are 5 or 6 years old ought to enjoy that privilege.  Societies are pervasive with graduated rights, which apply to persons at different stages in their lives under suitable conditions.  And this raises the question of the existence of a “right to life”.

The idea that ova fertilized by sperm are entitled to some “right to life” has no basis in law or human experience.  The most widely adopted standard is that newborn offspring have that right, which is reflected by virtually universal revulsion at infanticide.  But a zygote, an embryo, or even a fetus (during the first two trimesters)—in the opinion of the Supreme Court—does not enjoy that right.  And, viewed from the perspective of the theory of graduated rights, this makes a great deal of sense.  When the entity cannot even survive apart from its intrauterine environment, there is no appropriate basis for differentiating the fetus from the mother as a separate “person”.  The fetus at this stage appears to be a special kind of property of a woman where her rights far transcend those of the developing entity, whose continuing existence is dependent upon hers.

Indeed, the theory that ensoulment should be used to justify the claim that a zygote qualifies as a “person” with the right to life, if adopted as a matter of public policy, would inject the government into the most intimate aspects of our lives.  To protect the rights of “persons”, we would need the services of a vast enforcement apparatus, which would subject women to monthly pregnancy tests, since otherwise we would be unable to even identify the complete class of persons whose rights need to be upheld.  The occurrence of miscarriages would become important to make sure that murders were not being conducted and concealed under the guise of a natural process.  It might even become important to monitor the disposition of sperm to uphold that legal standard.  Cameras and wiretaps might be required to track the use made of ejaculate from masturbation.

Attacks upon the court’s decision are virtually universally not well-founded.  The core of morality is treating other persons as ends and never merely as means.  Expressed most simply, morality requires treating other persons with respect.  Persons are treated as ends when we respect their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  Persons are treated merely as means when we do not respect their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Consider murder, robbery, kidnapping, and rape.  The imperative not to treat others merely as means, however, does not entail that we never treat one another as means—as with employers and employees, doctors and patients, students and teachers—so long as that occurs within the context of relationships of mutual respect.  When conflicts arise between the interests of the mother and the interests of the fetus, there should be no serious doubt whose interests should prevail—even during third trimesters in matters of life and health.

The popular position that abortion is murder has inflamed politics in the United States, where many citizens embrace “single issue voting”, casting their ballots for those who oppose abortion and actively working against the “pro-choice” position.  One would have thought that forcing a woman to carry a fetus to term against her will was on a par with forcing a woman to have sex against her will.  But “pro-life” proponents don’t appear to be bothered by this specific form of enslavement as though women are not entitled to exercise control over their bodies or how they spend their lives, even though there are many reasons women might not want to carry to term.  As a rule, bringing a new life into existence entails a minimum eighteen-year moral obligation.

That a conception has resulted from incest or rape may be the most disturbing motive to seek an abortion, but it is far from the only.  Women who are very young and immature may simply not be prepared to bear and raise children.  Women who are sufficiently mature may have other plans in mind than rearing children, including the pursuit of higher education and securing employment.  A woman with children may dread the responsibilities that come with having more.  They may also lack the resources—material or emotional—to sustain them.  And many parents are unwilling to pass responsibility for raising their offspring to others through the process of adoption.  Surely no woman should be compelled to bear children, give birth or surrender her offspring against her will.

Those who oppose abortion would not only impose their moral codes upon others but appear to adopt a narrow-minded attitude toward sex.  Even the church tends to categorize sex as proper when its objective is procreation and improper for other purposes as recreational.  But surely there is an appropriate role for sex within the context of affectionate and loving relationships.  It is not the case that sexual relations are necessarily procreational or recreational.  And if measures taken to prevent conception should fail—which has been known to happen!—the termination of an unwanted pregnancy may be the most responsible and morally appropriate alternative.  It may be the option that, under those conditions, represents the highest degree of respect for all of the parties, including husbands and other children, who are thereby affected.

Like the existence or the non-existence of a divine creator, there is no proof of the occurrence of ensoulment.  Whether there is one god or many gods, a god for every season or every activity—even whether god should be envisioned as male or female!—lies beyond all possibility of human knowledge.  Were I to declare that there are exactly 435 gods, no one could prove I am wrong.  And the case for envisioning God as female rather than male is rather substantial.  Women, after all, are capable of giving birth, something no man can do.  If God is supposed to be the creator, then it makes more sense to envision The Creator as a woman than as a man.  The very idea that pubic policies should be based upon beliefs that lie beyond any possibility of objective investigation raises problems than which few qualify as more profound.

And yet the claim that ensoulment occurs at conception as opposed to implantation, coincident with the development of the heart and the brain, at viability or quickening (when the mother can feel activity by the fetus within her uterus) or even at birth is logically arbitrary and endlessly debatable.  There is no objective or scientific foundation for any such belief.  This, of course, is why matters like this are articles of faith insofar as they are incapable of resolution on the basis of objective or scientific investigation.  There are no observations, measurements, or experiments that could settle the matter one way or ther other.  As in the case of the existence of God, no one can prove the existence of souls, much less that ensoulment has ever taken place—even once!—during the history of the world.  The question lies beyond any prospect of empirical resolution.

As a young assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Kentucky, I attended a seminar by a member of the Department of Physics, who asserted that, because souls and electrons are both kinds of non-observable entities, there are no differences between them.  Challenging the audience to prove him wrong, I pointed out that there are significant differences between them because there are established laws that govern the behavior of electrons and but no known laws that govern the behavior of souls.  Electrons make impressions on photographic plates during the conduct of experiments in the laboratory, but no similar empirically detectable results are possible in the case of souls—or of God, for that matter!  If we allow articles of faith to determine public policies, we abdicate our responsibility to base actions that affect us all on established truths rather than mere beliefs.

The philosopher who has shown the most acute appreciation for the problems thereby engendered was a 19th Century Englishman by the name of William Clifford.  He advanced a principle known as “the ethics of belief”, according to which we are morally entitled to hold a belief only if we are also logically entitled to hold it.  We are logically entitled to hold a belief—about what is true as well as what is right—only when it satisfies appropriate standards of logic and evidence, which are objective in their application.  In this case, every suitable investigator, confronted with the same range of alternative hypotheses, the same body of evidence, and the same rules of reasoning, would arrive at the same conclusions as to which beliefs should be accepted, rejected, or left in suspense.  Beliefs about souls and gods would be left in suspense, since there is no way to determine their truth or falsity objectively.

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