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September 6, 2007
Election Law Mandates Public Inspection of Ballots and Ballot Boxes in Most States
By Runner
Paper ballots marked with a standard #2 pencil by voters and run through an optical scanner is a simple and transparent process that every citizen can observe and certify.
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Nearly very state still has within its election code a provision that allows public observers the right to inspect physical ballot box containers and paper ballots before the polls open on Election Day. (Example: New Hampshire Election Code Section 658:36 Inspection of Ballot Box – At the opening of the polls, the ballot box shall be publicly opened and shown to be empty; and the election officers shall ascertain that fact by a personal examination of the box. eff. July 1, 1979) Nearly every state also still has within its election code a provision that allows public observers to watch election clerks open physical ballot box containers and count the paper ballots at the end of the Election Day.Directly inspect ballots, stored as software code, to insure the ballot accurately lists every candidate in every election category.
Directly inspect the software that tabulates and records in memory each voter’s ballot selections, to certify the votes are properly and accurately recorded and that nefarious software is not lurking to stuff the virtual ballot box.
Directly inspect data storage drives and PC memory cards, to certify the virtual ballot box data storage is empty.
Election judges can only ask the eVoting machine software to write a paper report of vote totals for each ballot position at the start of the Election Day. Precinct level election judges and observers can only trust that when the vote totals report shows zero votes for every ballot position, the eVoting machine virtual ballot box is truly empty and nefarious software is not lurking to stuff the virtual ballot box some time during the election day.
Stuffing the DRE software virtual ballot box is potentially even easier to perpetrate than it was to rig Palm Beach County, FL punch card ballots to fail in November 2000. Any one of the small army of computer programmers who legitimately writes code destined to be loaded on each and every DRE system just prior to each election has the opportunity to privately stuff the eVoting machine software ballot box.
DRE system manufacturer programmers continually write voting application software code to fix software bugs and enhance general voting system function. Yet other technicians within the DRE Companies package these many software updates together for distribution to county election administration offices around the country. Typically, temporary contractor programmers are then hired at each local election administration office to install the manufacturer’s software updates on each and every DRE machine. This offers ample opportunity for someone hide nefarious software in these update packages.
Immediately preceding each election, local temporary contractor programmers are typically hired in each local county election administration office to write software that codifies election ballots and that tabulates and records in memory voters’ ballot selections. (This software dynamically builds and controls the ballot image voters see on the DRE touch screen) The same contract programmer, or perhaps another programmer, then loads that locally written election ballot software along with DRE system manufacturer supplied software updates to each and every DRE machine. This offers further opportunity for someone to load nefarious software on some or all eVoting machines.
Typically, after election ballot and ballot tabulation software is loaded a contract programmer ‘certifies’ each DRE machine by flipping the power-on switch to make sure it boots up and can display the just loaded new election ballots on its touch screen. The machines are then sealed and at some later time delivered to election polling places. Contract programmers then also write the central tabulator software code that on election night reads and tabulates together vote totals from PC memory cards taken from each and every DRE eVoting machine in the county.
Local election officials are not computer scientists; indeed, many have trouble even maintaining the Windows PC on their desk. They can neither adequately assess the competence and veracity of local temporary contractor programmers hired to work on voting machines nor review and assess new software destined to be installed on their eVoting machines. In actuality, local election officials cannot verify that a contractor programmer's work is bug free or that they did not nefariously write a few extra lines of software code that activates only on election day to flip votes or rig vote totals on a central tabulator and then self delete at the end of the election day.
Local election officials, precinct level election judges, clerks and observers and every voting citizen can only trust that each member of the small army of computer programmers who writes code destined to run on each and every DRE voting machine and central tabulator computer do not act on partisan political motivations to stuff the software ballot box. If Palm Beach County election officials could not catch a technical quality problem with punch card ballots used in the November 2000 election, how can anyone argue that election officials have a realistic ability of identifying potential problems buried in thousands of lines of software code often hurriedly written just prior to every election in every county using DRE eVoting systems.
In the November 2006 election 1,142 counties (36.63 percent of all 3089 U.S. counties) around the United States used DRE-type voting systems. So, at minimum, 1,142 programmers developed software to codify and count electronic election ballots in the weeks, or in some cases days, just prior to the start voting.
Across those 1,142 counties some 479,640 Election Judges, Alternate Judges, Election Clerks and Observers could no longer certify by their own independent direct observation that the ballots, ballot boxes, and ballot counting processes were accurate and clean. Many Election Judges faced the same voter complaints as those voiced by Montgomery County, Ohio voters.
During the November 7, 2006 general election, voters in Montgomery County, Ohio reported some of the voting machines were choosing candidates other than those selected by the voter. A subsequent investigation by the Montgomery County Board of Elections revealed that, indeed, there was a problem and that the problem was more common than anyone expected. On March 19 and 20, 2007, a significant number of machines from multiple Montgomery County precincts, where problems had been reported by voters, were tested at the offices of the Montgomery County Board of Elections. The test showed 41 percent of the machines tested “flip” votes in at least one race of the test ballot.
Originally, House Resolution 811 to amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require a voter-verified permanent paper ballot (the Holt Bill) included a provision that would have opened DRE eVoting software to inspection by anyone. Unfortunately, after heavy lobbying from DRE eVoting system and other major software vendors the current version of HR811 has been marked up to severely restrict software inspection. Now it is being reported that HR811 is ready to move forward in the U.S. House of Representatives for a floor vote.
So, many unchecked computer programmers at different levels writing software code that almost no one visually inspects or rigorously tests for nefarious content after they load vendor and locally written election ballot software immediately preceding each election. Local election officials and every U.S. citizen can only trust that each member of the small army of computer programmers who writes code destined to run on each and every DRE voting machine and central tabulator computer do not act on partisan political motivations to stuff the software ballot box. It would be so easy for a political partisan to entice or plant a few willing temporary contractor programmers in key election jurisdictions to stuff the software ballot box as they perform their legitimate programming duties. Even just a few motivated partisan programmers each working independently could easily throw an election into even deeper chaos than happen in Palm Beach County FL in November 2000 with rigged punch card ballots.
In the final analysis, software and ballot integrity issues surrounding DRE eVoting machines are so pervasive that, even if updated to print a paper audit ballot, they are just too complex and costly to resolve in any fully transparent election process.
Speaking as one of those 479,640 Election Judges who conducted the November 2006 election on DRE eVoting machines, I shudder to think of the chaos balky add-on ballot printers might inflict on the election process. Can you imagine the chaos and cost of fixing broken ballot printers, changing empty ink cartridges and paper rolls in a busy polling place with voters waiting in line one hour, two hours, three hours to vote? Remember, most citizen election volunteers are over the age of 70 and retired – could your grandmother tame a balky ballot printer?
This is a case where throwing more money and more technology at a problem only succeeds in making the problem worse. Pre-printed paper ballots marked by voters with a standard #2 pencil and run through an optical scanner is a simple and transparent process that any average citizen election volunteer can observe and certify. Such a process backed up with a random hand count of 10% of all optical scan counted ballots and statistically correlated to the scanner vote tabulation is the only way every state can 'uniformly' provide full election integrity and transparency.