on Voting Systems and Fair Vote Counts
Summarized by Rady Ananda
On behalf of J30 Coalition
January 18, 2007
The well-financed and most visible portion of the election integrity movement agrees with these solutions.
None of these solutions, however, meet the Fair Vote Count standard enumerated by international authority (OSCE, below, to which the US is a signatory. See page 9). Humans cannot observe the vote count when it is conducted inside a machine, be it touch screen, optical scan, mechanical lever, or any other machine tabulator. No amount of audits, security protocols, or paper trails will change the fact that machines count the vote secretly.
Key policy makers, on the other hand, see no urgency in reconsidering electronic voting systems. Warren Stewart of www.VoteTrustUSA.org recently advised,
This position simply ignores the science.
As to the most appropriate and best next step, a vocal portion of non-experts envisions an entirely different solution. We rely on expert conclusions about what doesn't work, and we rely on expert descriptions of what constitutes a democratic election: hand-counted paper ballots, at the precinct, before all who wish to observe.
Emphasis in the annotations below appeared in the original document.
Brennan Center, The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World, 2006 http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/Full%20Report.pdf
Compuware Corp. DRE Technical Security Assessment Report for Ohio, November 2003.
Cuyahoga Election Review Panel, Final Report, July 20, 2006 www.cuyahogavoting.org/CERP_Final_Report_20060720.pdf Reviewed by Kim Zetter of www.wired.com
Election Science Institute, 2006, "DRE Analysis for May 2006 Primary Cuyahoga County, Ohio"
http://www.cuyahogacounty.us/bocc/GSC/pdf/esi_cuyahoga_final.pdf or see http://www.electionscience.org click on Cuyahoga County Report tab.