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The eagerly awaited "written response" from the U.S. and NATO to Russia's security proposals is now in the hands of President Vladimir Putin. And yet there is no sign the West caved in on Moscow's insistence that NATO rescind its 14 year-old invitation to Ukraine to join NATO.
Those who expected the Russians to react to the West's refusal to "redraw the security architecture of Europe" by promptly attacking Ukraine can breathe a bit easier. Although Putin's spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, told reporters Thursday that the responses from the US and NATO provide "little ground for optimism," he quickly added, "there always are prospects for continuing a dialogue, it's in the interests of both us and the Americans."
Amidst the foreboding din in Western corporate media that, absent a written pledge to bar Ukraine from NATO, nothing else really matters to Putin and war is likely, Peskov has been much less gloomy on prospects for the bilateral talks. Immediately after the first bilateral talks on Jan. 9/10 in Geneva, for example, he noted: "It would be naive to think that one round of negotiations can bring comprehensive results." (Bear in mind that few have been as close to President Putin as Dmitri Peskov. Their working relationship goes back more than two decades; since 2012, Peskov has been Putin's press secretary.)
How Might Putin Regard His Half a Loaf
Call me old fashioned, but I have been practicing a simplified version of Kremlinology since the days of Nikita Khrushchev. It is called media analysis and includes a close reading of what prominent leaders say.
When he became CIA director, William Casey admitted being astonished at what we could glean from Soviet media. Well, media analysis was our bread and butter then and can provide helpful insights now as well. How best to decipher what Putin has said about the need for written agreements preventing further NATO expansion? He addressed this - and much more - head-on during a major speech on Dec. 21, 2021, before the senior military. (Please see if you can get an idea of what might be the rhetorical aim behind his emphasis on "written"; and hang in there long enough to get some feel for what he is, first and foremost, concerned about.)
Here is President Putin speaking to his top military officers:
"In particular, the growth of the US and NATO military forces in direct proximity to the Russian border and major military drills, including unscheduled ones, are a cause for concern.
"It is extremely alarming that "Mk 41 launchers, which are located in Romania and are to be deployed in Poland, are adapted for launching Tomahawk strike missiles. If this infrastructure continues to move forward, and if US and NATO missile systems are deployed in Ukraine, their flight time to Moscow will be only 7-10 minutes, or even five minutes for hypersonic systems.
"This is a huge challenge for us, for our security. In this context, as you are aware, I invited the US President to start talks on the drafting of concrete agreements. We need long-term legally binding guarantees. Well, we know very well that even legal guarantees cannot be completely fail-safe, because the United States easily pulls out of any international treaty that has ceased to be interesting to it for some reason, sometimes offering explanations and sometimes not, as was the case with the ABM and the Open Skies treaties - nothing at all".
"However, we need at least something, at least a legally binding agreement rather than just verbal assurances."
Gorbachev Should Have Said 'Put It in Writing'
At this point in his speech, Putin asserts that verbal assurances from the US can be worthless and recalls that Moscow was repeatedly told that Russian concerns about NATO expansion were without merit. "Take the recent past, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when we were told that our concerns about NATO's potential expansion eastwards were absolutely groundless."
Informed observers are well aware, though, that the most glaring broken promise came earlier, in Feb. 1990, when Gorbachev was persuaded to swallow the giant bitter pill of German reunification in return for an oral assurance from then Secretary of State James Baker that NATO would not expand "one inch" to the east. There is copious documentary evidence proving that this is exactly what happened.
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