Who Blinks First? Washington and Tehran Test Each Other's Limits
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By Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D.
After nearly seven months of war, the confrontation between the United States and Iran has entered a peculiar and potentially more dangerous stage. Neither side has achieved the political outcome it originally sought, yet neither appears prepared to make the first major concession necessary to end the conflict. The negotiations surrounding the United Nations General Assembly in New York demonstrated the problem. Diplomacy did not fail because Washington and Tehran had nothing to discuss. On the contrary, the two sides moved close enough to identify the basic structure of a possible phased settlement. What they could not agree upon was who should move first.
That disagreement goes to the heart of the present war. Washington and Tehran are communicating through intermediaries while simultaneously trying to demonstrate that each can tolerate the economic, military, and political costs of the conflict longer than the other. The war has therefore evolved from a contest measured primarily by missiles, airstrikes, sanctions, and naval power into something more difficult to quantify: a test of endurance. Increasingly, the central question is who will blink first.
Why New York FailedThe New York negotiations revealed that the distance between the two sides is simultaneously smaller and larger than it appears. It is smaller because both governments have discussed the elements of a possible phased arrangement. Iran could restore normal navigation through the Strait of Hormuz while the United States could lift or reduce its blockade and provide economic relief, with negotiations over broader disagreements continuing afterward. This means there is at least a conceivable framework for ending the immediate confrontation.
But the distance is also larger because the disagreement concerns the order in which these steps would occur. Iran does not want to surrender the leverage created by its control over navigation through Hormuz while the American blockade remains in place. Washington does not want to surrender the economic and military pressure created by the blockade without receiving significant Iranian concessions in return. Each side fears that if it moves first, the other will pocket the concession, retain its own leverage, and demand additional concessions.
This is why the negotiations in New York did not produce a settlement. The problem was not simply disagreement over the final terms. It was a disagreement over sequencing, reciprocity and trust. Iran wanted concrete American steps that would reduce the blockade and military pressure before surrendering its principal bargaining instrument. Washington wanted freedom of navigation and broader Iranian concessions before relinquishing the pressure that had brought Tehran to the negotiating table. Both sides therefore confronted the same question from opposite directions: why surrender leverage before the other side does?
The nuclear issue further complicated the negotiations. Tehran's proposal connected reopening Hormuz with American actions including lifting the naval blockade and easing restrictions on Iranian oil exports, while Iran also indicated that nuclear negotiations could resume within a broader diplomatic process. At the same time, a senior Iranian official told Reuters that Tehran would not make nuclear concessions merely in exchange for American acceptance of the Hormuz proposal. Washington, meanwhile, continues to regard Iran's nuclear program as a central issue rather than something that can simply be postponed until after the immediate military confrontation is resolved.
The result was a negotiation in which the outlines of a possible settlement became visible without resolving the fundamental problem of who should take the first consequential step. New York therefore did not demonstrate that diplomacy was impossible. It demonstrated why diplomacy remains so difficult. Each government believes its present leverage is precisely what makes an eventual agreement possible, and neither wants to discard that leverage prematurely.
Iran Puts Hormuz on the TableForeign Minister Abbas Araghchi subsequently described a plan under which the Strait of Hormuz could reopen within seven days if Washington accepted Tehran's conditions. Iran has sought an end to the American blockade, relief from restrictions affecting its petroleum exports and a reduction in military pressure. Tehran has also indicated willingness to resume negotiations concerning its nuclear program within a larger diplomatic process.
Hormuz matters because it gives a conventionally weaker Iran an unusual ability to impose costs far beyond its own borders. Before the war, roughly one-fifth of global petroleum consumption passed through the strait. Although producers, tanker operators and governments have improvised methods for keeping significant quantities of oil moving, normal commercial conditions have not returned. Tankers have used shuttle arrangements, ship-to-ship transfers and other costly mechanisms to reduce their exposure. These adaptations have prevented the complete paralysis of Gulf petroleum exports, but they have not recreated the inexpensive and predictable transportation system that existed before the war.
Iran therefore faces a fundamental bargaining dilemma. If it restores normal passage through Hormuz before obtaining concessions, it reduces one of the strongest sources of pressure it possesses. The United States faces the mirror image of that dilemma. If Washington removes the blockade and significantly reduces economic pressure before Iran changes its behavior, it relinquishes some of its strongest instruments of coercion. The dispute is consequently not only about what a final agreement contains. It is about who takes the risk of moving first.
Washington's Theory of PressureWashington's position appears to rest partly on the belief that time will eventually force Tehran to compromise. Iran's economy was already under considerable pressure before the present war. The blockade, sanctions, restrictions on trade and aviation, and continued military pressure have increased those difficulties. From Washington's perspective, therefore, there may be little incentive to provide Iran substantial relief while Tehran remains unwilling to satisfy major American demands.
President Donald Trump has publicly suggested that an agreement may come after the November midterm elections while simultaneously advocating continued economic pressure. This suggests that pressure is not merely an unfortunate condition surrounding negotiations. It is an essential component of Washington's bargaining strategy.
If economic conditions inside Iran continue deteriorating while the United States retains overwhelming conventional military superiority, American policymakers may calculate that Iran's bargaining position several weeks or months from now will be weaker than it is today. Under that assumption, accepting Tehran's present conditions could appear premature. Why compromise today if additional pressure might produce a more favorable agreement tomorrow?
The difficulty is that this strategy depends upon an assumption that has not yet been demonstrated: that time damages Iran's position more rapidly than it damages American interests and the international economic system. That assumption is precisely what Tehran is attempting to challenge.
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