Part I -- The Two-State Solution
Peter Beinart is a "liberal Zionist" who has written a piece in the New York Review of Books of 26 September 2013 entitled "The American Jewish Cocoon." In this essay he laments, "The organized Jewish community [is] a closed intellectual space." By this he means that most American Zionist Jews (it is important to remember that not all Jews are Zionists) know little or nothing about those who oppose them, particularly Palestinians. They also seem to have no interest in changing this situation. For these Zionists the opposition has been reduced to an irredeemably anti-Semitic "them."
Beinart goes on to tell us that such is the political clout of the organized Zionist community that this know-nothing attitude has come to characterize the "debate about Israel in Washington" and the opinions offered in the mass media as well. While Mr. Beinart does not say so, I can tell you that this has been the basic situation since the early 1920s. Beinart does note, however, that over time this situation has led Palestinians and those who support them to show less willingness to dialogue with Zionists, most of whom they consider irredeemably racist.
Beinart thinks this prevailing ignorance is a disaster. Why so? Because he feels that Jews betray the lessons of their own past by failing to understand the meaning of the "dispersion and dispossession" of the Palestinians. They do not seem to care that this particular people has had its "families torn apart in war -- [continue] to struggle to maintain [their] culture, [their] dignity, [their] faith in God in the face of forces over which [they] have no control." This sort of situation, according to Beinart, is something "the Jews should instinctively understand."
Be this as it may, achieving such an understanding is, for Beinart, a means to an end. That end is realizing a two-state solution to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian struggle. For this to happen the Zionists have to essentially feel the pain of the Palestinians and the Palestinians have to understand their no-win situation so that everyone agrees to a Palestinian mini-state on "22 percent of British mandatory Palestine" along with "compensation and resettlement [for the] people whose original villages and homes have long ceased to exist."
Part II -- The Two-State Illusion
An important question is whether Mr. Beinart's two-state solution does not itself represent a goal whose practicality has "long ceased to exist"? That certainly is the opinion of Ian Lustick, a professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. In the Sunday Review section of the New York Times of 15 September 2013, he published an op-ed piece entitled "Two-State Illusion."
According to Professor Lustick, the two-state idea has become something of a fraud behind which lies opportunistic political motives. For instance, the Palestinian Authority (PA) keeps this hope alive so that it can "get the economic aid and diplomatic support that subsidizes the lifestyle of its leaders, the jobs of tens of thousands of soldiers, spies, police officers and civil servants." The Israeli government keeps this hope alive because "it seems to reflect the sentiments of the Jewish Israeli majority and it shields the country from international opprobrium, even as it camouflages relentless efforts to expand Israel's territory into the West Bank." Finally, the U.S. government maintains the hope of a two-state solution to "show that it is working toward a diplomatic solution, to keep the pro-Israel lobby from turning against them and to disguise their humiliating inability to allow any daylight between Washington and the Israeli government."
Lustick believes the two-state solution is an impossible hope that has produced periodic negotiations which have always been "phony" and have prevented new ideas for positive change from being seriously entertained. This long-term stifling has also set the stage for possible "sudden and jagged" events that can send the conflict off in catastrophic directions. Oddly enough, Lustick finds this prospect of heightened conflict a necessary one.
He tells us that only when the "neat and palatable" two-state solution disappears -- and with it the PA and its policies of collaboration -- will we get the "mass mobilization, riots, brutality, terror, Jewish and Arab emigration and rising tides of international condemnation of Israel," along with the subsequent withdrawal of unconditional U.S. support for the Zionist State. At that point, "Israeli leaders may then begin to see, as South Africa's white leaders saw in the late 1980s, that their behavior is producing isolation, emigration and hopelessness." Then, finally, they will become reasonable, and something new and acceptable (a one-state solution?) will be possible.
Lustick's necessary scenario happens to be Peter Beinart's nightmare, and in the latter's essay it is called "civil war." Beinart's call for greater mutual understanding is designed to prevent this violence. One can assume that, for Professor Lustick, things have gone too far for this understanding to suddenly prevail. "Peacemaking and democratic state building require blood and magic," he tells us. Delaying the inevitable with false hopes will only make things worse.
By the way, Lustick is not alone in his view that the two-state formula is a dead end. One of Israel's very best historians, Ilan Pappe, who now is the director of the University of Exeter's European Centre for Palestinian Studies, believes that this prospect has been dead for over a decade. What killed it, and what keeps it dead, are "Zionist greed for territory and the ideological conviction that much more of Palestine [beyond the 1967 borders] is needed in order to have a viable Jewish State." It is worth noting that it is just this ideological conviction that renders Peter Beinart's plea for more understanding of the Palestinian position by American Zionist Jews a non-starter. Any ideology that can justify incessant ethnic cleansing has to make its adherents incapable feeling their victims' pain.
Part III -- Conclusion
If Beinart's hope for mutual understanding is naive, Lustick's hope that more "blood" will lead to the "magic" of a positive outcome is not at all assured.
One might ask just how much disaster is necessary before the hard-line Zionists who have long controlled Israel will compromise their ideological commitment. Keep in mind that the Israeli political elites, right and left, have always been expansionist. Even Peter Beinart is not pushing for a return to the 1967 Green Line and an evacuation of illegal settlements, as far as I can tell. In the past, the Israeli elites have judged their terror and brutality to be justified. They will do so in the future as well. Some of them will interpret any increase in Jewish emigration (a process already ongoing) as a weeding out of weak elements. Militarily the Israelis can probably maintain superiority over their neighbors even in the face of reduced American aid, and as far as world opinion is concerned, most of them care little about it. If this assessment has any validity, the Israelis could go on ethnically cleansing for a very long time.