One More Government Cover-up: The Diablo Canyon Nuclear Reactor System Explosions and Resultant Leak

The Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant sprung a leak due to explosions in an essential nuclear safety system, which is mandated to prevent nuclear disasters. The damaged cooling water system prevents nuclear reactor meltdowns and nuclear explosion disasters. Lies have already started to minimize the importance of this leak.

In a series of Op Eds and peer reviewed engineering journal publications, I proved that small explosions ignite inside nuclear power plants. In addition to water hammers, hundreds and maybe thousands of small explosions occur throughout the world-wide fleet of more than 400 nuclear power plants. Water hammers cause explosions to cause cracks, and water hammers may cause cracks themselves.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the International Atomic Energy Commission, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the American Nuclear Society have blockaded attempts to stop these small explosions, and they have blockaded attempts to stop the next large-scale Fukushima and Three Mile Island type water hammer explosions (The U.S. government murders through indifference and deceit - Cover-ups throughout U.S. industries", click here).

Here we go again with another cover-up. Explosions and water hammers caused this leak and earlier leaks ("PG&E makes alarming discovery at Diablo Power Plant", click here). The explosions that cause leaks are being covered up.

Earlier Diablo Canyon Leaks From Water Hammers

A 2020 leak was attributed to corrosion under insulation (CUI), which is a monumental piping industry problem ("Unsettling and unacceptable negligence uncovered at Diablo Canyon", click here). However, water had to accumulate from a source to initiate CUI.

There was no source of water other than the pipe itself. The piping was inside a building (Figure 1). Note that rust, or steel corrosion, bled out onto the aluminum covering of the pipe (Figure 2).

You can easily see that corrosion started at one single point on the pipe, and corrosion emanated outward. When water under insulation is deprived of oxygen from air, corrosion under insulation accelerates the corrosive destruction of piping steel. There had to be a crack in the pipe, and reactor system water hammers caused that crack. Note that hydrogen would not have dangerously accumulated in this feedwater system.

These fatigue cracks accelerate corrosion at the crack sites to initiate significant corrosion inside the pipe and significant CUI. For Diablo Canyon, CUI was obvious, but the corrosion that started inside the pipe was obliterated by the corroded hole in the pipe wall that formed from fatigue corrosion. The 2020 leak was caused by water hammers.

Scapegoats Rather Than Scientific Facts

As usual, government agencies - the NRC in this case - found a scapegoat, and the NRC blamed inspectors.

The NRC incorrectly claimed that 'The leak occurred because the pipe had become badly corroded from exposure to moisture that had gotten in underneath the pipe's insulation material. But the real problem highlighted by the Office of Inspector General for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was the failure of on-site safety inspectors with the NRC to detect the corrosion that led to the leak during an inspection of the plant that took place three months prior.'

'Admiral Hyman G. Rickover said that "Responsibility is a unique concept... You may share it with others, but your portion is not diminished. You may delegate it, but it is still with you... If responsibility is rightfully yours, no evasion, or ignorance or passing the blame can shift the burden to someone else. Unless you can point your finger at the man who is responsible when something goes wrong, then you have never had anyone really responsible" (.goodreads.com/author/quotes/1479495.Hyman_G_Rickover).'

While I agree with this concept, my experience has been that the people who are in control are frequently responsible for disasters and equipment failures. Leaders frequently blame those who report to them to hide their responsibility and culpability. In this case, NRC management was at fault.

This 2020 feedwater leak was found after a 2015 feedwater leak (""Diablo Canyon May Have Leaked Significant Radioactivity In Recent Years", click here). The NRC covered up nuclear plant water hammers, which formed such leaks. Perhaps the inspectors should have found this leak, but an NRC cover-up precipitated this leak and other leaks.

The 2023 Diablo Canyon Explosions

We have not seen this recent leak yet, but explosions certainly caused this leak. The fatigue corrosion process has damaged pipes all over this reactor system and other nuclear reactor systems. That is, explosions cause cracks, and cracks cause corrosion. A 2013 leak was also found in this primary cooling water water system, or reactor coolant loop ("Diablo canyon reactor shut down after leak found", click here).

I have been writing the U.S. NRC since 2011 to explain that cracks are caused by hydrogen explosions inside reactor cooling systems. The ongoing cover-up by the NRC directly resulted in the false reports that thwart the analysis of this nuclear reactor system failure.

Radiation inside nuclear reactor cores splits water into hydrogen and oxygen, which creates small bombs waiting to explode. When pressures in the system are caused by flow rate changes or system startups and shutdowns (water hammers), these pressures squeeze the hydrogen and oxygen to heat them up and detonate at high points in the cooling water system (Figure 3). Shock waves then bang through the pipes to expand the walls and form cracks (water hammer explosions). Similarly, water hammers bang through systems to crack pipes.

To address the parallel disasters of smaller explosions as well as larger explosion disasters, I sent the following unanswered email to the CEO of the American Nuclear Society.

'The ANS Kills People

By stopping water hammer explosions, the next nuclear power plant explosions like Fukushima or Three Mile Island can be stopped, and mass evacuations and deaths can be stopped (click here).

• Responsible organizations: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Department of Energy (DOE), nuclear power plant owners, and the American Nuclear Society (ANS).

I sent a tweet to ANS (1/6/2023): 'If ANS would stop censoring nuclear safety information, nuclear reactor power plants would be safer.'

[The ANS] organization acts more like a cheerleader, rather than a promoter of nuclear safety ("Trustees of nuclear", click here). ANS stated that 'Nuclear has a future again, and ANS has a unique opportunity to help win that future for all.' Yet, the ANS refuses to publish information about impending nuclear plant explosions.

The next cover-up started on [January 5, 2023], and' 'the following short analysis [summarizes the latest NRC cover-up].

The Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant sprung a leak in their reactor cooling system ("PG&E makes alarming discovery at Diablo Power Plant", click here). Small explosions cracked this pipe. PG&E is already falsely blaming vibrations. 'We identified a pipe associated with a cooling system where a minute amount of dry boric acid crystals accumulated' 'I can't even characterize it as a crack.'

Any crack in a nuclear safety system is a big deal and should not be dismissed as a minor problem.

• Responsible organizations: the ANS, the NRC and PG&E.

"The U.S. government murders us through indifference and deceit - Cover-ups throughout U.S. industries", Click Here.

Having such divergent opinions, would Trustees of Nuclear consider my membership?'

Science Rather Than Scapegoats

The statements presented here are backed up by years of research, as new scientific theories were invented. Science has evolved with these new developments since I started my fight against the NRC. The NRC has been informed of the following scientific technologies as they were accomplished.

• The Leishear Stress Theory describes the complex failure mechanism to crack pipes. Repeated forces from water hammers or explosions blast along the inside of pipes, expand the pipes, and crack those pipes ("Fluid mechanics, water hammer, dynamic stresses, and piping design", click here).
• The Leishear Fatigue Corrosion Theory explains how water hammers and explosions create microscopic cracks, which then accelerate corrosion in pipes ("Water hammer causes water main breaks", click here; "Water hammer and fatigue corrosion, in process). Note that the fatigue corrosion process is a recent discovery, and publications are still in process. Many CUI failures are initiated by water hammers and explosions. Perhaps most CUI failures are caused by water hammers. We do not know the extent of fatigue corrosion failures, since the technology was not previously available,
• The Leishear Explosion Theory explains how nuclear reactor operations detonate hydrogen for large and small explosions ("Water hammers exploded the nuclear power plants at Fukushima, Daiichi", click here; "Explosion differentiation using light emissions - nuclear reactor, steam, water hammer, hydrogen, piper alpha, and hydro-volcanic explosions").

An important side note is that corrosion failures will be slowed if explosions and water hammers are stopped. There will still be cracks and corrosion inside the pipes, but the explosion and water hammer sources that accelerate pipe leaks would be removed.

When Will We Act to Improve Nuclear Power Plant Reactor Safety and Stop Explosions?

Pretending that there are no problems dismally fails. We had a cover-up of a near-nuclear-disaster explosion in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine (Nuclear threats - Part 5 - An incoming nuclear plant explosion disaster - Zaporizhzhia near missed this next disaster", click here).

Now we are entering a new cover-up of ongoing smaller nuclear power plant explosions. Stating my frequent refrain, nuclear power plant explosions can be stopped!

Addendum

The Deadly Surry Nuclear Power Plant Piping Burst

Having spent a lot of time researching nuclear plant accidents, a few comments are warranted with respect to the 1986 Surry nuclear plant, piping rupture that killed four people ("Pipe rupture at Surry nuclear plant kills four workers", g.ucsusa.org/dlochbaum/pipe-rupture-at-surry). The pipeline explosion damages were significant in the 18-inch diameter pipe at 450 psi, 370 degrees Fahrenheit (Figure 4).

This discussion is qualitative in nature, and this discussion is brand new. Looking at Figures 3 and 5, there are different cooling water loops. The reactor cooling water loop contains significant hydrogen from radiation reactions to split water. The secondary loop and auxiliary cooling water loops are not in contact with the radioactive fuel.

Consequently, cracks in feedwater and secondary loops are induced by hammers and not explosions. Explosions ignite in the reactor cooling loop to cause cracks, and hammers cause cracks in the secondary and feedwater loops. Both types of cracks are subject to fatigue corrosion.

Wall thinning of the burst elbow at Surry was a major destructive factor, and material changes in reactor piping design historically followed. However, great care is taken to eliminate contaminants from the cooling water loop to ensue a longer life for the turbine blades, which are subject to stem from this same water. Given new research results, fatigue corrosion thinned the wall of the burst elbow.

There was little mention of steam hammers following this accident, where steam hammers are sometimes referred to as water hammers. The initial investigation learned that a steam valve unintentionally slammed shut due to improper repairs (Figure 5). Such a valve slam sent a significant steam hammer pressure wave down through the steam generator, through the pipes, and up into the elbow that burst.

Although wall thinning contributed to this failure, the thinned pipe burst due to the steam hammer, or multiple steam hammers, and fatigue corrosion. A public record of this court case was not located.

Earlier reports attributed the cause of the burst valve to 'perturbations' - not so. Once the steam hammer burst the elbow, the 370 degrees Fahrenheit water in the pipe exploded into steam vapor and killed the workers.

The Deadly Mohave Coal-fired Power Plant Piping Burst

To elucidate the raw energy releases in a steam system, the shut down Mohave power plant is mentioned. A 1986 explosion killed 6 and injured 10 ("Mohave Incident Report", .nrc.gov/docs/ML2023/ML20236E478.pdf, "Mohave Power Station - 1985 Pipe Failure Disaster", click here). A 30-inch diameter pipe, - 600 psi, 1000 degree steam - with 1-5/16 inch thick walls split horizontally along a weld seam (Figure 6).

An excellent materials analysis was performed, but there was no analysis for water hammer damages of this pipe, following the explosion. Reported data clearly proved that corrosion formed on fatigue damaged surfaces (Figure 7). Considering recent research, fatigue corrosion was the explosive factor that ripped this pipe apart.

The piping material that was used for this pipe was banned from international piping codes, and better steels are now used. However, the causal failure mechanisms were water hammer and fatigue corrosion.

I attended a 1991 failure analysis course taught by Helmut Thielsch. In that course, Helmut stated that the power company retained every engineering expert that he knew to defend a law suit. He was the only engineer allowed to testify in the case, and each engineer signed a non-disclosure agreement, according to Helmut. A public record of this court case was not located. We have met the enemy, and they are us.

A Lack of Transparency in Industry

By federal laws, damages are required to be reported for oil and gas pipelines and nuclear power plant piping - however- such damages are not required to be reported in other industries. As a member of different national organizations, I was informed that there are many explosions in piping throughout U.S. industries, where these explosions are not reported to the public. That is, U.S. industrial explosions are routinely covered up. A federal law needs to be written to demand reporting of all industrial explosions. Otherwise, lives are at stake, and no actions will be taken until people are killed.

Unsafe Nuclear Power Plants

The continuing censorship of new technology endangers our lives. These Surry and Diablo Canyon case studies prove that there are fundamental misconceptions of nuclear reactor safety - and throughout industry - with respect to explosions, water hammers, and fatigue corrosion in nuclear power plants, other power plants. The global dangers of these findings are yet to be fully understood.

However, safety analyses are required for every nuclear power plant. The NRC falsely claims that all reactors are safe, even though the technical bases for these analyses are currently being established. This new information proves that safety analyses for the world-wide reactor fleet are inadequate.

This inadequacy dismantles nuclear safety, damages nuclear reactor systems, and endangers our lives. One more time - stop nuclear power plant explosions!

(Article changed on Jan 11, 2023 at 6:49 PM EST)