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The Silent Transfer of Power: What Khamenei's Funeral Revealed About Iran's New Leadership

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Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D.
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The Silent Trasfer of Power
The Silent Trasfer of Power
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Political funerals in authoritarian systems are rarely confined to mourning. They are carefully orchestrated demonstrations of legitimacy, continuity, and state authority. Every public appearance, every symbolic gesture, and every conspicuous absence become part of a political narrative designed to reassure domestic audiences while communicating strength abroad. The week-long state funeral of Iran's late Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, should therefore be understood not merely as a religious ceremony but as one of the most important political events in the history of the Islamic Republic since the 1979 Revolution. Recent reporting has emphasized the unprecedented scale of the ceremonies, the extraordinary security arrangements, and the regime's effort to portray institutional continuity following the devastating Iran-Israel war.

History demonstrates that moments of succession frequently reveal the real structure of political power more clearly than years of ordinary governance. The death of a long-serving ruler removes the familiar center of authority and exposes the institutions and personalities capable of preserving the state. Funerals, therefore, are not simply endings; they are carefully managed introductions to a new political era.

One of the most striking features of the ceremonies has been the continued absence from public view of the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei. Iranian officials have attributed his absence to security concerns and injuries reportedly sustained during the war. Whether these explanations fully account for his nonappearance is ultimately less important than the political consequences of that absence. Leadership is communicated not only through constitutional authority but also through public visibility. During periods of national uncertainty, citizens, political elites, and foreign governments naturally look for the individuals who visibly embody the functioning state.

In contrast, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has occupied a highly visible position throughout the funeral ceremonies. His repeated presence alongside senior officials, foreign delegations, and military commanders projects an image of administrative competence and governmental continuity. Regardless of formal constitutional hierarchy, Ghalibaf has appeared as one of the principal public faces of the post-war Islamic Republic. This visibility is politically significant because crises often elevate individuals who demonstrate organizational capacity rather than merely constitutional status.

Equally noteworthy has been the prominent role played by Ahmad Vahidi. Following months of limited public visibility during the war, his appearance at the funeral serves as an unmistakable reminder that the Revolutionary Guard remains one of the central pillars of the Iranian political system. Rather than suggesting competition between Ghalibaf and Vahidi, the ceremonies have projected complementary functions. Ghalibaf represents the administrative machinery of the state, while Vahidi symbolizes the resilience of Iran's security establishment. Together they present an image of institutional continuity in which civilian administration and military authorities reinforce one another rather than compete for immediate public attention.

Equally revealing is what official television coverage has chosen to emphasize. The broadcast consistently highlighted current officeholders, senior military commanders, and religious authorities responsible for managing the state during the post-war transition. Whether or not other prominent political personalities attended particular ceremonies, the visual narrative presented to the public has centered overwhelmingly on those currently exercising institutional responsibility. In highly centralized political systems, official imagery is rarely accidental. State television does not merely record events; it helps construct the political message the leadership wishes to communicate.

The funeral also appears to illustrate a broader transformation within the Islamic Republic itself. For more than three decades, analysts frequently described Iran as a political system revolving almost exclusively around Ali Khamenei's personal authority. The current transition suggests a somewhat different picture. Instead of demonstrating institutional collapse following the death of a dominant leader, the funeral has projected the image of a governing structure increasingly dependent upon interconnected political, military, and bureaucratic institutions capable of maintaining continuity during periods of exceptional crisis.

This distinction between constitutional authority and visible authority deserves particular attention. A political leader may possess formal legal power while remaining largely absent from public life because of security or other considerations. In such circumstances, other officials inevitably become the visible representatives of state continuity. The Iranian funeral ceremonies illustrate precisely this phenomenon. Public legitimacy is shaped not only by legal succession but also by repeated public demonstrations of effective governance.

None of this guarantees political stability. Iran continues to confront profound economic challenges, unresolved factional disagreements, international isolation, and the long-term consequences of a devastating regional conflict. Leadership transitions often produce unexpected political developments that remain invisible during carefully choreographed public ceremonies. Nevertheless, the funeral has provided a rare opportunity to observe the Islamic Republic at one of the most consequential moments in its modern history.

Historians may ultimately conclude that the lasting significance of Ali Khamenei's funeral was not simply the farewell to a leader who dominated Iranian politics for thirty-seven years. Its greater importance may lie in revealing the outlines of a new governing structure. Whether temporary or enduring, the ceremonies have suggested that Iran's political future may increasingly depend upon collective institutional leadership rather than the singular public dominance that characterized much of the Khamenei era. If that interpretation proves correct, this funeral will be remembered not only as the end of one chapter in Iranian history, but as the first carefully choreographed public presentation of the next.

References

Associated Press. (2026, July 4). Iran begins dayslong funeral for Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, killed in war. Click Here

Reuters. (2026, July 3). Khamenei lies in state in Tehran as Iran begins week of funeral ceremonies. Click Here

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Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D. Social Media Pages: Facebook Page       Twitter page url on login Profile not filled in       Linkedin page url on login Profile not filled in       Instagram Page

I was born and raised in Tehran, Iran, and came to the United States in 1976 to study psychology. Over time, America became my home, and I later became a U.S. citizen. My professional career has centered on clinical neuropsychology, particularly (more...)
 
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3 people are discussing this page, with 9 comments  Post Comment


Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D.

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The Politics of Absence: What the Cameras May Have Revealed

One aspect of the funeral deserves continued attention as additional photographs and video recordings become available. Beyond the remarkable public turnout, political analysts should examine not only who appeared prominently but also who appeared less visibly-- or perhaps not at all-- in the official broadcasts. In highly centralized political systems, state ceremonies are carefully choreographed, and the visual narrative presented to the public often carries political significance beyond the ceremony itself.

If future reporting confirms that several former presidents, including Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani, were absent from the principal public ceremonies-- or were largely omitted from state television coverage-- that would itself be a noteworthy political signal. It could suggest that the regime deliberately chose to emphasize the officials currently responsible for governing Iran rather than political figures associated with previous administrations. Conversely, if these former leaders did attend but received little or no official media coverage, that editorial decision would be equally revealing. In political communication, omission can sometimes be as meaningful as inclusion.

Perhaps the most striking contrast throughout the ceremonies has been the limited public visibility of the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, alongside the highly visible roles assumed by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Ahmad Vahidi. Iranian authorities have attributed Mojtaba's absence to security concerns, and there is no confirmed evidence supporting alternative explanations. Nevertheless, the political effect remains the same: in moments of national transition, the individuals who are repeatedly seen managing state affairs naturally become the public face of continuity.

History teaches that leadership transitions are often understood not only through official announcements but also through carefully managed public imagery. As more evidence emerges in the coming days, historians may conclude that Ali Khamenei's funeral was remembered not only for its extraordinary scale, but also for the subtle political messages embedded within it. Sometimes the most revealing story is found not only in who stands at the center of the stage, but also in who remains outside the camera's frame.

Submitted on Sunday, Jul 5, 2026 at 1:32:13 AM

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Hmmm... Does this mean Trump has gotten his goal of regime change after all? I haven't seen much of the usual "Death to Israel. Death to America" rallies lately. Those were mainly religious ethno-state Islamic-political rallies. It will be interesting to see if Iran has really come under more "practical leadership" as Trump keeps insisting is the case.

Submitted on Sunday, Jul 5, 2026 at 1:39:50 AM

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David Wieland

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Ghalibaf is acting statesmanlike now, but he has a lot of blood on his hands, not so different from other IRGC figures who have repeatedly displayed their murderous ways. If this regime retains power, it will be a bitter pill for the majority of Iranians that it has harshly oppressed.

Submitted on Sunday, Jul 5, 2026 at 2:24:22 AM

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David,

I understand your concern, and I don't think anyone would deny that Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is a controversial figure with a long history in Iran's security establishment. His record has been debated by supporters and critics alike for many years. My article was not intended to absolve any individual of responsibility for past actions.

The central question I raise is different. Political systems are often forced to adapt after major wars, regardless of who occupies senior positions. Leaders with military backgrounds have, at various points in history, shifted from coercive roles to pragmatic statecraft-- not because they became different people overnight, but because the strategic environment changed.

I also agree that many Iranians have suffered under decades of political repression, economic hardship, and international isolation. That reality should neither be ignored nor minimized. But there is an equally important analytical question: can a political system become more pragmatic without first undergoing regime change?

History suggests that it can. China after Mao, Vietnam after the Cold War, and even the Soviet Union during parts of the Gorbachev era all demonstrated that significant changes in governing style can occur before, or even without, a complete change of regime. Whether Iran is entering such a phase remains uncertain, but that possibility deserves careful analysis rather than dismissal.

My article is therefore less about defending personalities than about identifying political trends. If the evidence ultimately shows that pragmatism is replacing ideological confrontation as the dominant mode of governance, then analysts should acknowledge that development regardless of their opinion of the individuals involved. If the evidence points in the opposite direction, then that conclusion should be accepted as well. The purpose of analysis is to follow the evidence, not our preferences.

Submitted on Sunday, Jul 5, 2026 at 2:33:16 AM

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If by "regime change" we mean the collapse of the Islamic Republic, then I would say no. The institutions of the state remain intact, and the political system continues to function. My article argues something different: not that the regime has disappeared, but that its governing style may be evolving under the pressure of war, economic realities, and changing regional dynamics.

The apparent decline in the highly publicized "Death to America" and "Death to Israel" demonstrations is certainly noteworthy. Whether this reflects a deliberate policy shift, public fatigue after the war, or simply a change in official priorities remains to be seen. Political slogans are often tactical instruments rather than permanent indicators of state strategy.

What I find more significant is whether decision-makers increasingly prioritize national interests, economic recovery, and diplomatic flexibility over ideological confrontation. If that trend continues, it would represent an important evolution in the Islamic Republic-- not necessarily a new regime, but potentially a new phase in its political development.

History reminds us that political systems often survive by adapting. China's reforms after Mao and Vietnam's post-war economic opening did not end one-party rule, yet they fundamentally changed how those states governed. Whether Iran is beginning a comparable process is one of the central questions that observers should watch over the coming months rather than answer today.

Submitted on Sunday, Jul 5, 2026 at 2:30:11 AM

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We should hope that Trump's claim about Iran's leadership being more practical now -- a different "regime" -- is just his typical inaccurate rhetoric and not what he truly believes. There is clearly no change in the determination to create a nuclear weapon, the threat against which all the regime's previous operations against Western civilization pale. (See, for example, click here) Regardless of who is heading the regime, it remains evil and extremely dangerous in its goals and actions.

Submitted on Sunday, Jul 5, 2026 at 11:42:08 PM

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It's impossible to know what Trump "truly believes" partly because he doesn't seem to know himself. He can be threatening to destroy Iran at the same time his negotiators - such as they are - are trying to work out a deal with Iran's much more competent, if no more honest, negotiators. Both regimes lie to each other and to their respective peoples. It may be that more Americans believe Iran than believe the Trump administration. To the extent that Iran is even allowed enough internet access to listen to the U.S., the reverse may even be true of them. Many Iranians believed Trump when he said "help was on the way" and that there would be a chance to overthrow their own hated regime. They feel betrayed now and many still support the previous leadership, judging by the turnout for Khamenei's funeral - though it's hard to tell how much of that was coerced too.

It's understandable that Iran believes a nuclear weapon - several, actually - would be their best insurance against U.S. attack. After all, North Korea was threatened repeatedly by every administration this century and before to prevent them from getting nuclear weapons, but now that they have them, and are even regularly testing them, no American president has threatened them with anything more than sanctions, which, like Iran, they've pretty much learned to live with. Libya voluntarily gave up its nuclear program and it got Qaddafi sodomized and killed and the country embroiled in a civil war ever since. I actually don't think even the theocratic Iranian leadership - which may not even be in charge of future nuclear capabilities since there is daylight between the IRGC leadership and the theocratic leadership now - is suicidal enough to launch nuclear missiles at the U.S. even if they got them. They know any U.S. president would react immediately by nuclear bombing Iran into a permanent wasteland, even if it contaminated the whole Middle East and beyond.

But tiny Israel could be nearly destroyed by 1-3 nuclear bombs, or so damaged it couldn't effectively retaliate. There's reason to believe Trump might not respond to such a fate accompli though, again, it's impossible to know what Trump really believes. I'd credit Madman theory to Trump, but I don't think he's even coherent or competent enough to pull that off, like Nixon did. Iran remains the biggest sponsor of terrorism in the world, overwhelmingly so in the Middle East.

It's almost as hard to know if Israel is just in a stalemate or is finally making progress in vanquishing Hamas and Hezbollah (the latter of which is the most funded and supplied by Iran). Israel's soldiers are exhausted and in need of rotation. But a combination of Netanyahu coalition retention and deep Haredi resistance to serving or even working in Israel means their ample supply of young men aren't there to relieve the troops in their 3rd year of service, with no end in sight. The new regiment from Trump's Board of Peace is said to be far too small, and is certainly too inexperienced, to control Hamas, let alone end them. Israel isn't being allowed to finish the war and win by the world, even if it knew how. I've had a proposal to do so since before Sinwar was killed (see below). Israel has been too slow in destroying the tunnel networks, hasn't built a moat or anything comparable to prevent Hamas from rearming from Egypt's Sinai, and isn't making fast enough progress against Hezbollah either. Like America, it relies too much on air power, which is why their are so many mostly immune tunnels in the first place. Massive surface destruction doesn't accomplish the mission and turns the world against them.

A plan to defeat Hamas
A plan to defeat Hamas
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Submitted on Monday, Jul 6, 2026 at 1:21:41 AM

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The Real Struggle Is Inside the Islamic Republic

One point should be added to this discussion because it is essential for understanding where Iran may be heading.

The Islamic Republic has not suddenly become a unified, pragmatic political system. Rather, it is experiencing what may be its most important internal strategic debate since the end of the Iran-Iraq War. The question is no longer whether Iran should survive, but how it can survive.

On one side stand the hardline ideological conservatives associated with figures such as Saeed Jalili and Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel. Their political outlook continues to emphasize revolutionary ideology, resistance, and confrontation with the United States and Israel. During the funeral ceremonies for Ayatollah Khamenei, some mourners carried red Shiite flags-- a traditional symbol associated with the call to avenge an unjust martyrdom. Many observers interpreted these displays as reflecting demands for retaliation rather than reconciliation. Similar calls for revenge could also be heard among sections of the crowd.

On the other side appears to be a more pragmatic current centered around Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and supported by experienced diplomats such as Abbas Araghchi. Their objective does not appear to be abandoning the Islamic Republic but preserving it through adaptation. They seem to recognize that after years of sanctions, economic decline, military confrontation, and growing public dissatisfaction, Iran cannot indefinitely govern through revolutionary mobilization alone. A state exhausted by war eventually requires economic recovery, diplomatic flexibility, and institutional stability.

This should not be misunderstood as a democratic transformation. Nor does it erase the human rights concerns or political repression that many Iranians have experienced over the past four decades. Rather, it suggests that part of the governing elite may have concluded that refusing to adapt carries its own existential risks. History shows that political systems often change their governing style long before they change their constitutional identity.

The most important actor, however, is neither faction within the establishment. It is the Iranian people. Large numbers of Iranians continue to seek meaningful political, social, and economic change, although they differ profoundly about what that change should look like. The leadership is well aware that continued economic deterioration and permanent confrontation could produce another nationwide crisis comparable to previous waves of protest. That reality inevitably shapes strategic calculations inside the state.

For this reason, I would caution against interpreting recent developments as evidence that the Islamic Republic has fundamentally reinvented itself. It has not. The more accurate interpretation is that an internal struggle is underway between those who still see ideological confrontation as the path to survival and those who increasingly believe that pragmatism offers a better chance of preserving the system. Which tendency ultimately prevails will likely determine Iran's direction far more than any single speech or funeral ceremony.

References

  1. Reuters. Three sons of Iran's slain leader Khamenei appear at funeral, not his successor. July 5, 2026.
  2. Associated Press. Iran's top officials attend prayer for the late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran. July 5, 2026.
  3. Reuters. Mass grief in Iran at Khamenei funeral after US, Israel war killing. July 4, 2026.

Submitted on Sunday, Jul 5, 2026 at 3:41:34 AM

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The Man Who Chose Negotiation: Why Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf May Become Iran's Most Important Political Figure After the War

Few political careers in modern Iran have been as unusual as that of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. At different stages of his career, he has served as a commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), chief of the national police, mayor of Tehran, presidential candidate, and Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament). Throughout these transitions, he has repeatedly reinvented himself while consistently remaining close to the center of power. Yet the Swiss negotiations may ultimately define the most significant chapter of his political life.

Many observers outside Iran continue to interpret Iranian politics through the simplistic lens of a struggle between "hardliners" and "moderates." Such labels often obscure more than they reveal. As in many political systems, including Iran's, the more meaningful divide frequently exists between ideological actors and pragmatic ones. Ghalibaf's significance lies less in his ideological positions than in his longstanding reputation as a manager, administrator, and problem solver.

The recent war fundamentally altered Iran's strategic environment. Regardless of how its military outcome is interpreted, the conflict imposed substantial economic, social, and political costs on all parties involved. In such circumstances, societies often seek leaders capable of rebuilding the nation rather than merely mobilizing it for further confrontation. History repeatedly demonstrates that the leaders who emerge after wars are often quite different from those who rise to prominence during them.

This is where Ghalibaf's political profile becomes especially compelling. Unlike many figures whose legitimacy is derived primarily from revolutionary credentials or religious authority, his public image has been built largely upon managerial competence, infrastructure development, administrative efficiency, and institutional effectiveness. His supporters view him as a pragmatic executive. His critics may disagree with his policies, but even many of his opponents acknowledge that his emphasis on implementation and tangible results distinguishes him from politicians who rely primarily on rhetoric.

The Swiss negotiations appear to reflect precisely this style of politics. Negotiation is not a sign of surrender. Rather, it is an acknowledgment that military power alone rarely resolves political conflicts. Some of the most significant diplomatic achievements of the modern era-- from Richard Nixon's opening to China to the Camp David Accords and the Good Friday Agreement-- were accomplished by leaders willing to engage their adversaries in dialogue while safeguarding their national interests.

It is only natural that Ghalibaf now faces criticism from multiple directions. Some will argue that the negotiations conceded too much. Others will contend that they did not go far enough. Such criticism is almost inevitable for any political leader attempting to move from confrontation toward compromise. Yet history often treats negotiators more generously than their contemporaries do.

Whether Ghalibaf will ultimately succeed remains uncertain. Iran continues to face major economic challenges, regional tensions, demographic pressures, and institutional constraints. No single politician can resolve such complex problems alone. Nevertheless, if the Swiss negotiations mark the beginning of a broader transition from permanent confrontation to strategic pragmatism, Ghalibaf may ultimately occupy a unique place in Iran's political evolution.

The reason is straightforward. Postwar societies often reward those who promise reconstruction rather than continued resistance, efficiency rather than symbolism, and practical solutions rather than ideological purity. If this historical pattern proves true in Iran as well, the political significance of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf may only now be beginning.

References
  1. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf profile.
  2. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Iran Backgrounders.
  3. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Iran Program.
  4. Brookings Institution. Iran Studies.
  5. Abrahamian, Ervand. A History of Modern Iran. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
  6. Axworthy, Michael. Revolutionary Iran. Penguin, 2013.
  7. Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. Yale University Press, 1968.
  8. Fukuyama, Francis. Political Order and Political Decay. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014.
  9. International Crisis Group. Iran Reports.
  10. United Nations Charter, Article 33.
  11. Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. Simon & Schuster, 1994.
  12. Camp David Accords (1978) and the Good Friday Agreement (1998).

Submitted on Monday, Jul 6, 2026 at 2:18:56 PM

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