Reprinted from Consortium News
An Israeli soldier prepares for a night attack inside Gaza as part of Operation Protective Edge, which killed more than 2,000 Gazans in 2014.
(Image by (Israel Defense Forces photo)) Permission Details DMCA
On March 3, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu issued an impassioned plea to Congress to protect Israel by opposing diplomacy with Iran. Referring to "the remarkable alliance between Israel and the United States" which includes "generous military assistance and missile defense," Netanyahu failed to mention that Israel has an arsenal of 100 or 200 nuclear weapons.
The day before he delivered that controversial address, Netanyahu expressed similar sentiments to AIPAC, Israel's powerful U.S. lobby. He reiterated the claim that Israel acted in the 1967 Six-Day War "to defend itself." The narrative that Israel attacked Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in self-defense, seizing the Palestinian territories in the West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula in 1967, has remained largely unquestioned in the public discourse.
But declassified high-level documents from Britain, France, Russia and the United States reveal that Egypt, Syria and Jordan were not going to attack Israel and Israel knew it. In fact, they did not attack Israel. Instead, Israel mounted the first attack in order to decimate the Egyptian army and take the West Bank.
For two weeks following the Six Day War, Amos Oz and Avrahim Shapira visited Israeli kibbutzim and recorded interviews with several Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers who had just returned from that war. Largely censored by the Israeli government for many years, those reels have finally been made public. "Censored Voices" features the taped voices of young IDF soldiers, as the aging, former soldiers sit silently beside the tape recorder, listening to their own voices.
The testimonies documented in the tapes reveal evidence of targeting civilians and summarily executing prisoners, which constitute war crimes. A soldier asks himself, "They're civilians -- should I kill them or not?" He replies, "I didn't even think about it. Just kill! Kill everyone you see."
Likewise, one voice notes, "Several times we captured guys, positioned them and just killed them." Another reveals, "In the war, we all became murderers." Still another says, "Not only did this war not solve the state's problems, but it complicated them in a way that'll be very hard to solve."
One soldier likens evacuating Arab villages to what the Nazis did to Jews in Europe. As a soldier watched an Arab man being taken from his home, the soldier states, "I had an abysmal feeling that I was evil."
In what proved to be a prescient question, one soldier asks, "Are we doomed to bomb villages every decade for defensive purposes?" Indeed, Israel justifies all of its assaults on Gaza as self-defense, even though Israel invariably attacks first, and kills overwhelming numbers of Palestinians -- mostly civilians. Each time, many fewer Israelis are killed by Palestinian rockets.
Israel's False Self-Defense Claim
The film begins by showing a map of Israel surrounded by Egypt, Syria and Jordan, with arrows from each country aimed at Israel. The IDF soldiers felt those Arab countries posed an existential threat to Israel.
"There was a feeling it would be a Holocaust," one soldier observed. The Israeli media claimed at the time that Egypt had attacked Israel by land and by air on June 5, 1967. According to British journalist Patrick Seale, "Israel's preparation of opinion" was "brilliantly managed," a "remarkable exercise in psychological warfare."
In his book, The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense: Questioning the Legal Basis for Preventive War, published by Cambridge University Press, Ohio State University law professor John Quigley documents conversations by high government officials in Israel, the United States, Egypt, the Soviet Union, France, and Britain leading up to the Six-Day War.
He draws on minutes of British cabinet meetings, a French government publication, U.S. documents in "Foreign Relations of the United States," and Russian national archives. Those conversations make clear that Israel knew Egypt, Syria and Jordan would not and did not attack Israel, and that Israel initiated the attacks.
Egypt was the only one of the three Arab countries that had a military of any consequence. Israeli General Yitzhak Rabin told the Israeli cabinet that the Egyptian forces maintained a defensive posture, and Israeli General Meir Amit, head of Mossad (Israeli's intelligence agency), informed U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara that Egypt was not poised to attack Israel. Both the United States and the Soviet Union urged Israel not to attack. Nevertheless, Israel's cabinet voted on June 4 to authorize the IDF to invade Egypt.
"After the cabinet vote," Quigley writes, "informal discussion turned to ways to make it appear that Israel was not starting a war when in fact that was precisely what it was doing."