Since the collapse of the diplomatic process between the United States and North Korea in 2019, relations between the two sides have been at a standstill.
In 2021, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un set into motion a wide-ranging plan for the modernization of his nuclear forces. This modernization has helped render his nuclear deterrent more credible while accentuating the risks of nuclear conflict on the Korean Peninsula. It has further cemented North Korea's lack of intent to relinquish its nuclear weapons, which it views as essential to its defense.
Since it's hard to imagine North Korean nuclear disarmament soon, the United States and South Korea should seek a new approach that seeks to manage and reduce nuclear risks through practical measures, as suggested by a recent United Institute of Peace study. The US, South Korea, and any interested allies should adopt a new approach to the North Korean challenge; the approach should address the mistrust among Pyongyang, Washington, and Seoul. It should further seek to stabilize the Korean Peninsula so that future crises are less prone to spiral into a major conventional war. At the same time, the new approach could also be compatible with the status quo policy of maintaining robust deterrence and seeking the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea is unlikely to express interest in such proposals. However, the US and South Korea could also seek to reduce the risks of unintentional escalation. Realistically, Washington and Seoul should recognize that the prospect of a nuclear-armed Pyongyang is likely to remain a long-term fixture of the strategic environment in Northeast Asia.
North Korea's strategic stance led to its national defense strategy privileging the role of nuclear weapons. Facing a conventionally superior, nuclear-armed U.S.-South Korea alliance, Pyongyang has threatened to resort to early nuclear use both to deter conflict and engage in a nuclear escalation to fend off an attack by the alliance. A realistic goal for the alliance means measures that acknowledge the most likely alliance behaviors and capabilities that would lead to early use by North Korea.
The USIP study stated: "One highly tractable, short-term intervention could be declaratory assurances by the US concerning the possibility of offensive cyberattacks on Pyongyang's nuclear command and control systems. Since the Trump administration, the US has pursued a comprehensive missile defeat strategy that explicitly contemplates the possibility of employing offensive cyberweapons to sever Kim from his nuclear arsenal. Due to a lack of effective strategic situational awareness capabilities, North Korea would be unable to observe any US preparation for such an attack during a crisis, but its leadership would fear that its ability to exercise effective control over its nuclear forces could be degraded, creating incentives to nuclear use." Pyongyang's concern about these matters was expressed in its 2022 update to its nuclear weapons law, which announced that it would "automatically and immediately" use nuclear weapons if its command and control systems were degraded.
However, our government could take action. It could forswear deliberate non-kinetic attacks on North Korean nuclear command and control; this could provide an important reassurance to Pyongyang that could mitigate its incentives to resort to early nuclear use. The military postures of both North and South Korea today meet the classic definition. of crisis instability: each side signals its resolve to launch preemptive strikes during a war, hoping to limit damage and seek strategic and tactical advantage. For North Korea, this threat of preemption is underwritten by its nuclear weapons. For South Korea, the preemptive use of conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, backed by high-quality intelligence, is a central pillar of its "Kill Chain" strategy.
Any agreement between the two Koreas could steer the two countries away from these preemptive attack postures and would contribute to improving crisis stability. Failing this, however, the two Koreas should look to the 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement as a template for managing the sources of instability. Though North Korea scrapped the CMA last November in response to South Korea's partial suspension of the deal following North Korea's launch of a military satellite, the basic logic of the agreement remains sound in addressing possible misunderstanding and incidents that could spiral into a major conventional military conflagration that includes a nuclear component. Should political conditions improve between the two Koreas, Pyongyang and Seoul should seek a renewal of the CMA or a similar successor agreement that generally provides for a greater buffer between the Korean People's Army and South Korea's armed forces. Such an agreement need not be tied to concrete measures by Pyongyang on denuclearization but would have the practical effect of limiting pathways to a conflict that could rapidly escalate due to the two sides' preemptive attack postures.
Though not a traditional focus of nuclear risk reduction on the Korean Peninsula, improving diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea could stabilize the region. An early step would be a US liaison office in Pyongyang, staffed by one or multiple U.S. Foreign Service officers, which has been a part of negotiations going back to the Agreed Framework. The suggested actions can contribute to a short-term reduction of the risk of nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula. US and South Korean policymakers and military planners must recognize that, as a practical matter, they will continue to coexist with a nuclear-armed North Korea in the interim, out of a shared interest with Pyongyang in lowering the risk of a nuclear conflict that neither side desires, but Washington and Seoul should seek to advance measures that can limit the risk of nuclear escalation in future crises.
The suggestions outlined by USIP on contributing to a short-term reduction of the risk of nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula should be used to engage in long-term thinking about denuclearization possibilities on the Korean Peninsula. Out of a shared interest with Pyongyang in lowering the risk of a nuclear conflict, Washington and Seoul should seek to promote measures that can limit the risk of nuclear escalation in future crises. These diplomatic moves are the best we can do at this time. Will we even do our best?
Jason Sibert is the Lead Writer of the Peace Economy Project
