Amidst a wave of optimism surrounding China-India relations, there are talks of President Xi Jinping's possible visit to India for the G-20 summit in September. The upcoming summit holds promise as it could offer a high-level platform to discuss and address bilateral relations between the two nations.
India and China have been experiencing escalated tensions since the outbreak of the border conflict in May 2020. Despite multiple rounds of military and diplomatic talks over the past several years, they have not managed to achieve the full disengagement of forces. Only a few areas along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) have seen limited disengagement, with little tangible progress on the ground.
The rivalry between China and India plays out in the region of South Asia, particularly along the LAC. Despite various border agreements in 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012, and 2013 that temporarily reduced tension along the LAC, the core boundary dispute remained unresolved. The 2013 Depsang standoff shattered hopes of resolving the dispute, and subsequent incidents in Demchok (2014), Depsang (2015), Doklam (2017), and Galwan (2020) revealed a clear pattern of China attempting to establish a new normal through these incursions.
China's expanding influence in South Asia poses significant security concerns for India as it selectively pushes its borders with Bhutan and Nepal. Additionally, China's economic grip on countries in the region, along with its actions in Myanmar, raises apprehensions about its intentions.
India's growing stature, economic progress, and proximity to the US have caused unease for China, which is heavily influenced by US-India relations in shaping its policy towards India. On the other hand, India's approach towards China is not solely dependent on US-India or US-China relations. India values its strategic autonomy and has a history of making issue-based policy decisions aligned with its economic and security interests. This display of strategic autonomy by India, including its stance on the Ukraine war and refusal to follow Western diktats, does not sit well with China, which perceives India's ties with the US as adversarial.
Both China and India have competing interests in the Indo-Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South Asia, which further adds complexity to their bilateral relations. India's assertive posture and its unwillingness to ally with any specific power bloc have intensified China's concerns regarding India's intentions and alignment with other nations in the global power dynamics.
Unreasonable hopes have been triggered by the possibility of Chinese President Xi Jinping visiting Delhi in September for the G20 summit, with some optimists expecting a breakthrough in bilateral relations. The hope is that Xi's potential visit could end the current stalemate that began with China's aggression in Ladakh in 2020, resulting in the loss of Indian soldiers' lives. The optimism grew after the recent meeting between National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi in Johannesburg during a BRICS forum when Yi urged that the bilateral relationship not be defined by a single issue, in a reference to Sino-Indian border disputes. The Chinese statement mentioning the "Bali Consensus" between Modi and Xi on stabilizing bilateral relations, along with some parts of the conversation confirmed by South Block that were not disclosed earlier, has added to the excitement in Delhi.
However, this enthusiasm should be tempered by the fact that Modi and Xi had only a brief chat at the G20 dinner table in Bali, Indonesia, last November. Claims that the two leaders agreed to swiftly resolve the Ladakh frontier issues might reflect wishful thinking, which has been a characteristic of India's traditional approach to dealing with China. In the past, Delhi was eager to overlook significant differences to promote bilateral relations or collaborate on global matters. The Modi government has been clear in stating that normalcy in relations will not resume until Beijing restores peace and tranquillity on the border. On the other hand, Chinese officials have demanded that India set aside the border issue and focus on cooperation in other areas. Delhi remains firm in its stance that the "state of the border reflects the state of the relationship".
Last week, a fresh reminder of the structural crisis in bilateral relations between India and China surfaced when Beijing issued "stapled visas" to Indian athletes from Arunachal Pradesh participating in the World University Games in Chengdu, China. This move by Beijing was a calculated attempt to assert its territorial claim over Arunachal Pradesh, a region over which territorial sovereignty is fiercely disputed between Delhi and Beijing.
Over the past several decades, efforts have been made to manage these disputes, but the progress has been consistently undermined by the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) aggressive military and political postures along the disputed frontier. This aggressive behaviour on the part of the PLA has further eroded the already fragile trust between the two nations.
Restoring the shattered trust with Delhi lies primarily in Beijing's hands. Until concrete steps are taken by China to address the underlying issues and build genuine trust, scepticism should colour India's expectations of any meaningful progress in their bilateral relations. Beijing's provocative and hostile actions, such as issuing stapled visas and maintaining a belligerent approach on territorial disputes, create significant obstacles to any constructive dialogue and cooperation between the two countries.
Addressing the structural crisis requires a willingness from both sides to engage in meaningful and open discussions, respecting each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Until then, the path towards a stable and cooperative relationship remains uncertain, and India must remain vigilant in protecting its interests and standing firm in its stance on territorial matters.
