Palestinians in Gaza celebrate Egypt's revolution. (Via Press TV)
"Will the Arab Spring serve the cause of Palestine?" is a question
that has been repeatedly asked, in various ways, over the last year and a
half. Many media discussions have been formulated around this very
inquiry, although the answer is far from a simple "yes" or "no."
Why
should the question be asked in the first place? Hasn't the Arab link
to the Palestinian struggle been consistently strong, regardless of the
prevalent form of government in any single Arab country? Rhetorically,
at least, the Arab bond to Palestine remained incessantly strong at
every significant historical turn.
True, disparity between
rhetoric and reality are as old as the Arab-Israeli conflict. But the
relatively small divide between words and actions widened enormously
following the Arab defeat in the 1967 war, which cemented US-Israeli
ties like never before.
The war brought an end to the dilemma of
independent Palestinian action. It shifted the focus to the West Bank
and Gaza, and allowed the still dominant Fatah party to fortify its
position in light of Arab defeat and subsequent division.
The
division was highlighted most starkly in the August 1967 Khartoum summit
in Sudan, where Arab leaders clashed over priorities and definitions.
Should Israel's territorial gains redefine the status quo? Should Arabs
focus on returning to a pre-1948 or pre-1967 situation?
The PLO
insisted that the 1967 defeat should not compromise the integrity of the
struggle. It also stressed that Palestine -- all of Palestine -- was
still the pressing issue. Then-Egyptian President Jamal Abdel Nasser's
messages seemed, for once, befuddled, although he continued to advocate
conventional military confrontation with Israel. Syria, on the other
hand, didn't attend the summit.
International response to the
war was not promising either. The United Nations Security Council
adopted resolution 242 on Nov. 22, 1967, reflecting the US' wish to
capitalize on the new status quo (Israeli withdrawal "from occupied
territories" in exchange for normalization with Israel). The new
language of the immediate post-1967 period alarmed Palestinians, who
realized that any future political settlement was likely to ignore the
situation that had existed prior to the war, and would only attempt to
remedy current grievances. Then, the boundaries of the conflict
permanently changed. For some, Palestine and its conflict became more of
a burden than a shared responsibility. Official Arab solidarity with
Palestinians become a form of everyday politics -- essential to claim
relevance to greater Arab causes, but extraneous in terms of substance
and application.
Present-day Palestinian leaderships -- since
there are several bodies that claim to represent Palestinians
"everywhere" -- also learned how to stage-manage official Arab
manipulation of Palestine. They often did so out of desperation, as they
urgently needed a physical base and sources of financial support.
Over
time, it became clear that official Arab solidarity with Palestine was
mostly -- although not entirely -- a farce. The solidarity they speak of
is either entirely nonexistent, or grossly misrepresented. Palestinian
communities in various Arab countries are treated with suspicion at
best. Those who never tired of publicly calling for freedom for
Jerusalem failed to treat Palestinian refugees with respect. They
refused entry to stateless Palestinians and denied Palestinians work and
permanent residence. Many Palestinians surely concluded that one must
learn to differentiate between Arab peoples and Arab governments. Since
the latter mostly dominate the former without legitimate mandate, it was
foolish to expect official Arab institutions to lead any substantive
action to end the subjugation of Palestinians.
That is, until
several Arab nations revolted. The more genuine and inclusive the
revolt, the more representative the outcome has been. A sudden surge in
popular solidarity with Palestine in Tunisia replaced bashful but real
attempts by the former Tunisian regime to normalize relations with
Israel.
Per Israeli calculations, Arab peoples are dismissible.
They are a non-entity. But now Israel is forced to revisit that old
calculation. Its fears that Egypt's new president, Muhammad Mursi will
shun, or at least revisit the Camp David peace treaty -- signed between
Egypt and Israel in 1979, with the ultimate aim of sidelining Egypt from
a conflict that remains essentially "Arab" -- are well-founded. But
Mursi is not the one that is truly feared, and nor is his Muslim
Brotherhood. The trepidation stems from the fact that a truly democratic
Egypt is unlikely to work in tandem with US-Israel to further pressure
and isolate Palestinians -- or sideline Egypt from its Arab context.
Israel and its allies fear genuine Egyptian democracy.
With the
notable shifts that may redefine Palestine's position within Arab
priorities, one cannot ignore the fact that several Arab countries
continue to normalize with Israel, oblivious to any seasonable political
changes in the region. They do so as if there are hidden hands that
wish to balance the possible losses in Tunisia and Egypt, with gains
elsewhere. Palestinians in Gaza, as elsewhere, still speak of Arab
solidarity with passion, but also with obvious bitterness. They still
pray for their brethren to come to the rescue. The older generation
speaks of the bravery and sacrifices of many Arabs who fought alongside
Palestinians. But the generational expectations have also been altered.
Palestinians simply want real solidarity. They want to see Palestinian
communities treated with respect and a complete end to Arab
normalization with Israel.
