al-queda in Iraq. The Shiite run central government won't pay for these people.
The US won't pay for them for much longer. When they stop getting paid by us
they will go back to killing us.
Big bro 43 is essentially going with the 80% theory but without announcing it,
and for the remainder of his term he's paying the 20% Sunnis, who he had been
allowing to be decimated by the Shiites and by al-queda in Iraq, who was willing
to kill even their Sunni brethren, to fight against al-queda in Iraq. If a
Democrat is elected president the US funds for the Awakening will end. That
means these Sunnis will get better equipment from us to kill us in less than a
year. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has feared these US-armed concerned
local citizens are an armed Sunni opposition in the making.
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim is the leader of SIIC, the largest political party in the
Iraqi Council of Representatives-so what is the intent of what he says is near to what will happen, and he
had this to say about funding the Awakening:
"We appreciate the role of the armed forces, the Awakening Councils, tribes and
popular committees in tracking down terrorism and criminals," he said, in a
speech at his Baghdad compound, where thousands had gathered for Id al-Adha, the Feast of Sacrifice. "But at the same time we emphasize that these awakenings
must be an arm of the Iraqi government and not a substitute for it."
but when push comes to shove he sees them as not only fighting "terrorism and
criminals", but being them also and they won't get dime one from the Shiite
Why would the Sunnis benefit from this government when one group of the same
Shiite mob is using the Shiite state military to go after another Shiite group
led by Sadr, who was labeled as the king-maker by Maliki when Maliki was
selected as Prime Minister?
The situation with the Shiites is working against US interests also.
states "Are the Iranians extraordinarily clever, or are we extraordinarily
dim? Certainly, when it comes to pursuing our respective interests in Iraq, they
seem to be thinking and acting strategically, while we seem not to be.
A fascinating story in the April 21 New York Times by James Glanz and Alissa J.
Rubin reveals that in the battle for Basra-the major port city of southern
Iraq-the United States and Iran are on the same side. Yet the Bush
administration is doing nothing to gain leverage from this convergence.
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki launched his troop offensive in Basra
province last month in an attempt to crush the militia of radical Shiite cleric
Muqtada Sadr. President George W. Bush-who backed Maliki's move, first with air
power, then with armor and special-operations forces-described Sadr's militia
men as Iranian-backed thugs.
He might have been right about "thugs," though several analysts (including this
one) noted at the time that the rival Shiite militia backing Maliki-known as the
Badr Organization, whose men fought alongside the Iraqi army-had ties to Iran as
It is now clear that the Badr Organization's ties to Iran are not merely as
close as Sadr's; they are much closer. In fact, as the Times reports, Iran's
ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Kazemi Qumi, expressed full support for Maliki's
offensive in Basra and denounced Sadr's fighters as "outlaws."
It is reasonable to ask what the hell is going on here. President Bush assisted
Maliki's offensive as a campaign against Iranian-backed extremists. Now it turns
out the Iranians are backing Maliki.
Much of the confusion is dispelled when you consider that the battle for Basra
is not so much a military contest between the Iraqi government and outlaw rebels
as a power struggle between rival Shiite mafias.
In this sense, Maliki is joined at the hip to the Islamic Supreme Council of
Iraq, a political party that used to be known as the Supreme Council for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq. The Badr Organization is this party's militia. (It
is integrating itself with the Iraqi army, but it's unclear whether this means
that the militia is becoming more like a national army or that the national army
is becoming more like a militia.)
The leaders of SCIRI, now ISCI, are tied to Iran in two ways. First, during
Saddam Hussein's reign, they spent many years exiled in Iran. Second, and more
to the point, their political agenda-whether by design or coincidence-dovetails
ISCI advocates the creation of a semiautonomous super-region incorporating all
nine provinces of oil-rich southern Iraq-a Shiite enclave similar to the Kurdish
enclave in Iraq's three northern provinces. Iran's leaders also like this idea
because they think that such a large, ethnically homogenous region would give
them the best chance to influence and possibly control the southern territories,
Iraq's Shiite politics, and, therefore-by dint of the country's Shiite
majority-Iraqi politics generally.
Muqtada Sadr, on the other hand, rejects the idea of a super-region. He has
grander ambitions to control all of Iraq from a central government-a vaster,
more turbulent entity, which the Iranians would have a harder time handling.
(They probably wouldn't have such an easy time manipulating a southern
super-region, either, but at least they'd have an entry point.)"
Sadr is against federalism, as is big bro 43, and ISCI wants to carve Iraq-which
W is against, but W is supporting ISCI. How recently and firmly is W against
federalism? As recently as Sept. 27 2007, the US Senate voted on Mr. Biden's
proposal to actively support the creation of federal regions in Iraq, consistent
with the wishes of the Iraqi people and their elected leaders. The nonbinding
measure passed resoundingly, tallying up 75 votes in favor and just 23 against.
Ever since, the concept of Iraqi "federalism" has been at the center of a political
firestorm. The White House has expressed its opposition to Mr. Biden's plan,
with President Bush himself calling it a "very bad idea."
What was the recent Basra violence about? The article postures that "What may
well have prompted last month's offensive is that Sadr's militia, the
Mahdi Army, is gaining strength in Basra. As a result, it is widely believed
that Sadr's party might win there in this fall's provincial elections-a
development that would deal a crushing blow to ISCI, weaken Maliki's standing in
Iraq's second-largest city, and, perhaps, put an end to the dream of a southern
Hence the desire to crush Sadr's gangs in Basra, and thus the base of his
political support there, before it's too late.
Maliki managed to pull Bush into the conflict because Sadr vociferously opposes
any continued U.S. military presence in Iraq, and-until last year, when he
declared a cease-fire-his militiamen have devoted a lot of effort to killing
American soldiers. By contrast, ISCI's fighters have not posed a direct threat.
Since the start of the offensive in Basra, Sadr's Mahdi Army has resumed
shooting at American soldiers in the Sadr City neighborhood of Baghdad-and,
interestingly, in that fight, the Iranians are supporting Sadr.
In other words, we find ourselves lassoed into an armed intra-Shiite power
struggle on two fronts-and the Iranians are positioned to benefit from one or
both contests, no matter whether the side we're backing wins or loses.
So, again: Are they really good at this game, or are we simply out of our
It is just another example of W's stubbornness stupidity. The article concludes
"One thing is for sure: It is time to start talking with the Iranians. First,
they control too many of the pieces for us not to engage them diplomatically.
Second, it turns out that we do have some common interests (for instance,
crushing Sadr in Basra). Might it be possible to leverage those interests to induce cooperation, or extract concessions, in other realms where we have
differences? Third, Maliki clearly has no qualms about talking with the Iranians
when it suits his purposes. Why should we?
Finally, there is so much to discuss with Iran that unless we're at war with
each other (and nobody has suggested that we are), it's stupid-unfathomably
self-destructive-not to make a serious effort."
W can arm the Sunnis, who have been killing us, but can't talk to the Iranians
who, in this instance, might have concerns that mirror ours. Why not? Why do we
have to be dragged into sectarian warfare, within a sect-a sect--the Shiites,
who originally were ecstatic that we overthrew the Sunni Baathist Hussein? It
points to our failed, non-existent attempts at diplomacy in the region.
The article "Iraq Pm: Factions To Rejoin Cabinet" at
seems to be promising-it should be more representative of the Middle Eastern perspective as it is written by Al Jazeera, but something is missing. It states that "The government has frequently
said it is close to persuading the Sunni Arab Accordance Front, Iraq's main
Sunni bloc, to return in what would be a major breakthrough towards reconciling
Iraq's different sects.
Salim al-Jubouri, a spokesman for the Accordance Front, said the group intended
to submit a list of candidates for cabinet posts "in a few days", which the
cabinet could then present to parliament.
"Our return to the government is very close," he said."
The items that the Sunnis want rectified are very substantial, but the Sunnis
think they can work them out.