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No, not hoaxer. This is serious-very serious. The paper amounts to a pre-emptive strike on what's left of the Intelligence Community, usurping its prerogative to provide policymakers with estimates on front-burner issues-in this case, Iran's "weapons of mass destruction" and other threats. The Senate had already requested a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran.
But Hoekstra is first out of the starting gate. Professional intelligence officers were "as a courtesy" invited to provide input to Hoekstra's report, but there is no evidence they contributed. Indeed, several rather basic factual errors suggest they refused even to review a paper clearly aimed at marginalizing them. It will be interesting to see how Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte chooses to respond. "Team player" that he is, Negroponte seems unlikely to make an issue of this latest indignity at the hands of his nominal overseer in the House. And that should squeeze out what's left of morale in the ranks of honest intelligence analysts.
While you can't judge a book by its cover, you can glean insight these days from the titles given to National Intelligence Estimates and papers meant to supplant them. Remember "Iraq's Continuing Program for Weapons of Mass Destruction," the infamous NIE of October 1, 2002 by which Congress was misled into approving an unnecessary war? "Continuing" leaped out of the title, foreshadowing the one-sided thrust of an estimate ostensibly commissioned to determine whether WMD programs were "continuing," or whether they had been dead for ten years. (The latter turned out to be the case, but the title-and the cooked insides-provided the scare needed to get Congress aboard.)
Hoekstra to the Rescue
Pete Hoekstra apparently has set his sights on outstripping his Senate counterpart, Pat Roberts of Kansas, for first honors as intelligence partisan of the year. Roberts, who has torpedoed all attempts to complete the long-promised study on whether the George W. Bush administration played fast and loose with intelligence on Iraq, is a formidable competitor, but Hoekstra is moving up steadily on the right. Tellingly, his zeal (and that of FOX News) recently found him well ahead of even Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Citing an old Army report that units had dug up corroded canisters of chemical agent dating back decades, Hoekstra and Sen. Rick Santorum (R, PA) insisted that weapons of mass destruction had indeed been found in Iraq. "We were right all the time!"
As recently as May 4, in answer to a question after a speech in Atlanta, Rumsfeld conceded, "Apparently there were not any weapons of mass destruction." Was Hoekstra so naive as to think he could pressure the administration into recanting its painful recantation and risk re-opening that still festering wound?
The snub by the administration has not affected Hoekstra's zeal to do its bidding, even if further ridicule awaits him. Hoekstra has violated all precedent in consenting to have his committee author this faux-National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, making Tehran out to be a strategic threat. But a threat to whom? The answer leaps off the cover. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is pictured giving a Nazi-type salute behind a podium adorned with a wide poster (in English) "The world without Zionism." And atop the first page stands an Ahmadinejad quote: "The annihilation of the Zionist regime will come... Israel must be wiped off the map..."
The authors make a college try to persuade us that Iran is also a threat to the US, but the attempt is singularly unpersuasive. Like Cheney's major speech of August 26, 2002, which provided the terms of reference and conclusions of the subsequent NIE of October 1, 2002, it simply asserts that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons and probably has offensive chemical and biological weapons programs. It goes on to make the highly dubious assertion that Iran has "the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East." The authors then tack on for good measure Iranian support for terrorist groups and support for the insurgency in Iraq.
The paper gives pride of place to the nuclear issue (shades of the ubiquitous "mushroom cloud" conjured up before Congress voted to authorize war on Iraq in October 2002). But the best the authors can do in dressing up a threat that most specialists-including those of the intelligence community-see as 5 to 10 years out is to suggest that a nuclear-armed Iran might be emboldened to "advance its aggressive ambitions in and outside of the region...[and]...threaten U.S. friends and allies. Stretching still further, the authors argue that Iran might think that a nuclear arsenal could protect it from retaliation and thus would be "more likely to use force against U.S. forces and allies in the region." Last, but hardly least: "Israel would find it hard to live with a nuclear armed Iran and could take military action against Iranian nuclear facilities."
The Hoekstra-issued draft bears the fingerprints of one Frederick Fleitz, and initial press reports pointed to Fleitz as the principal drafter. Fleitz did his apprenticeship on politicization under the watchful eye of John Bolton when the latter was Undersecretary of State, and became his principal aide and chief enforcer while on loan from the CIA. His history of trying to get intelligence cooked to the recipe of high policy is counterintuitive and inexcusable-at least according to the ethos of the intelligence analysis discipline in which I was proud to serve. CIA analysts, particularly those on detail to policy departments, have no business playing the enforcer of policy judgments; they have no business "fixing" intelligence to support high policy.
Fleitz must have flunked Ethics and Intelligence Analysis 101. For he is the same official who "explained" to State Department's intelligence analyst Christian Westermann that it was "a political judgment as to how to interpret" data on Cuba's biological weapons program (which existed only in Bolton's mind) and that the intelligence community "should do as we [Bolton and Fleitz] asked."