Turkish foreign policy, codified by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, used to be known in shorthand as "zero problems with our neighbors." When Turkey started calling for regime change in Syria, it turned into "a major problem with one of our neighbors" (even tough Davutoglu himself admitted on the record the policy change failed).
Now, in yet another twist, it's becoming "all sorts of problems with two of our neighbors." Enter -- inevitably -- Ankara's ultimate taboo; the Kurdish question.
Ankara used to routinely chase and bomb Kurdish PKK guerrillas crossing from Anatolia to Iraqi Kurdistan. Now it may be positioning itself to do the same in Syrian Kurdistan.
He was referring to the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Party (PYD) -- affiliated with the PKK; after a quiet deal with the Assad regime in Damascus, the PYD is now in control of key areas in northeast Syria.
So Ankara may provide logistics to tens of thousands of Syria's NATO "rebels" -- which include plenty of hardcore Sunni Arab "insurgents" formerly known as terrorists; but as long as Syrian Kurds -- which are part of the Syrian opposition -- demonstrate some independence, they immediately revert to being considered "terrorists."
Follow the oil
This Swedish report contains arguably the best breakdown of the hyper-fragmented Syrian opposition. The "rebels" are dominated by the exile-heavy Syrian National Council (SNC) and its Hydra-style militias, the over 100 gangs that compose the Not Exactly Free Syrian Army (FSA).
But there are many other parties as well, including socialists; Marxists; secular nationalists; Islamists; the Kurdish National Council (KNC) -- an 11-party coalition very close to the Iraqi Kurdistan government; and the PYD.
The KNC and the PYD may bicker about everything else, but basically agree on the essential; the civil war in Syria shall not penetrate Syria Kurdistan; after all, when it comes to the nitty gritty, they are neither pro-Assad nor pro-opposition; they favor Kurdish interests. The agreement was sealed under the auspices of their cousins -- the Iraqi Kurds. And it explains why they are now in full control of a de facto Kurdish enclave in northeast Syria.
As much as Turkish paranoia may apply, it's a long and winding road from a semi-autonomous area to an independent Kurdistan agglutinating Kurds in both Syria and Iraq -- not to mention, in the long run, Turkish Kurds. Yet half of a possible, future, independent Kurdistan would indeed be Turkish. Ankara's nightmare in progress is that the closer Iraqi and Syrian Kurdistan get, the merrier the agitation among Turkish Kurds in Anatolia.
This concerns above all two strategic oil and gas pipelines from Kirkuk to Ceyhan -- a direct deal between Ankara and the Iraqi Kurds which in theory bypasses Baghdad.
Well, not really. As Baghdad has made it clear, there's no way these pipelines will be operative without the central government having its sizeable cut; after all it pays for 95% of the budget of Iraqi Kurdistan.