The numbers speak for themselves. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 790,000 Syrian refugees have crossed into Lebanon since the beginning of the conflict. The number is constantly increasing, as an estimated 75,000 make the difficult journey every month. Those refugees also include tens of thousands of Palestinians who have suffered as a result of the war.
Lebanon had already hosted hundreds of thousands of refugees driven out of Palestine in several waves, starting with the Nakba, or catastrophe in 1947-48. While the refugees were initially welcomed by their host country -- as Syrians were initially welcomed in Lebanon -- they eventually became a party in Lebanon's war of numbers, with each sect terrified by the prospect of losing political ground to their rivals.
This bloody legacy is returning due to the sectarian nature of the Syrian war, and Israelis are already on the lookout for a possible future role. Aside from the flood of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, legions of Lebanese fighters from Hezbollah and other groups are fully engaged in the Syrian strife along sectarian lines. The fight has crossed over into Syrian borders and made it into Lebanon in the form of cars bombs, mortar shells, hostage taking and occasional street fighting. If tension continues to build, there is little question that Lebanon will become embroiled in its own civil war.
All of this is of course, welcome news in Israel, which prefers to wait until the warring parties exhaust each other in every way before it launches a new confrontation. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon was quoted in the Jerusalem Post on October 24 as saying that a civil war between Hezbollah and a group called "Global Jihad" had erupted in Lebanon. "To those who are not yet aware, there is already a civil war in Lebanon. Global Jihad, which has infiltrated Lebanon and is attacking Hezbollah, is blowing up car bombs in Dahia and is firing rockets at Dahia and the Beka'a Valley," he said.
This is a win-win situation for Israel, which continues to navigate the Syrian war very carefully so it is not directly involved but ready to deal with its consequences.
History is of the essence here. The Israeli attitude towards the war in Syria and the fledgling civil war in Lebanon is similar to its attitude towards Lebanon a few decades ago in the lead up to the Israeli invasion of 1978 and again in 1982. However, then it mostly aimed at destroying the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
Lebanon's political and social upheaval dates back to before both the PLO and Israel, to the years of French colonialism in the Middle East. In 1920, France separated Lebanon from greater Syria, which was under French mandate. The country was then run by various Christian sects who represented a slight majority according to a 1932 consensus.
When Lebanon became completely independent in 1945, a political arrangement on how to run the country was reached. Christian Maronites were given the seat of presidency, Sunnis the premiership, and a Shi'ite was installed as the speaker of parliament. Other sects received less consequential positions, but the parliament control ratio still favored Christian sects.
The PLO's arrival in Lebanon in the early 1970s -- following its departure from Jordan -- worsened an already difficult situation. The PLO represented Palestinians who were largely Sunni Muslims, and its existence and growth in Lebanon complicated the extremely delicate demographic balance.
The fiasco in Lebanon however was not a simple tit-for-tat action, but reflected internal and external balances and calculations. On one hand, the ruling Maronite leadership was greatly challenged by the presence of the PLO and the alliance between the latter and Lebanese opposition groups.
Routine Israeli raids on Lebanese territories undermined the Lebanese army's role as a protector of the country. Israel was determined to eradicate the "terror infrastructure" in Lebanon, ie PLO factions, and used the civil war as an opportunity to intervene in 1976 by arming Christian militias. Additionally, Syria, who also intervened in 1976, did so first on behalf of the Palestinians, then on behalf of the Maronites, when it appeared that they were losing the fight.
A brief lull in the fighting in 1976, was soon interrupted by violence that engulfed Lebanon for nearly 15 years. In 1978, Israel occupied South Lebanon, driving away thousands of PLO fighters from the area, whose arrival to Beirut had shifted the balance of power, altering the alliances, and, once again Syria's position. Tens of thousands of Lebanese and Palestinian civilian casualties however, paid the heavy price of the fighting.
The PLO remained in Lebanon until the Israeli invasion of the country in the summer of 1982. Ultimately, the civil war achieved little for the warring parties except that it fit perfectly into Israel's strategic goal of removing the PLO from South Lebanon, and eventually the country altogether.
When Israeli forces finally occupied Lebanon in 1982, as PLO fighters were being shipped by sea to many countries around the Middle East, a triumphant Israeli defense minister, Ariel Sharon, permitted his Christian Phalangist allies to carry out a notorious massacre in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps.
Yes, the circumstances are not exactly identical, and history cannot repeat itself in an exact fashion. But these historical lessons should not escape us as we watch Lebanon descend into another abyss. Judging by the brutality of the Syrian war, Lebanon's own bloody history, and Israel's familiar military tactics, another Lebanese war is very much possible. Such a war will revive old animosities and establish new military alliances, but as always the most vulnerable will pay the price as they already have in Syria's unending bloodbath.