"We should consider first whether we can set in motion any methods of influencing internal developments in Iran. Since none of the existing exile movements have major support within Iran, we have to look primarily at other internal means for the present...."Do you have any way of providing useful resources to the moderate clergy who are now out of politics? ... In a civil war situation, what are the crucial skills and equipment that the pro-Western elements are more likely to lack?"
The talking points -- for what McFarlane should tell Kimche -- added...
"Finally, we believe it is important to ensure that the West has some counter to Soviet introduction of paramilitary or proxy forces, without necessarily having to turn to U.S. forces -- so that the USSR does not have an option we cannot counter."
The talking points also impressed upon Kimche the need for utmost secrecy: "Of course, for this dialogue to be fruitful it must remain restricted to an extraordinarily small number of people."
In other words, McFarlane and Wolfowitz were looking to the Israelis as key partners in devising strategies for affecting the internal behavior of the Iranian government. And the Israelis' principal currency for obtaining that influence was the shipment of weapons.
McFarlane and Wolfowitz also planned to collaborate secretly with Israel in devising broader U.S. policies toward the Middle East and intended to hide those policies from other U.S. government officials.
A Strategic Agreement
In his 1994 memoir, Special Trust, McFarlane described the broad sweep of issues raised in his meetings with Kimche, who had served as a senior Mossad official but in 1981 was director-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry.
McFarlane wrote:
"In addition to sales of military hardware and substantial U.S. military and economic aid to Israel, we discussed the possibility of applying Israel's experience and talent in the areas of ... police and security training in third world areas, particularly Central America, under contracts from the Agency for International Development." [p. 186]
In 1982, Reagan moved McFarlane to the White House as Deputy National Security Advisor, giving him responsibility for integrating the administration's foreign policies. But Wolfowitz's Policy Planning office came under the control of more seasoned leadership, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger.
According to the declassified records, Eagleburger was far from impressed by the McFarlane-Wolfowitz schemes for Iran. On April 1, 1982, Eagleburger responded to a memo from one of Wolfowitz's assistants, James G. Roche. Eagleburger dryly noted that Roche's memo, "A More Active Policy Toward Iran," "contains a number of interesting ideas. I have serious doubts about nearly all of them, largely because of their effects on our relations with the Arabs."
Eagleburger put question marks after several sections of Roche's memo including one, "a more forthcoming policy toward third party arms transfers to both Iran and Iraq," and another urging "exploration of possible U.S. and other Western economic cooperation with Iran."
In the memo, Roche expressed frustration at the failure of the more Iran-focused strategy to carry the day. "Opportunities in this area have so far been allowed to slip away," he wrote. "None of them got off the ground and Bud MacFarlane [sic] who presided over them has departed."
After reading Eagleburger's terse reaction to Roche's memo, Wolfowitz wrote, "I perhaps should have made clearer from the outset that we recognize the immense danger Iran poses to our Arab friends in the [Persian] Gulf, and the need to contain it. We are by no means recommending a 'tilt' towards Iran at this moment."
The Iraq Tilt
Instead, U.S. policy on the Iran-Iraq War would begin to move in the opposite direction as President Reagan grew worried that Iran was gaining the upper hand in the war and might actually defeat Iraq. To prevent that possibility, Reagan authorized a "tilt" toward Iraq in June 1982, according to a sworn affidavit filed in a 1995 criminal case by a Reagan NSC aide, Howard Teicher.
Teicher described a highly classified National Security Decision Directive that called for providing intelligence assistance to Iraq and directing the CIA to help Saddam Hussein's army secure third-country military supplies, a project that fell largely to CIA Director William Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates.
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