Close to 200 girls' schools have been destroyed by the Taliban militants. This has left thousands of girls without any means of education. Reconstructing schools and providing security necessary for parents to be comfortable sending their daughters to school is significant project in its own right. Before the uptick in violence, around 70,000 to 80,000 girls were enrolled in schools in the Swat district. Following Taliban threats, many stopped going to school because of fear for their safety.
IDPs Crisis: The U.S. Response
The United States has a good role model of 2005 earthquake in northern Pakistan and Kashmir when it act expediently and tactfully and found a favorable rating among Pakistanis for the first time in recent history. This spring, the U.S. was again presented with an opportunity to prove itself a positive force when the IDP crisis began in the north west of Pakistan. The United States has a much bigger opportunity today to improve its image in a region that is reeling under the deep-rooted anti-Americanism.
In my view the Obama administration realized the scope of the crisis quickly and its response thus far has been encouraging. President Obama's special envoy went twice to the region to see the IDP situation.
If local newspapers are to be believed, Ambassador Holbrooke spent more time in the refugee camps talking to the IDPs than the Pakistani ruling elites did. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a "Text Swat" SMS campaign -- whereby you could text the word "SWAT" to the number "20222" and $5 would be donated to the U.N. Pakistan Relief Fund to provide food, water, medicine, clothing, shelter, and other basic necessities to the IDPs.
These efforts are commendable, and to those in Pakistan that are aware of them, an example of the United States' capacity and inclination to render aid. Still, there is a persistent question of whether the aid has been effective, especially whether it has gone to the right people.
It's pertinent to mention here that Nasim Ashraf, executive director of Pakistan Studies Center at the Middle East Institute, has been quoted in the media that he has conducted a survey about the IDPs and found that when they were asked if they had received any help from the U.S., 72 percent said "No." He was quoted in a news article saying, "The common man [in Pakistan] doesn't know that, you know, Secretary Clinton here has announced $200 million [in aid] because they don't think that it ever gets there to them."
This is a big dilemma for the U.S. The people on the ground do not know about American aid. The Obama administration should work on how to reach out to the Pakistani people.
Suggestions for the Best Utilization of U.S. Aid
Winning hearts and minds of the Pakistani people will take years and will require long-term as well as short-term policies.
Policing: The United States should help the NWFP government develop community policing at the village level to give people a sense of security. There is an urgent need for a strong, well-trained and well-equipped police system in the Swat valley that can resist intimidation and overcome violence on the street. When the Taliban extended their writ in the Swat region few months back, the police force completely collapsed and put up no resistance. One sympathizes with the ill-prepared and ill-equipped policeman confronting the relatively well-equipped and adept Taliban fighters. There has already been an interest on the part of the U.S government in reforming the Pakistani police system. However, the fall of the Swat to the Taliban and now its takeover by the Pakistan Army makes it urgent to have a strong regular police force in the valley to protect the return of militancy. The Army can launch military operations at anytime, but its police responsibility is to maintain law and order and do the routine patrolling in the streets and keep a vigilant eye on miscreants and militants. The Pakistani government has decided to increase the number of police stations and police forces in Swat in order to fulfill the requirements of the people. The U.S. can assist in these efforts.
Compensation: The United States should help the Pakistani government and local NGOs to give a compensation package to the victims of military operations. The packages should include enough money to reconstruct damaged homes, restart businesses and meet the living requirements for a meaningful period of time as former IDPs get back on their feet. It should be much larger than the current amount of $312 for a family that can range in size from four to eight and sometimes 10 members. Since Pakistani government officials have a trust problem due to the widespread accusations of corruption even in this humanitarian crisis, I suggest that it would be useful to involve local NGOs in Swat and the Malakand region to help conduct loss assessments and then involve local community leaders for the distribution of financial and other aid and rehabilitation support.
Schools, Hospitals, Roads: Most people are aware that the United States has been using drones and missiles in the tribal region to target and attack militant hideouts. The attacks also incur collateral damage -- loss of lives and injuries to innocent civilians including women and children. As a part of the rehabilitation of the IDPs, the United States should help rebuild schools and hospitals destroyed by the Taliban militants. This will be a great help to the people of war-hit areas of Swat and other parts of the tribal region. The U.S. should also help the Pakistani government rebuild the destroyed buildings from the Swat conflict on an accelerated basis.
Microfinance/banking: With the help of the Pakistani government and NGOs, the U.S. can also help launch microfinance banking facilities for the people of Swat and FATA to create sustainable livelihood opportunities, including support farmers, smalls industries and skill development programs for men and women. Local NGOS can be involved in the interest-free loans for launching small businesses.
Local Pashtun Media: Establishing, promoting and encouraging local Pashtun media is needed at this time. In the absence of a strong local Pashtun media, people of Swat and FATA have become "captive audience" to the Taliban pirated FM radio stations. Fazlullah's FM radio station, which earned him the nickname "FM Mullah," contributed to the fall of Swat into the hands of the Taliban. A local independent Pashtun media is necessary to provide alternative radio stations and content that people will want to listen to. This will also help improve the U.S image in the long run by engaging Pashtuns in the political discourse. A Pashtun media would ultimately support Pashtun nationalism, which is one way to help combat Taliban militancy. I would argue that a Pashtun social movement is needed to raise the voices for their identity, culture and heritage - which are the antithesis of the Taliban.
Cultural/Sports: This area has long been ignored by the successive Pakistani regimes as well as international donors. There is a lack of sports and cultural facilities for the youth of Tribal region and many parts of NWFP. But this is one of the potential area in which a long term investment can stop the drift of young people to extremism. The revival of secular Pashtuns' culture and traditions is must for stopping the march of Taliban in the border region.
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