But we now know that the "alleged studies" are an intelligence fabrication.US national security journalist Gareth Porter has recently confirmed from senior US and German intelligence officials that purported evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons programme including theIAEA's "alleged studies'as well as an allegedIranian "neutron initiator' documentunearthed by theTimes was forged. The IPRD published an extensive analysis of previous IAEA reports and information on, among other issues, the Iranian nuclear weapons issue toward the eve of the Bush administration. Ourreportfound systematic evidence of intelligence politicization and even fabrication in relation to Iran over the last few decades. In summary,detailed analysisof this new 2010 IAEA report illustrates that on matters of fact, evidence and substance, it yet again undermines the case against Iran.
In the meantime, there is, evidence that Western intelligence agencies are already conducting a covert war inside Iran.In early 2008, a US Presidential Finding uncontested by Democrat members of the House affirmed that the CIA was financing anti-Iranian "blackops' to the tune of $300 million. Robert Gates, the architect of Bush's Iran strategy, remains Obama's defence secretary.Former CIA counterterrorism official Philip Giraldi toldGareth Porterthat the media had frequently published "false intelligence" on Iraq and Iran from unreliable pro-Israeli sources.
Thecore issuefor Iran "is its need for fuel rods, which are processed from 20%, enriched uranium" to create "medical isotopes" (for cancer treatment) at the Tehran Research Reactor - a need which no one disputes. The Reactor was in fact built by the United States in 1968 under the Pahlavi regime. Iran's current need for fuel rods is new, and has arisen "due to the low levels of its current stockpiles and its need for 120Kg of fuel."
Under the latest deal proposed in October 2009, Iran would be required to send its uranium to Russia, where it would be further enriched and then dispatched to France for conversion into fuel rods for use in the Tehran reactor. Under US leadership, the international community unilaterally demanded that Iran send 1.2 tons (1,100 kilograms) around 70 percent of its entire stockpile by the end of last year. Iran received heavy criticism for failing to meet the deadline, despite the fact that no actual agreement was reached, largely due to the international community having failed to provide unequivocal legally-binding assurances that they would comply with fuel rod supply requirements; and despite the problem that the international community still refuses to recognize Iran's right to develop and enrich the uranium in its own reserves under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran has already had binding agreements with both France and Russia with which they have failed to comply - more would be needed than bland assurances.
As if to prove this point,goal-posts keep changing, with the US and EU suddenly declaring on 6thFebruary 2010 that "even if it agrees to a nuclear-fuel swap", Iran must separately "prove to the rest of the world that its nuclear programme is purely for peaceful purposes." Their "clarification' came shortly after Ahmedinejad announced Iran's willingness in principle to accept the deal, subject to reviewing "some of the details."
Yet Iran has for long stated itswillingnessto implement the IAEA's "Additional Protocol', an entirely voluntary measure which would subject Iran's nuclear facilities to an even more stringent and intrusive international inspection process, and which would satisfy US and EU professed demands for "proof', while also permitting amultilateral consortiumto adjudicate uranium enrichment within Iran as long the international community equally recognizes Iran's NPT-stipulated right to develop its own peaceful nuclear enrichment programme. Yet detailed proposals along these lines have been repeatedly ignored and rejected out-of-hand by both the US and the EU.
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