"Internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state: intensive-military industrialization; maximum development of armed forces""
It's interesting to note that this did indeed happen - in the late 1940's, after relations between the Soviets and the West broke down and the Cold War was underway. The Soviet Union had begun demobilizing its military in 1945 when the war ended which Kennan, being the expert, surely should have known.
As an historian, Kennan should have also known that there were plenty of historical examples of Russia pursuing a realist, balance of power approach to foreign policy, regardless of its domestic policies. For a man with such a supposedly brilliant grasp of his subject, not considering the aforementioned nuances about Russia's past and its leadership would seem to reveal a significant lack of insight.
But perhaps one could argue that the Soviet Union under Stalin represented something fundamentally different when it came to formulating foreign policy. Kennan seemed to think so, arguing in absolutist terms in Section 4:
"In general, all Soviet efforts on unofficial international plane will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources strength beyond reach of Soviet control. This is only in line with basic Soviet instinct that there could be no compromise with rival power and that constructive work can start only when Communist power is [dominant]."
In Section 5, he reiterates the point that the Soviet Union is irrational and implicitly cannot be reasoned with via negotiations:
"Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force."
Obviously, this would provide a convenient justification for U.S. military hegemony and the continuation of high military budgets. This approach was also likely to create a self-fulfilling prophecy as the Soviets would predictably view such a buildup as an excuse to justify their own, particularly in light of their recent history of invasion and the death and destruction that accompanied it.
Kennan was advocating a hard line on the Soviet Union, suggesting the Russians were incapable of honesty or meaningful negotiation and only understood force. As previously mentioned, Kennan's experience with Stalin's show trials during the Great Terror of the mid-30's contributed to this harsh thinking. Another factor that reinforced this view was Stalin's decisions during the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. That event hardened Kennan's position that the Soviets were worthy only of the military aid necessary to defeat the Nazis but not a full political alliance during the war, much less afterward.
As early as 1941, he suggested a political alliance with the Soviets would be equivalent to condoning the Soviet invasion of Finland and the division of Poland, stating that the Soviets would have to accept the consequences of having collaborated with Hitler and deserved no western sympathy. Interestingly, Kennan never mentions the events that led up to the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which included Stalin strenuously but unsuccessfully attempting to pursue a military alliance with France and Britain to counter Germany's stampede through Europe. Moreover, much of the west had failed to act honorably, appeasing or enabling Hitler's aggressive ambitions at various points. One doesn't have to agree with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, but an historian should certainly be aware of and consider the context of this event.
Kennan also admitted he had no patience for considering the sensibilities of domestic opinion on the conduct of foreign policy, which would have complicated his stance of military aid to the Soviets without an alliance.
An overview of Kennan's analyses over the course of his service in the State Department, as well as some of his correspondence, shows that he clearly struggled between moralist and realist impulses. While it is understandable that Kennan (along with Ambassador Harriman), on a human level, felt disgust by the Soviet response to the Warsaw Uprising, the calculations that went into Stalin's decision turned out to be a bit more complicated than how it was perceived by Kennan and others.
According to Kennan, considering that Soviet territory had been liberated by this time and the western allies had opened up the long-desired second front, Stalin's decision to refuse the use of airfields in Ukraine for U.S. and British planes in support of the Warsaw insurgents in mid-August represented a callous and self-satisfied prioritization of the post-war division of Europe to the Soviet Union's benefit.
However, according to historian Roberts, the backstory to Stalin's decision was that the Soviet Union had parachuted a liaison officer into Warsaw days before to facilitate the dropping of supplies, but he was captured and killed by the Germans. This incident had reinforced Stalin's growing skepticism about the wisdom of the uprising, which had been organized by the Polish Home Army - a wing of the Polish government -in-exile in London (aka AK). Furthermore, western media had reported the Soviets had encouraged the uprising and then cynically abandoned it.
Again the reality is more complicated than this narrative. When the uprising began on August 1st, Stalin thought it may have a chance of success due to the weakening of the German army. However, as events unfolded, Stalin began to express doubts about its feasibility. On August 5th, Stalin replied to a message from Churchill about British plans to drop 60 tons of equipment and ammunition to the insurgents. Stalin told Churchill it was unlikely the insurgents could take over the city in light of the Germans' four defensive divisions.
In a meeting with the leader of the Polish government-in-exile on August 9th, Stalin told his interlocutor that he saw the uprising as not "a realistic affair when the insurgents had no guns whereas the Germans in the Praga area alone had three tank divisions, not to speak of infantry. The Germans will simply kill all the Poles."
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